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Essays on Firms in Developing Countries
Matthieu Teachout
In this dissertation, I study the behavior and the factors that impact the performance
of firms in developing countries. Chapter 1 and 3 investigate the determinants of pat-
terns of trade in Myanmar, a country which over the past decade has been undergoing
an extraordinary transition, from military control and diplomatic isolation to political
and economic liberalization. Chapter 2 studies how firms upgrade the quality of their
output to increase sales abroad.
Specifically, in Chapter 1, I investigate the hypothesis that if matching frictions in
international trade are important, a seller’s ability to connect with buyers could explain
a substantial part of exporters heterogeneity in size. I do so in Myanmar’s bean ex-
port market. Despite beans having all the attributes of a commodity, there is significant
transaction price dispersion across both exporters and foreign buyers. Empirical pat-
terns are consistent with foreign buyers facing search costs to find exporters. I estimate
a model of search and auctions, where foreign buyers first search for a set of exporters,
and then run a competitive bidding process between exporters within that set. In the
model, exporters are described by two parameters: a visibility parameter that impacts
their likelihood of being found by foreign buyers and a cost parameter that drives the
level of their price quotes and thus their market share with each foreign buyer. Visibility
explains an important part of the firm size distribution. On the buyer side, searching for
an additional exporter has an estimated cost of about $2,000. Moving to a centralized
market would lead to a five percent decrease in transaction prices.
Chapter 2 looks at the relationship between firms’ output quality and their orga-
nizational structure. Using data on the production and transaction chain that makes
up Peruvian fishmeal manufacturing, we establish three results. First, firms integrate
existing suppliers when the quality premium rises for exogenous reasons. Second, sup-
pliers change their behavior to better maintain input quality when vertically integrated.
Third, firms produce a higher share of high-quality output when supplier availability
constraints shift them into using integrated suppliers. Overall, our results indicate that
quality upgrading is an important motive for integrating suppliers facing a quantity-
quality trade-off, as classical theories of the firm predict.
Chapter 3 quantifies the impact of import license liberalization in Myanmar’s unique
political economy environment. By contrast to previous literature on the issue, we find
that liberalization did not lead to substantial entry in the sectors populated by firms
connected to the party in power. We document two facts that rationalize these findings.
First, connected firms tend to import products subject to important economies of scale,
which provide opportunities for rent-seeking and act as a “natural” barrier to entry for
small firms. Second, we show that a subset of the products liberalized de jure were not
liberalized de facto. Products not liberalized de facto are more likely to be sectors where
connected firms are present and where economies of scale are less important. This last
result suggests that institutional arrangements were made to protect connected firms in
the sectors where they faced higher potential competition.
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Chapter 1
Buyer Search and the Determinants of Ex-




Most export markets around the world are decentralized. Foreign buyers need to search
for exporters to import goods from a country. This costly search process benefits sellers
by allowing them to charge higher prices. Moreover, if buyers can only afford to look for
a subset of available suppliers, a firm’s ability to be found easily may be an important
source of differences in exporter performance.
In this chapter, I test the hypothesis that a firm’s capacity to capture foreign demand
— which I term its visibility — contributes to its place in the distribution of exporter
size. This conjecture is inspired by recent developments in the trade literature where
firm-level demand is quantitatively important in explaining a firm’s success (Hottman
et al., 2016; Redding and Weinstein, 2018). Differences in firm level demand are typically
thought to be driven by vertical or horizontal differentiation. However, conditional
on the attributes of the goods produced or exported, firms may be able to capture a
higher share of total demand if they are better at building and maintaining business
relationships with potential buyers. In differentiated good markets, it is impossible to
distinguish whether higher firm level demand is due to consumers’ taste for a firm’s
product or to the marketing capacity of the firm. Thus, testing my hypothesis requires a
setting in which firms do not differ in the set or attributes of products they sell.
Myanmar’s bean export market is an ideal setting in which to consider the role of
visibility for at least four reasons. First, the market is decentralized, there is no central
location where buyers can meet exporters and ask for price quotes for a specific ship-
ment. In order to import beans, buyers first need to identify local exporters. Second,
beans are vertically differentiated but the quality of the good is determined upstream
and is measurable. Exporters are simply intermediaries that purchase the beans from
farmers or local traders and have very limited influence over the quality of their out-
put product. The capacity needed to process and prepare orders is the same across all
types of beans so all exporters have the same product scope. Third, there is significant
2
variation in exporter size in this sector1. Fourth, there are a large number of buyers and
exporters in the market and high turnover, meaning buyers must regularly search for
new exporters and exporters constantly need to build new relationships with buyers.
I begin by documenting significant residual price dispersion using transaction level
customs data. While measurement error undoubtedly accounts for a large portion of the
variation in residual prices, the significant price differences across exporters and buyers
cannot entirely be explained by iid draws of reporting errors. Several empirical patterns
indicate that search frictions play an important role in generating this dispersion. First,
entrant foreign buyers pay higher prices than established buyers for the same type of
bean purchased in the same week. This difference fades out as buyers accumulate more
experience. Second — as predicted by a model of sourcing through auction — buyers
who purchase beans from a wider set of exporters pay lower prices in a given season. In
a given week, for the same type of bean, exporters charge higher prices to buyers who
have built fewer relationships with exporters.
Based on qualitative interviews with buyers and exporters in this sector and the em-
pirical findings presented above, I model the market as follows. Before the season starts,
buyers search for and choose a set of exporters for the season. Searching for one more
exporter is costly but decreases the average price paid for orders. The reason is that
for each shipment, buyers run a competitive bidding process between all the exporters
they have built a relationship with, pre-season. A larger set of sellers to source from
thus gives lower prices in expectation. On the other side of the market, exporters are
characterized by two parameters: a visibility parameter that determines their likelihood
of being found by foreign buyers pre-season and a marginal cost parameter that impacts
the level of their price quotes to buyers and hence their capacity to win the bidding pro-
cess. Visibility captures any marketing capacity or any other characteristics that buyers
might value in exporters that are unrelated to the product itself. Empirical analysis re-
veals that an exporter’s likelihood to be sampled by buyers is not correlated with any
1In fact, the distribution is very similar to the distribution of exporters in differentiated good sectors
e.g. garments
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observable characteristic. The cost parameter is more standard and reflects productivity
or any supply-side advantage exporters may have in this market.
I estimate the model in two stages. First, the visibility parameters are obtained for
each exporter from the new relationships that are built over time in my sample. I then
estimate exporters’ marginal costs, using methods inspired by recent developments in
the empirical auction literature. An exporter’s cost parameter impacts his likelihood of
winning a given auction with a buyer as well as the average transaction price with that
buyer. Finally, I recover search costs from the trade-off buyers face. In equilibrium, the
marginal cost of searching should equal the price benefits of running auctions with one
more exporter. Given the estimated distribution of exporter costs, I can compute the
marginal benefit of sourcing from one additional seller and hence buyers’ search costs.
Results are as follows. Firms vary in both their visibility and cost parameters but
the two are orthogonal. Marginal cost parameters are time persistent and are correlated
across bean types. I use survey data collected from exporters to look for predictors of
visibility and costs. Exporters who purchase directly from farmers (rather than solely
from local traders) or trade in the domestic market (as opposed to trading solely in the
export market) have lower marginal costs. Exporters with higher visibility typically
have made investments consistent with trying to get more attention from buyers: they
are more likely to be found online and are more likely to have an office in downtown
Yangon, Myanmar’s economic capital. The median search cost of finding one exporter is
$2,588 for entrant buyers and $1,725 for continuing buyers, in line with the burden faced
by buyers who have to initiate a relationship for the first time: contacting an exporter,
meeting, and then conducting due diligence.
With my estimates in hand, I can perform several counterfactual analyses to quantify
the sources of exporter heterogeneity. I simulate the model under two scenarios. If
exporters had equal marginal cost parameters, the standard deviation of the logarithm
of firm size would be 13 percent lower. On the other hand, if all exporters had the same
visibility, the same number would fall by 30 percent, highlighting the importance of
relationship building in explaining exporter performance. The majority of the variation
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though is random from the exporters’ perspective. It comes from the distribution of
quantity purchased by the buyers an exporter connects with.
An important consideration is the external validity of these results. The magnitude
of search costs is quite high, but as interviews with buyers revealed, a large fraction of
these costs can be attributed to vetting and auditing exporters before doing business. As
such, the poor contracting environment in Myanmar is likely responsible for the search
process 2 buyers have to go through and so search could be less important in other ex-
porting countries. However, in differentiated good markets, the auditing process buyers
need to go through is likely to be even more costly as it typically includes discovering
the precise characteristics of the goods a firm can produce3. Similarly, in differentiated
products, the marketing capacity of firms is likely to play an even more important role
in shifting firm-level demand.
A natural question emerging from this chapter is why a decentralized market sub-
sits in this sector. Another counterfactual exercise offers insight. If buyers were able
to connect and get price quotes from all available exporters, prices would be on aver-
age 5.3 percent lower. A centralized market would be equivalent to a surplus transfer
from exporters to buyers. As the number of competitors on any given auction increases,
exporters submit lower price bids and thus charge lower markups. Low cost and low
visibility exporters would benefit from moving to a centralized market but model esti-
mates suggest that the majority of exporters would make lower profits under a common
exchange market. Implementing such a platform could be initiated from the buyer side
but high turnover and limited coordination are likely to make such a plan infeasible.
This chapter relates to several distinct literatures. First, it highlights the importance
of firm-level demand in explaining exporter performance. Hottman et al. (2016) and
Redding and Weinstein (2018) similarly show the importance of demand idiosyncrasies
2 Kranton and Swamy (2008) also study contracting problems in export markets where the goods are
likewise supplied through an auction mechanism.
3See e.g. Startz (2016) for an empirical investigation and Anderson and Renault (1999) or Kuksov
(2004) for models of buyer search with heterogenous products.
5
in explaining firm sales and trade patterns, but in their setting, variation in demand
is attributed to horizontal or vertical differentiation in the products firms sell. While
this chapter investigates the importance of a seller’s visibility in the static distribution
of sales, recent papers have shown that exogenous shocks to firm-level demand can
have long-lasting effects both on productivity (Atkin et al., 2017b) and the likelihood to
capture a higher share of demand in the future (Ferraz et al., 2015).
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on search in decentralized markets.
Work in this area was led by Stigler (1961), who explores the pricing behavior of firms
when consumers need to search for the lowest price in decentralized markets4. The goal
of the empirical literature in this area is to back out buyer search costs from price and
quantity data (see Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) on the mutual fund industry) or from
price data alone (Hong and Shum, 2006; Giulietti et al., 2014).
In the trade literature, Allen (2014) shows how information frictions generates price
dispersion in commodities across local markets whereas this paper explores how buyer
search can create price dispersion across exporters within a given market. This study
also relates to the literature on the matching process between exporters and buyers using
customs data (Blum et al., 2010, 2011; Benguria, 2015; Kamal and Sundaram, 2016; Yoichi
et al., 2016; Bernard et al., 2018; Cajal-Grossi et al., 2019). Eslava et al. (2015), using
customs data from Colombia, estimate the search costs of identifying potential clients
and the costs of maintaining business relationships with existing buyers5.
Finally, this paper uses recent developments in the auction literature to identify sell-
ers’ costs from observed transaction prices and quantities (Salz, 2018; Cuesta and Sepul-
veda, 2018). The choice of using an auction model not only maps into the mechanism
that buyers actually follow in the sector studied, but also allows to overcome the prob-
4While this paper assumes that search costs are constant, Stiglitz (1987) shows that when search costs
are increasing with the number of previous searches, more firms in the market does not necassirily lead
to more competition and thus lower prices
5The estimated search costs are convex in buyer arrival hazards, from $1,405 per year for an expected
yield of one potential client every two years but rising to $51,471 for an expected yield of one potential
client per year. In this paper, buyers search for exporters and search cost estimates are much lower.
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lem that the full range of price quotes a buyer receives, which is derived from the cost
distribution, is unobservable. Most papers in this field use a result from Athey and
Haile (2002) to identify non-parametrically the distribution of costs from transaction
prices and the identity of the auction winner. In this chapter, I follow the same intuition
but I impose structure on the distribution of sellers’ costs over time. This allows me
to identify a cost parameter for each firm rather than the distribution of costs across all
exporters.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides relevant
facts about the sector and describes the data. Section 1.3 establishes empirical facts that
are consistent with a model of search and auction. Section 1.4 describes the model, and
Section 1.5 the estimation. Section 1.6 describes the results and Section 1.87 counterfac-
tual analyses.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 The bean export sector
Several types of beans are produced in Myanmar. This chapter focuses on the three
main bean types that dominate the export market: black matpe (or urad, 53 percent),
toor whole (or pigeon peas, 21 percent) and mung beans (or green grams, 17 percent).
Exports in other types of beans (black eyed beans, kidney beans, bamboo beans...) ac-
count for less than 9 percent of the total quantities exported. Black matpe and mung
beans are also consumed locally but in very small quantities compared to the amounts
exported. Production is seasonal but exports are usually more spread out during the
year as the beans can be stored up to 18 months with a sales peak from April to Septem-
ber.
In total, beans account for approximately seven percent of the country’s total exports
and about 10 percent of the non mineral resources exports. India is by far the main
destination of Myanmar beans exports (71 percent) as it is also the main consumer of
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that ingredient in the world. The Mumbai commodity market is the world reference
price for these beans.
Exporters are all intermediaries, none of them produce the beans themselves. They
buy the good from domestic traders or farmers, and store them in their warehouse,
usually in the suburbs of Yangon, Myanmar’s economic capital. There, they clean the
beans (remove dirt), repackage, store and ship the goods to the port of Yangon. Some
exporters are also involved in other activities. Survey data collected with a sample of
exporters revealed that approximately 63 percent of them are also involved in domestic
trading activities and 70 percent in import activities.
Foreign buyers are generally intermediaries who conduct search and ship the beans
to their final destination on behalf of a final buyer (most of the time based in India). The
final buyer sends an order for a certain number of containers of a bean type at a price
(generally around the current Mumbai market price) and the foreign buyer conducts
search in Myanmar to find the lowest possible price and hence maximize profits on the
order. The foreign buyer or intermediary takes ownership of the beans at the port of
Yangon and is in charge of shipping the good to the destination country. These buyers
usually operate from Singapore but some of them also have a local office in Yangon.
Most of them also trade other commodities in all of South East Asia.
Interviews with these foreign buyers provided insight into how they operate. Buy-
ers build relationships with exporters before the season starts. Initiating a relationship
typically involves contacting the exporter, meeting with him several times, conducting
an audit of the exporter’s past records and visiting the warehouse. This vetting process
has to be done for two reasons. First, once the season starts, buyers must be able to sign
contracts with exporters and ship the goods in a few days. They would not have time to
conduct search and the vetting process for every new order. Second, once the exporter
and the buyer agree on a price, they sign a contract and the exporter usually has a few
days to prepare and ship the order. Yet, half of the order payment is typically done at
the time when the contract is signed and the other half upon delivery of the order at
the port. The value of these shipments being relatively large (around $100,000), buyers
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need to make sure that exporters have built some form of reputation and would not run
off with half the payment upon signing the contract. All buyers interviewed for this
project referred to such events having happened in the past. As such, Myanmar’s poor
contracting environment contributes significantly to buyers’ search costs. Interviews
with buyers and exporters revealed that even when a relationship has been going on for
several years, both parties meet at least once a year to maintain the relationship. Over
the course of the season, upon receiving a request from a final buyer, foreign buyers call
each of the exporters they have built a relationship with to ask them for a price quote
for the quantity and the type of beans they need. Buyers then sign a contract with the
exporter who offers the lowest price. When asked why they do not buy beans from
the same exporter for every order, all interviewed buyers responded that an exporter
who offers the lowest price on a given week might not offer the lowest price the follow-
ing week, hinting at variation in exporters’ marginal costs over the course of a season.
This flucuation in exporters’ costs is likely to be due to inventory management. As the
local price fluctuates, exporters who bought their stock at different points in time face
different marginal costs when contacted by buyers.
Beans can be of two qualities labeled as Fair Average Quality (FAQ) or Superior Qual-
ity (SQ). These quality labels refer to the size of the beans which is determined by the
seeds used by farmers or the conditions under which the beans are grown. Critically,
exporters have no influence over the quality of the beans. As quality can be perfectly
measured, it is specified in the contract and buyers typically send an inspector to check
the quality of the shipment in the exporter’s warehouse before it is sent to the port. More
importantly for this paper, the quality of beans is reported in the customs data and can
be accounted for when measuring price dispersion. Another dimension in which quality
could matter is the amount of dirt mixed with the beans which can hardly be measured
and hence cannot be specified in a contract. The quality inspectors sent by the buyers
examine the beans and if they are not cleaned enough, ask that they be processed in
the warehouse once more before being shipped. Buyers interviewed for this project de-
clared that such a case happens less than 5 percent of the time and there is no significant
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difference across exporters in how likely the quality inspector would ask the exporter to
reprocess the goods. Thus, quality is unlikely to be a determinant of vertical differenti-
ation across exporters.
Buyers interviewed for this project listed trust and how easy it is to do business with
an exporter as the most important determinants that make them choose some suppliers
over others. Importantly, they did not list any product characteristics such as vertical or
horizontal differentiation to be important.
1.2.2 Data
This chapter uses Myanmar export customs data which was provided by the Ministry
of Commerce there. It is available at the transaction level between April 2011 and March
2017. The data provides the name of the exporter, the type of beans, the quality of
the beans (see above), the quantity and value of the shipment, the date at which the
shipment is cleared by customs, the name of the foreign buyer and the destination to
where the beans will be shipped. The data contains around 38,000 transactions.
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics. There are on average of 228 distinct buyers
and 168 exporters in the market on a given season. Buyers make on average 24 orders
per season. 41 percent of buyers on a given season are entrant and 23 percent of ex-
porters are new in the market, so turnover on both sides of the market is high, reflecting
the need for buyers to constantly keep searching for exporters. On average, buyers pur-
chase from 3.4 distinct exporters on a given season.
In addition to this data, I collected in the first semester of 2018, surveys from firms
sampled from the top 100 exporters of beans in the last year available in the customs
data. The survey gathered information about how exporters build relationships with
buyers as well as how they source and process the beans (capacity, location of ware-
house...). Unfortunately, reaching out to these exporters was extremely difficult and only
35 exporters were surveyed in the end. However, these interviews provided insight into
how the market operates to build the model presented below. The few variables col-
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I first document residual price dispersion which is inconsistent with a model of perfect
competition across exporters. Over the sample period, export prices fluctuate a lot due
to variations in demand in destination countries and supply conditions in Myanmar and
other producer countries. Thus, I analyze price dispersion from price residuals rather
than just prices. I construct price residuals from the following regression:
pijpqw = αpqw + δk · 1(qty = k) + p˜ijpqw (1)
where i in an exporter, j a foreign buyer, p a bean type, q a given quality, w is the
week during which the transaction happens, pijpqw is the transaction unit price and δk
are quantity bins fixed effects. Price residuals p˜ijpqw are devations from product-quality-
week fixed effects. Across the sample, there are an average of 29 transactions for each
bean-quality pairs on a given week so the fixed effect should reflect the trend in the
average price. I also include quantity bin fixed effects as there are consistent price dif-
ferences across transactions of different sizes reflecting the fixed costs (clearing customs,
transport) associated to delivering the order to the port (see Appendix Figure A.1). For
the rest of the chapter, I work exclusively with the constructed price residuals and refer
to these residuals when using the term transaction price. In particular, residual prices
can be negative.
The distribution of residual prices is presented in Panel a of Figure 1.1. The standard
deviation is $73 with the average transaction price around $800, reflecting significant
price dispersion within a week. Of course, a large fraction of this variation is due to
measurement error in the customs data. Quantities and values from which the transac-
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tion unit price is computed are likely to be misreported by customs agents. Nonetheless,
I can rule out that all of this variation in price residuals is entirely due to measurement
error. If within a week, transaction prices were equal but only differed in the data by an
iid error term, the distribution of error term should be equal to the distribution of the
price residuals plotted in panel a of Figure 1.1. Thus, I can construct a 95 percent confi-
dence interval for exporter (or buyer) price fixed effects from the empirical distribution
of price residuals and compare where the actual price fixed effect stands compared to the
confidence interval. I plot the confidence interval and the residual price fixed effect for
the largest exporter-season pairs in Panel b of Figure 1.1 and for the largest buyer-season
pairs in Panel c. The price fixed effects are outside the 95 percent confidence intervals for
more than 5 percent of the cases and for some exporter-season pairs, the price residual
fixed effects are really far from the boudaries of the confidence interval. In other words,
there is too much dispersion in exporter-season and buyer-season price residual fixed
effects for the variation in price residuals to be entirely explained by idd error terms.
The measurement error in the customs data could be firm specific if e.g. some exporters
consistently over-report quantities or values to customs. Another potential explanation
could be that there are important switching costs which allow exporters who have been
in a relationship with buyers for a long time to charge higher prices. If this hypothesis
were true, the average price an exporter charges to a given buyer should increase with
the length of the relationship. Appendix Figure A.2 rules out the presence of switching
costs as within a relationship, prices are constant over time. Moreover, the next set of re-
sults suggest that part of the price residual dispersion can be attributed to buyers facing
costly search to find and build a relationship with exporters.
1.3.2 Evidence of search
In Panel A of Table 1.2, I report evidence that new buyers, for whom search costs should
be relatively higher, pay higher prices. Column 1 shows that entrant buyers in their first
season pay on average $13 (1.6 percent) higher prices than other buyers. But as column 2
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reveals, this difference fades over time. For every additional year of experience, entrant
buyers pay on average $2 (0.3 percent) lower prices.
From the list of buyers in the customs data, I collected information about them. Col-
umn 3 of Panel A of Table 1.2 shows that buyers who have an office in Myanmar, and
thus are likely to face lower search costs than buyers operating from abroad, pay on
average $15 (1.8 percent) lower prices.
The auction mechanism which buyers go through for every order as described in sec-
tion 1.2 suggests that buyers who purchase beans from a wider set of exporters should
pay lower prices. The distribution of the minimum bid shifts to the left as more ex-
porters are included in the competitive bidding process. Panel B of Table 1.2 explores
this hypothesis. Column 1 shows in a cross-section that foreign buyers who purchase
from one more exporter over the course of a season pay on average $1.9 lower prices.
Column 2 studies the same correlation but within buyers over time. When buyers add
one more exporter to the set of firms they purchase from, transaction prices decrease by
an average of $1.4. Finally, column 3 explores how prices vary within the set of sales an
exporter does within a week in a particular type of good. For each additional exporter
included in the supply set of a given buyer, exporters charge on average $2.5 higher
prices. Even if the coefficient is not significant in column 3, these results clearly show
that buyers who purchase from a wider set of exporters get lower prices. This is consis-
tent with the assumption that buyers face a trade-off when searching for more exporters.
One the one hand, they need to pay a cost to search for more sellers. On the other hand,
including more exporters in their buying set allows them to source the beans at lower
prices on average over the course of the season. This relationship is key to estimating
search costs in the structural exercise that follows.
1.3.3 Evidence of auctions
Customs data shows evidence of the auction mechanism described by buyers which
they use to find the lowest price available for each order. A classic auction model pre-
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dicts that exporters who consistently offer lower prices to buyers should get a higher
market share. As the price data is particularly noisy, I do not observe a clear mono-
tonic relationship between exporter price fixed effects and market shares but the two
are clearly negatively correlated.
Column 1 of Table 1.3 shows that exporters with low price fixed effects have a higher
market share in the sector as a whole. Within each buyer, the negative correlation is even
stronger. If buyers were including all exporters available in their auctions, the slope of
the coefficients in column 1 should be similar to the one in column 2 and 3. Thus, results
in this table are consistent with buyers using auctions to source the beans and that these
auctions do not include all available exporters in the market.
1.3.4 Buyer-exporter relationships
Decomposing total quantity sold for each exporter into the number of buyers he sells
to and the mean quantity sold to each one of these buyers reveals that about 40 percent
of the variation in the distribution of exporter size can be attributed to the number of
buyers they sell to. This highlights the importance of building connections with buyers
for explaining an exporter’s success.
At this stage, an important question is whether exporters who can offer lower prices
to buyers can signal this before the season starts and are thus more likely to build new
relationships with buyers. In Panel A of Table 1.4, I find that exporters’ average prices
in the current or previous season do not correlate with the number of new matches they
make with buyers in the current season.
Looking at exporter-buyer divorces, Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that the length of
the relationship is a factor that significantly impacts the rate of survival of exporters
with buyers. However, and perhaps surprisingly, an exporter’s market share or average
transaction price with a given buyer does not affect its survival rate in the next season.
This confirms what buyers reported during interviews. They value other characteristics
than average prices when choosing which exporters they want to do business with.
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Overall, these results suggest that the matching process between exporters and buy-
ers is not driven by exporter characteristics that are observable in the customs data.
Nonetheless, as the number of buyers a given exporter sells to is important for explain-
ing firm size, I assume in the model section below that exporters vary in their probability
to be sampled by buyers.
1.4 Model
1.4.1 Search
For each season s, there are a total of Ms foreign buyers indexed by j. Among those
Ms buyers are M˜s new buyers (entrant) and (Ms − M˜s) continuing buyers from season
s − 1. Each buyer j needs to make Sj,s orders to local exporters over the course of the
season, each of size q 6.
Buyer j can only source orders from local exporters which he has searched and built
a relationship with. I note Ωj,s this set, Nj,s the number of exporters included in that set
and cj buyer j’s cost of searching one additional exporter. The number and identities
of exporters in Ωj,s is fixed for the duration of the season. In line with the sourcing
procedures described by foreign buyers during interviews, I assume that for each order
t, buyer j runs a first-price sealed auction between all exporters included in his set Ωj,s.
I first consider entrant buyers. They start with an empty set and must decide how
many exporters to include in their set before the season starts. Each new buyer mini-
mizes total costs of the orders he will make over the course of the season and the cost
associated to the initial search of the Nj,s exporters to include in his setΩj,s. His objective
6I abstract from the distribution of order size. In reality, orders vary in size but 60% of orders are of
exactly 5 containers and there is no systematic difference in the top of the distribution of order size across
buyers. See Appendix Figure A.3.
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function can be expressed as:
min
Nj,s
q · Sj ·E
[
pt




∣∣∣∣Nj,s] is the expected unit price obtained for each order t from running
an auction with Nj,s exporters. It is the average lowest bid submitted by Nj,s exporters
(see the next sub-section).
For a continuing buyer, I assume that among the Nj′,s−1 exporters buyer j′ had in
his set Ωj′,s−1 in the previous season, only N˜j′,s−1 < Nj′,s−1 relationships can be carried
forward into season s. Following the empirical analysis in section 1.3, I assume that this
number is exogenous: some exporters leave the market and some relationships don’t
survive. In particular, the probability that a relationship ends on a given season is a
function of the length of the relationship but is the same across all exporters and all
buyers. I assume that the cost of maintaining relationships with existing exporters is
cj′ < cj′ so that buyer j′ continues working with all exporters for which the relationship
is not exogenously broken. Continuing buyer j′ must then decide the number of new
exporters N˘j′,s to include in his set Ωj′,s for season s. Similarly to entrant buyers, buyer
j′’s objective function is given by:
min
N˘j′ ,s
q · Sj′ ·E
[
pt
∣∣∣∣N˜j′,s−1 + N˘j′,s]+ cj′ · N˘j′,s + cj′ · N˜j′,s−1 (2.2)
On the other side of the market are a total of N exporters indexed by i. Exporter i is
characterized by his visibility parameter γi, i’s probability of being sampled in a search
for one exporter among all N exporters. If all exporters have the same visibility, then
γi =
1
N . The probabilityPi,n that i is sampled in a search for n > 1 exporters is a complex
function of n and all the γi’s since search is conducted without replacement. But for




On a given season s, exporter i is also described by his average marginal cost mci,s which
reflects i’s productivity in cleaning the beans and preparing the order7 as well as i’s
ability to buy beans in the local market at a low price. Across all exporters, mci,s is an
iid draw from distribution F (.). I assume that i’s marginal costs are not fixed over time
within a season. As explained in section 1.2, exporters’ optimal bids are not constant,
even relative to the average market price, which explains why foreign buyers need to
run a new auction for every order. For each order t, i faces marginal cost mci,t, an iid
draw from a continuous distribution mci,t ∼ F˜ (.|mci,s). Finally, I note G(.) the overall
(across all exporters) distribution of marginal costs in the market at any point in time.
Section 1.3 above showed that exporters offer lower prices to buyers with larger sets
Ωj,s. Assuming that exporters know the number of exporters Nj,s included inΩj,s but do
not know the identity nor the average marginal cost parameter of the other exporters in-
cluded inΩj,s, the optimal bidding function is symmetric across all exporters competing
to sell an order to the same buyer j 8. I note β j,s(.) the optimal bidding strategy, which is
















is the exporter perceived probability that his bid b
will be lower than all other exporters submitting a bid for the same order. The optimal
bidding strategy for a first-price sealed auction is a well-know function (see Krishna,
2009) and is given by:
7Preparing the order includes putting the beans into bags, loading them on trucks and delivering the
orders to the port
8Moving away from this assumption would be significantly complicate the model. A closed form
expression for the bidding strategies in first-price asymmetric auction may not be available. See Chapter
4 in Krishna (2009).
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β j,s(mc) = E[Yj,s|Yj,s > mc] (4)
where Yj,s is the first order statistic, i.e. the minimum, of Nj,s− 1 random draws from
the cdf G. In particular, β j,s is strictly increasing in its argument mc.
1.5 Estimation
This section describes how the set of parameters in the model {Nj,s, cj,γi, mci,s} are es-
timated from the data. I estimate marginal costs parameters for each type of bean sep-
arately but abstract from bean type notations in the estimation procedure described be-
low.
Most empirical estimations of models of search and auctions estimate the overall
distribution of search costs or marginal costs. I estimate a search cost for each foreign
buyer and a visibility and a marginal cost parameter for each exporter. I do so to study
the factors that influence visibility and costs from survey data and identify winners
and loosers in counterfactual settings. However, estimating a cost parameter for each
exporter poses a number of challenges as explained below.
1.5.1 Estimation of buyers sets Nj,s
I assume that Nj,s is the number of exporters who do at least one transaction with buyer
j during season s, I note this number N̂j,s. In reality, it is possible that Nj,s > N̂j,s but
that only a subset of the exporters in the set end up making at least one transaction with
buyer j over the course of the season. In this case, the search costs estimated below
would be an upper bound to the true search costs and the average marginal costs esti-
mated below would be lower than their actual value. Nonetheless, I am more interested
in the relative value of marginal costs across exporters than their absolute level. More-
over, exporters who are included in a buyer’s set but do not end up making a transaction
with that buyer on a given season are likely to be high marginal cost exporters. Thus, the
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estimation procedure described below is likely to underestimate the visibility parameter
γi for high marginal cost exporters.
The auction model described above is not defined for Nj,s = 1 and a large proportion
of buyers only buy from one exporter over the course of a season. If Nj,s = 1, exporter’s
bids would always be the same, at the buyer’s reservation price. However, as long as
exporters expect Nj,s to be greater than one, the auction model is defined.
I do not find any statistical difference in prices between buyers who buy from one
exporter and buyers who buy from two exporters over the course of the season. Thus,
I assume that buyers who end up buying from only one exporter have actually two
exporters in their set. In the data, while there are numerous buyers who only have
one exporter in their set, the majority of these buyers tend to make only one order on
a given season and so these buyers only account for a small share of total transactions.
However, I estimate the auction model and the marginal cost parameters only for buyers
with more than one exporter (see Section 1.5.3).
1.5.2 Estimation of visibility γi
In the data, in any buyer’s set, the number of exporters is much smaller than the total
number of exporters (see Table 2.1). Thus, as highlighted in the model section, I can
make the assumption that the sampling of each exporter is done with replacement. I
gather all buyer season pairs r = {j, s} where a buyer samples N̂r new exporters (either
entrant buyers or new relationships for continuing buyers as described in the model
section above). I note Ω̂r the realized set of sampled exporters. An estimator for γi is






1.5.3 Estimation of marginal costs mci,s
For the estimation of the marginal cost parameters, I assume that F˜ (.|mci,s) follows a
normal distribution with mean mci,s and variance v2. Similarly, F is the cumulative
distribution function of a normal with mean µ and variance σ2m so that G is also normal
with mean µ and variance σ2 = σ2m + v2. Thus, the set of parameters to estimate here are
{mci,s, σm, v}.
In the data, only the transaction prices are observed. I note Hijs(.) the distribution
of optimal bids submitted by i in response to a request by buyer j during season s.
Given that the optimal bidding strategy β j,s(.) is strictly increasing in its argument, if
X ∼ F (.|mci,s), then Y = β j,s(X) ∼ Hijs(.). Submitting a bid b, i’s probability of winning
the auction, i.e. submitting the lowest bid, is the probability that all exporters in buyer
j’s set submit higher bids that i:







The challenge of the estimation lies in translating the parameters that defineF (.|mci,s)
which we want to identify into the parameters that define Hijs(.). In Appendix A.1, us-
ing results from Chen and Tyler (1999) and Benaroya et al. (2005), I show that Hijs can
be very well approximated by a normal distribution with mean µijs = m(µ, σ, Nj,s, mci,s)
and standard deviation σijs = s(µ, σ, Nj,s, mci,s, v).
Finally, as noted in section 1.3, errors in the transaction price reported in the data are
likely to be very large. To account for this, I assume that the observed price in the data
p˜ijt is given by p˜ijt = pijt + eijt with eijt ∼ N (0, σe). Then, the log-likelihood contribution
of a contract between exporter i and buyer j at an observed price p˜ijt is:














where H˜ijs is the cdf of a normal with mean µijs and variance σ2ijs + σ2e and θs =
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{mci,s, v, µ, σ, σe}.
Two things prevent the simultaneous estimation of all parameters in θ using equa-
tion 4. First, it is not possible to differentiate v from σe as both parameters increase the
variance of the observed price p˜ijt but do not impact its level. Second, a constraint im-
posed by the model is that µ = 1N ∑
N
i=1 mci and σ
2 = σ2m + v2 and an unconstrained
estimation of equation 5 might not lead to these equalities holding with the estimated
parameters.
To solve this issue, I estimate the parameters of the model in two steps:
1. I first estimate µ, σ and σe by simulating the model to match three moments
in the data: the mean and standard deviation of the price residuals p˜ijt, and the co-
efficient in column 1 Panel B of Table 1.2 which drives how average prices change
with the number of exporters included in a buyer’s set. To do so, I assume that
visibility and marginal costs are orthogonal, so that the expected marginal cost
parameter of any sampled exporter is just µ. I check the validity of this assump-
tion ex-post by checking the correlation between the estimated marginal costs and
visbility paramaters. The key parameter to estimate at this stage is σ. Intuitively,
higher variation in marginal costs not only shifts the distribution of the first-order
statistics to the left but also increases the gap between the distribution of the min-
imum between N and N+1 draws. A higher σ thus increases the coefficient ob-
tained in a similar regression as in column 1 Panel B of Table 1.2.
2. I follow the literature on auctions to estimate the mci,s and v by maximizing
the log-likelihood in equation 4, taking the estimated µˆ, σˆ and σˆe from step 1 9.
Note that estimation through maximum likelihood is similar to estimating the mci,s
with observed transaction prices and within buyer market shares as the function
in equation 5 measures both the likelihood of observing a certain price bid level
for exporter i as well as the probability that i wins a given auction with that bid.
9For that, I first take a guess at v and estimate the mci,s and then reestimate the mci,s with a new guess
of v =
√
σ2 − SD(mci,s)2 until the estimated mci,s and v converge.
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1.5.4 Recovering search costs cj
Having estimated the distribution of marginal costs, I can then recover search costs for
each entrant buyer j from the first order condition of the maximization problem pre-
sented in equation 2.1:









can be approximated by the derivative of the optimal bidding strat-
egy taken at the average marginal cost: β(µˆ|Nj,s + 1)− β(µˆ|Nj,s).
Similarly, for continuing buyers, searching for N˘j′,s new exporters, searched costs
can be recovered from the first order condition of the maximization problem presented
in equation 2.2:






Note that search costs can only be estimated for continuing buyers with N˘j′,s > 1,
that is buyer-season pairs that build at least one new relationship on a given season.
In practice, only four continuing buyer-season pairs in the data do not build any new
relationship with exporters on a new season.
1.6 Results
The estimated parameters are presented in Table 1.5 for each type of bean separately and
for a specification with all beans together. The estimates are similar across bean types.
Average marginal costs are between $1 and $7. Recall that the model is estimated with
the transaction price residuals which have mean zero, so the level of marginal costs is
expressed relative to the weekly price averages. In other words, the average marginal
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costs are between $1 and $7 higher than the average weekly transaction price. This is
not surprising as variations in marginal costs make the expected value of the lowest bid
lower than the average marginal cost paramater. The variation in marginal costs across
exporters σm is about half the variation in marginal costs within exporters but across
transactions v. As expected, the variance of the error term is very large and so measure-
ment error accounts for the majority of the variation in the observed residual transaction
prices p˜ijt. Figure 1.2 shows how the model moves from the distribution of marginal
costs to the distribution of optimal bids and transaction prices. Panel a presents the dis-
tribution of marginal costs and optimal bids for N=2 and N=8, Panel b the distribution
of transaction prices and Panel c the simulated and the actual distribution of residual
transaction prices.
In Table 1.6, I study various correlations with the estimated exporter-level average
marginal cost parameters mci,s. Panel A shows that the estimated marginal costs for each
type of beans correlate with the exporter-season price fixed effects. This is not surprising
as higher marginal costs imply higher price bids and hence higher transaction prices in
the model described above. Columns 1 and 3 of Panel B show that if exporters have
a high marginal cost in one bean type, they are likely to have high marginal costs in
other bean types as well. Columns 2 and 4 look at the same correlations but within
exporters and across time: if an exporter faces an increase in marginal costs from one
season to the next in one bean type, marginal costs in other beans types are also likely to
increase. Panel C looks at serial correlation of marginal costs. An exporter who has faced
low marginal costs in the previous season is likely to have low marginal costs in the
current season. However, this serial correlation is not perfect which might explain why
buyers do not seem to end relationships with exporters based on the average transaction
price they got from this exporter in the previous season. Overall, these results suggest
that marginal costs are driven by an exporter supply ability. Finally, Panel D shows
that the estimated marginal cost paramaters are orthogonal to the estimated visibility
paramaters, confirming the validity of the assumption made in section 1.5.3. This result
suggests that an exporter’s efficiency to supply the goods at a low cost is unrelated to
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the exporter’s ability to make business connections with foreign buyers.
I then investigate how the estimated marginal costs correlate with some supply-side
variables from the survey data. Obviously, as the number of exporters in the sample
is very small, catching a significant correlation with any of the survey variable is chal-
lenging. However, two variables stand out. Figure 1.3 shows that exporters who buy
some of their beans directly from farmers (as opposed to traders) and exporters who also
trade in the domestic market (as opposed to only selling on export markets) have lower
marginal costs (significant at the 10 percent level). None of the self-reported estimates
on the cost of cleaning the beans or the cost of shipping the goods from the warehouse to
the port are significant, suggesting that exporters compete more on their ability to find
cheap beans than in their ability to process and ship them.
Looking at the factors that impact an exporter’s visibility, I do not find any of the
variables collected in the survey (number of trips made aborad, number of people in the
firm who speak different languages, number of years of experience...) to be significantly
correlated with an exporter’s visibility. However, looking at the variables collected to
build the survey sample frame, I find that having an office in downtown Yangon and
having a website are correlated with an exporter’s estimated visibility (see Figure 1.4).
Of course, these correlations could simply be the result of these exporters already deal-
ing with a lot of buyer relationships and making a location choice and setting up a web-
site as a result of that. But these correlations suggest that being seen by buyers seems to
be more important in making connections with them than any outreach capacity such
as traveling abroad as measured in the survey.
Search costs are reported in Table 1.7 for entrant and continuing buyers separately.
The median search cost is about $2,600 for entrant buyers and $1,700 for continuing
buyers. These costs are somewhat aligned with the process buyers need to go through
to find buyers as described in section 1.2. Search costs are on average $1370 lower for
buyers who have an office in Myanmar and hence do not have to travel or use local
intermediaries to search and connect with local exporters.
Finally, the model and estimation allow to estimate markups for each exporter. Con-
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ditional on winning an auction process with a buyer, the markup of exporter i that faces
marginal cost mci,t is given by: β j,s(mci,t)−mci,t. However, for a given transaction, mci,t
is not observed but knowing all the exporters that are in buyer j’s set and their marginal
cost parameters, one can estimate the distribution of mci,t conditional on i winning (hav-
ing the lowest bid) against all other exporters included in j’s set. Thus, the expected
markup is given by: E
[
β j,s(mci,t) − mci,t
∣∣∣∣i wins bid with buyer j]. Abstracting from
fixed costs, I can then estimate total profits for an exporter by aggregating expected
transaction markups. The distribution of profits is given in Appendix Figure A.4.
1.7 Counterfactuals
1.7.1 The sources of exporter heterogeneity
I first explore the sources of exporter heterogeneity. Three factors impact the size of
exporters: i) the marginal cost parameter which drives exporters’ market share with
each of the buyers they are connected to, ii) the visibility parameter which drives the
number of buyers they do business with and iii) the quantity bought by each of the
buyers who exporters are connected to. From the perspective of exporters, iii) is random
so I only quantify how i) and ii) contribute to exporter heterogeneity. Unfortunately, the
model does not lead to a simple formula to decompose the contribution of each factor in
firms’ total sales. Thus, I perform two counterfactual analysis to quantify the importance
of each parameter in explaning exporter heterogeneity: one where I set all marginal cost
parameters to be equal across exporters and one where I set visibility to be the same
across all firms.
If all exporters had the same average marginal cost parameter, the likelihood of win-
ning an auction for an order with a given buyer would be the same across exporters.
So two exporters included in the sets of the same buyers would sell the same amount
over the course of the season. I simulate the distribution of exporters under the hy-
pothesis that they all have the same marginal cost paramater in Panel a of Figure 1.5. I
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then compare that distribution to the actual distribution of exporters. Under the equal
marginal cost assumption, the likelihood of observing very small exporters who only do
a couple of shipments per year because their high average marginal cost prevents them
from winning a significant number of bids is lower. Similarly, observing exporters who
have high market shares with each of the buyers they serve is also less likely. The stan-
dard deviation of the distribution of log(orders) is about 13 percent lower with equal
marginal cost parameters than the distribution in the data.
The exporter size distribution under the equal visibility assumption is presented in
Panel b of Figure 1.5. Under this scenario, the variation in exporter size would be even
smaller. The difference between the two distributions suggest that many of the small
(big) exporters in the current distribution are firms with low (high) visibility and hence
are able to sell to very few (many) buyers. The standard deviation of log(orders) would
be about 30 percent lower if all exporters had the same visibility parameter.
Overall, these simulations suggest that visibility, or an exporter’s ability to make
connections with foreign buyers is much more important in explaining an exporter per-
formance than his average marginal cost, i.e. his supply-side productivity.
1.7.2 Lower search costs and centralized market
I first consider the case where buyers’ search costs would be twice lower. This would
correspond to a case where it would be easier for them to search for exporters with for
example a list of all exporters with their contact information available online. Under
this hypothesis, buyers would on average be purchasing from 5.3 exporters on a given
season, compared to 3.4 in the data. In turn, trasaction prices would be on average $6.2
lower. As the average price is about $800/ton, this is roughly equivalent to 0.7 percent
lower prices.
A more interesting counterfactual is the centralized market case where search costs
are brought to zero. Implementing such a setting would require a platform where buyers
could post bid requests to all exporters at the same time with the platform having a
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market clearing agent to avoid any payment risk for which buyers need to vet exporters
for. Under this case, not only would search cost vanish but visibility would be the same
across all exporters.
Simulations of such a scenario reveal that transaction prices would be on average
$42 lower (or 5.3 percent lower). Having all exporters included in the auction process
significantly reduces the expected lowest bid. This exercise also provides insight into
why such a decentralized market does not exist. As the drop in prices reflect, moving
to a centralized market is equivalent to an important transfer of surplus from exporters
to buyers. The logistics needed to move to a centralized market would definitely need
to come from the exporter side but this analysis reveals that exporters would not have
incentives to do so. While moving to a decentralized market would create winners and
loosers among Myanmar exporters, the loosers clearly outweight the winners. First,
under a centralized market, about 6 percent of exporters would be driven out of the
market, not making any transaction with foreign buyers over the course of the season.
Given the high number of firms bidding for each order, the likelihood that high marginal
cost exporters have the lowest bid for a given order is close to zero. Second, simulating
profits shows that 55 percent of exporters would make lower profits under a common
exchange market than under the current setting and for 60 percent of the exporters who
would make higher profits, the additional profits would be less than $8,000.
However, moving to a centralized market is likely to increase demand from foreign
buyers which could benefit farmers upstream. Yet, the setting does not allow to estimate
the foreign buyer’s price elasticity so the exact impact of such a policy cannot be quan-
tified. Moreover, lower transaction prices for foreign buyers might not pass through to
lower prices for the final buyers in the destination country which are the ones determin-
ing the quantities bought from Myanmar. Finally, in recent years, India has imposed
quotas on some bean varieties imported so the quantities exported in the future are
likely to be determined by such policies rather than transaction prices in Myanmar.
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies the importance of an exporter’s visibility to foreign buyers in ex-
plaining its performance. I argue that even for homogeneous goods, conditional on
their costs, firms differ in the level of demand they capture. The search process that
buyers need to go through in a decentralized market generates more sales opportunities
for exporters who can easily be found. This allows high cost exporters to subsist in the
market by reducing the degree of competition they are exposed to.
Methodogically, this study builds on recent developments in the search and auction
literature to identify a cost and visibility parameter for each exporter and a search cost
for each foreign buyer. The auction model allows to identify sellers’ costs from trans-
action prices and the identity of the seller who wins the contract. Because of the time
variability in exporters’ marginal costs, running a competitive bidding process with one
more supplier allows buyers to source the good at lower prices on average. However,
searching for additional exporters is costly, and this trade-off provides a way to identify
search costs.
The estimates reveal that the magnitude of buyers’ search costs is important and that
visibility explains about 30 percent of the exporter size distribution. While this paper
focuses on trade from a single country but looks at the allocation of purchases across
exporters, a parallel can be drawn into sourcing decisions from multiple countries. In a
world where buyers can source goods from different origins but need to pay a fixed cost
for searching in each country separately, a country’s visibility and marketing capacity
could be an important factor in explaining world trade patterns. As such, this paper also
provides a rationale for export promotion at the country level.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Foreign buyers
Average number of buyers per season 228
Average number of buyers making more than one order per season 145
Average number of orders made per buyer per season 24
Entrant share of total buyers 41%
Buys Black Matpe (Urad) 0.84
Buys Toor Whole (Pigeon peas) 0.39
Buys Mung Beans (Green grams) 0.66
Exporters
Average number of exporters per season 168
Entrant share of total exporters 23%
Buyer-exporter relationships
Average number of exporters per buyer 3.4
Notes: This table presents summary statistics from the customs data. Many buyers are small
and only make one purchase per season. Buyers may buy one, two or three different types
of beans. There is high turnover of buyers and exporters.
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Table 1.2: Evidence of search
Panel A: Entry of foreign buyer
XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX
Dep. var: Price residual - P˜ijt (in $)
(1) (2) (3)
Entrant foreign buyer 12.958∗∗∗
(1.709)
Foreign buyer experience −2.410∗
(1.305)
Foreign buyer has office in Myanmar −14.583∗∗∗
(0.826)
Foreign Buyer FEs No Yes No
Panel B: Number of exporters in foreign buyer’s set
XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX
Dep. var: Price residual - P˜ijt (in $)
(1) (2) (3)
Number of exporters in foreign buyer’s set −1.901∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗ −2.467
(0.295) (0.499) (1.813)
Foreign Buyer FEs No Yes No
Exporter X Product X Week FEs No No Yes
Notes: This table shows price patterns that are consistent with buyers paying search costs to find ex-
porters. The unit of observation is a transaction. The dependent variable is P˜ijt the price residuals ob-
tained from Equation 1. In Panel A, Entrant foreign buyer is a dummy equal to one if the buyer was not
purchasing in the prior season. Foreign buyer experience is the number of season since a given buyer
entered the market. Foreign buyer has office in Myanmar is a dummy equal to one if the buyer is listed
in the yellow pages as having an office in Yangon (as opposed to operating solely from abroad). In
Panel B, Number of exporters in foreign buyer’s set is the number of distinct exporters a buyer purchases
from on a given season. Standard errors clustered at the exporter level are included in parentheses. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
30
Table 1.3: Evidence of auctions
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Overall Within buyer Within
market share market share buyer-product
market share
(1) (2) (3)
P˜ijt - Exporter X Season FEs −0.002∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.007)
Season FEs Yes No No
Foreign Buyer X Season FEs No Yes No
Foreign Buyer X Product X Season FEs No No Yes
Notes: This table shows correlations between prices and market shares that are consistent with the hypothesis
that buyers source beans through a competitive process between exporters in their set. The right hand side vari-
able is the exporter-(buyer)-season fixed effect of residual prices as defined in Equation 1. The dependent vari-
able is in column (1) the overall market share of a given exporter, in column (2) the within-buyer market share
and in column (3) the within buyer and bean type market share. Standard errors clustered at the exporter level
are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Exporter-buyer matches and divorces
Panel A: New exporter-buyer relationships
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
Dep. var: Number of new matches per exporter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P˜ijt - Exporter X Season FE −0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
P˜ijt - Exporter X Season FE - −0.002 0.001
in previous season (0.001) (0.001)
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter FEs No No Yes Yes
Panel B: Survival analysis
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Dep. var: Exporter survival in relationship (dummy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Length of relationship 0.103∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017)
Average transaction price −0.000 −0.000
in previous season (0.000) (0.000)
Market share with buyer 0.002 0.031
in previous season (0.008) (0.022)
Season FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No
Foreign buyer X Season FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: This table documents stylized facts about matches and divorces between exporters and buyers. In Panel A, the
dependent variable is the number of new buyers a given exporters matches to on a given season. The right hand side
variable is the exporter-season fixed effect of residual prices as defined in Equation 1. It shows that exporters who sell
or sold in the previous season at low prices do not necessarily make more connections with buyers in the current sea-
son. In Panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a given exporter survives in his relationship with
a buyer to which he has made at least one trade in the previous season. Length of relationship is the number of seasons
since the buyer-supplier relationship exists, Average transaction price in previous season is the exporter-buyer-season fixed
effect of residual prices as defined in Equation 1 in the previous season and Market share with buyer in previous season is
the market share a given exporter had with a buyer in the previous season. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Estimated parameters
Parameter Black Matpe Toor Whole Mung Beans All beans
(Urad) (Pigeon Peas) (Green grams)
µ 7 4 1 5.5
σ 22 14 13 19
σm 9.5 6.8 5.8 6.3
v 19.0 12.1 11.2 16.4
σe 66 76 76 67
Notes: µ is the mean of the distribution of marginal costs across all exporters and σ
its standard deviation. σm is the standard deviation of the distribution of the mean
marginal costs parameters (mci,s) across exporters. v is the standard deviation of the
distribution of marginal costs across time for a given exporter. σe is the standard devi-
ation of the measurement error in the data.
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Table 1.6: Analysis of estimated mci,s
XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
Panel A: Correlation with average transaction price
Dep. var: mci,s
Black Matpe Toor Whole Mung Beans
P˜ijt - Exporter X Season FEs 0.175∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Correlation across bean types
Dep. var: mci,s - Black Matpe
mci,s - Toor Whole 0.251∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.069)
mci,s - Mung Beans 0.082 0.135∗
(0.055) (0.072)
Season FEs Yes No Yes No
Exporter FEs No Yes No Yes
Panel C: Serial correlation
Dep. var: mci,s
Black Matpe Toor Whole Mung Beans
mci,s−1 - Black Matpe 0.170∗∗∗
(0.042)
mci,s−1 - Toor Whole 0.321∗∗∗
(0.040)
mci,s−1 - Mung Beans 0.197∗∗∗
(0.043)
Panel D: Correlation with visibility parameter
Dep. var: mci
Black Matpe Toor Whole Mung Beans
γi 61.976 22.309 −49.472
(134.991) (88.583) (68.342)
Notes: This table studies various correlations with the estimated exporter-level average marginal cost parameters
mci,s for each season and each bean type. Panel A looks at the correlation between the mci,s and the exporter-season
fixed effect of residual prices as defined in Equation 1. Panel B looks at the correlation between the estimated mci,s
across bean types. Panel C looks at the correlation between the estimated mci,s for season s and season s− 1. Panel D
shows the absence of correlation between the estimated cost parameter mci,s and the estimated visibility parameter
γi. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Search costs
Percentiles Entrant buyers Continuing buyers
10th $ 1,643 $ 520
25th $ 1,725 $ 575
50th $ 2,588 $ 1,725
75th $ 4,313 $ 4,908
90th $ 18,426 $ 12,077
Notes: This table describes the distribution of estimated
search costs across buyers for new and continuing buyers sep-
arately. These search costs are obtained from equation 2.1 and
2.2.
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Foreign buyer rank
Notes: Panel (a) of this figure shows the distribution of the residual prices. Panel (b) and (c) show the
price fixed effects for the top exporter and the top buyers. If residual prices were iid draws of reporting














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Only buys from local traders Buys directly from farmers
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the correlation between the estimated exporter cost parameters mci and
survey data. Panel (a) shows a negative correlation between marginal costs and the likelihood that an
exporter also trades in the domestic market. Panel (b) shows that exporters who buy some of the beans
directly from farmers (as opposed to solely from traders) have lower estimated marginal costs. The bars
represent the 90 percent confidence interval.
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Does not have a website Has a website
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the correlation between the estimated exporter visibility parameter γi and
data collected to build the survey sample frame. Panel (a) shows that exporters who have an office in
downtown Yangon have a higher visibility parameter. Panel (b) shows that buyers that are listed online
are more likely to have a high visibility parameter. The bars represent the 90 percent confidence interval.
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Actual distribution of number of orders Simulated distribution with equal visibility
Notes: This figure plots the two counterfactual distributions used to quantify the importance of visibility
versus cost in explaining the distribution of exporter size. Exporter size corresponds to the number of
orders that a seller gets on a given season. Panel (a) plots the actual distribution with the distribution
under the scenario that all exporters have the same marginal cost parameter. Panel (b) plots the actual
distribution with the distribution under the scenario that all exporters have the same visibility.
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Chapter 2
Vertical Integration, Supplier Behavior, and
Quality Upgrading among Exporters
Joint with Christopher Hansman, Jonas Hjort and Gianmarco León
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2.1 Introduction
Why do so many of our economic transactions occur within firm boundaries (Coase,
1937; Gibbons, 2005a; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007)? Vertical integration occurs for many
different reasons, and motives vary by context.1 However, as global incomes rise and
barriers to trade fall, one potential motive has gained increased relevance: firms in-
tegrating in order to improve product quality. Access to wealthier, quality sensitive
markets brings rising returns to output quality,2 but producing high quality output
typically requires high quality inputs (see e.g. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Halpern
et al., 2015a; Amodio and Martinez-Carrasco, 2018). Because input quality is often hard
for firms to measure and contract over (Gibbons, 2005a; Lafontaine and Slade, 2007)—
especially where institutions are weak (Woodruff, 2002; Nunn, 2007)—organizational
structure may play a crucial role in firms’ ability to meet demand for quality.
In this chapter, we test the hypothesis that firms vertically integrate in order to pro-
duce higher quality products. This hypothesis is inspired by classical theories char-
acterizing how firm boundaries are expected to respond to output objectives (Baker
et al., 2001, 2002; Gibbons, 2005a,b) when suppliers multitask (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991). However, given the rarity of data on product quality and internal firm structure,
and the challenges of isolating firm strategy from confounding factors, causal evidence
on the extent to which firms change their organizational structure to upgrade quality
has remained elusive.
The context we study, the Peruvian fishmeal industry, enables progress. The simple
structure of the sector creates an ideal setting in which to study the relationship between
integration and output quality. Independent and integrated suppliers deliver inputs of
hard-to-observe quality to manufacturers. Manufacturers convert these inputs into a
1Empirical work on the causes and consequences of firms’ choice of organizational structure in devel-
oping countries began in earnest with Woodruff (2002). Gibbons (2005a); Lafontaine and Slade (2007);
Bresnahan and Levin (2012) provide excellent overviews of the broader literature on firms’ structure.
2See e.g. Sutton (1991, 1998); Hallak (2006); Verhoogen (2008); Manova and Zhang (2012); Atkin et al.
(2017a); Bastos et al. (2018).
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vertically differentiated but otherwise homogeneous product.3 Furthermore, uniquely
rich data on the sector’s entire chain of production is available, including within-firm
transactions and direct measures of output quality. Finally, there is substantial—and
plausibly exogenous—variation in the quality premium, the price differential between
high and low quality fishmeal. This allows us to isolate explicit strategic responses to
incentives to quality upgrade.
Our analysis proceeds in four steps. We first present a simple theoretical frame-
work that describes how and why a firm’s choice of organizational structure may de-
pend on its output quality objectives. We then ask if quality upgrading motives are—
empirically—a direct determinant of integration decisions; that is, whether a manufac-
turer is more likely to integrate its suppliers when its returns to shifting from low to high
quality production are higher. Next, we explore the mechanisms through which output
quality objectives may impact integration decisions. We estimate how organizational
structure affects supplier behavior, focusing particularly on “switchers”—suppliers who
supply the same plant before and after being integrated (or sold). To conclude, we in-
vestigate whether integration ultimately raises output quality.
There are several reasons why unique data is available on the fishmeal industry in
Peru. The regulatory authorities record all transactions between fishmeal plants and
suppliers, and require firms to report each of their plants’ production of fishmeal in the
“prime” (high) quality and the “fair average” (low) quality range each month, providing
a direct measure of quality.4 We can link these input and output quantities to all export
transactions, which are recorded in customs data. Furthermore, researchers—but not
3Fishmeal is a brown powder made by burning or steaming fish, and mostly used as animal feed.
Peru’s fishmeal industry accounts for around 3 percent of GDP (Paredes and Gutierrez, 2008; De La Puente
et al., 2011). Price differentials across shipments of a given quality level in a given time period are negligi-
ble (see Sub-section 2.2.2). Our focus on a vertically differentiated but horizontally homogeneous product
is inspired by influential earlier papers testing market power theories of integration in sectors producing
homogeneous products (Syverson, 2004; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2007; Foster et al., 2008).
4See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007); Khandelwal (2010); Hallak and Schott (2011) for discussion of the
indirect quality proxies used in the existing literature, which risk conflating quality with mark-ups and
horizontal differentiation, and Atkin et al. (2017a) for an example of direct measures of quality.
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manufacturers—directly observe both independent and integrated suppliers’ behavior
because fishing boats are required to transmit GPS signals to the regulatory authorities.5
In combination, these data sources allow us to track the flow of goods—from suppliers,
to manufacturers, to foreign buyers—and provide the measures of output quality and
firm-supplier transactions necessary to establish a correlation between the quality of a
firm’s output and the organizational structure of its production chain.
However, even if documented with ideal data, such a correlation may reflect third
factors rather than an explicit organizational choice made in order to “climb” the quality
ladder. It could be, for example, that productivity or demand affect both firms’ choice
of structure and products produced without the two being directly related. It could also be
that firms integrate for reasons other than quality—for example to assure their own or
restrict competitors’ general access to inputs—but in the process coincidentally produce
higher quality output. To identify a direct relationship between output quality objec-
tives and integration, exogenous variation in incentives to upgrade quality—the quality
premium—that firms are differentially exposed to is needed.
The quality premium facing Peruvian fishmeal firms varies considerably during the
period we study. This allows us to test our causal hypothesis. Our empirical strategy
exploits season-to-season variation in the quality premium that is due to fluctuations in
the regulatory fishing quota-driven supply of high (and low) quality fishmeal in countries
other that Peru. We construct an instrument for the quality premium, and test whether
these fluctuations affect firms differently depending on their scope for upgrading qual-
ity.
We begin our analysis with a stylized model, which demonstrates how character-
istics of the Peruvian fishmeal industry map directly to the existing theoretical work
we build on. Fishmeal manufacturers face two important contracting challenges. First,
the quality of the product’s primary input—fish—is difficult to observe and, because
5The regulators do not allow manufacturers to access data on the behavior of independent suppliers.
This is the primary reason why manufacturers and independent suppliers cannot contract over GPS-
measured actions.
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of its perishable nature, even harder to contract upon. Second, the presence of out-
side options—other fishmeal firms who may value input quality less—complicates con-
trolling the incentives of an independent supplier (see also McMillan and Woodruff,
1999).6 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) elegantly demonstrate how, when suppliers
face a trade-off between producing inputs of high quality or in high volumes, weaken-
ing incentives over easier-to-measure quantity may be necessary to ensure that suppliers
do not neglect quality (see also Holmstrom and Tirole, 1991; Holmstrom, 1999). In many
situations, the best or only way to do so may be to bring the suppliers inside the firm
(Baker et al., 2001, 2002; Gibbons, 2005a,b).
To take these textbook theoretical insights to the data, we first demonstrate that out-
put quality is in fact significantly positively correlated with integration. Our primary
measure of quality is the share of a firm’s output that is of high quality grade—which we
directly observe in production data. We also consider a fine-grained (but not-directly-
observed) measure of the average quality grade of a firm’s output. Similarly, we con-
sider two different measures of vertical integration, one based on use of integrated ver-
sus independent suppliers and the other on supplier ownership. The relationship we
establish holds across each of our measures of a firm’s output quality and each of our
measures of a firm’s organizational structure.7
6It is in theory possible to imperfectly measure fish quality with chemical tests. As discussed in Section
2.2, industry insiders informed us that such tests were much too expensive and impractical to use during
our data period. Alternatively, manufacturers and their suppliers could attempt to contract on plants’
output quality. This would be difficult because of noise—input from multiple suppliers is, for technologi-
cal reasons, typically used in a given batch of fishmeal, and other hard-to-measure exogenous factors also
influence output quality realizations—and, more importantly, because outside inspectors would need to
be able to determine if low output quality was due to poor input quality or actions taken by the fishmeal
plant itself during the production process. The dynamic version of our model in Appendix B.2 demon-
strates why the presence of other fishmeal manufacturers who value input quality less can make repeated
interactions solutions to these challenges infeasible.
7Our primary measure of integration is the fraction of inputs that are sourced from integrated suppliers
(“Share VI”)—a measure that is motivated by our hypothesis that the characteristics of the inputs actually
delivered by a supplier changes with integration so that integration and output quality are causally linked
via firms’ (and individual plants’) production process. (On use of integrated versus independent suppliers,
see also, among others, Baker and Hubbard (2003); Atalay et al. (2014); Breza and Liberman (2017)). Al-
ternatively, we also consider the number of suppliers owned. Note that, in our setting, since boats’ total
seasonal catch is governed by a quota—and boats almost always exhaust their quota over the course of a
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We then proceed to our central empirical analysis, which consists of three key pieces
of evidence. The first of these—and this paper’s main finding—shows that vertical in-
tegration is used by firms as a strategy for increasing output quality. To demonstrate
this causally, we develop an IV for firm-specific incentives to upgrade quality. We in-
strument for the quality premium—the difference between the price of high and low
quality grades—using the quantities produced by other top exporters. Because the other
top exporters specialize in particular quality grades (e.g. Iceland produces primarily
high quality fishmeal, while Thailand produces primarily low quality), and because
their production quantities are driven by country specific regulatory fishing quotas,
these quantities generate plausibly exogenous variation in the premium. We test if this
variation differentially impacts Peruvian firms’ integration decisions depending on their
firm-specific scope for upgrading quality. Firms that are already producing mostly high
quality output have little scope to improve quality further and are hence unlikely to re-
spond strategically to an increase in the quality premium. Conversely, firms producing
mostly low quality output have significant scope to upgrade. Thus, if our hypothesis
is true—that is, if firms use integration as a strategy for upgrading quality—then firms
producing primarily or exclusively high quality output will face weaker incentives to
integrate when the quality premium rises.8
We find that Peruvian manufacturers integrate when their incentives to upgrade
quality rise, and vice versa. The industry as a whole integrates when the quality premium
increases for exogenous reasons and de-integrates when the quality premium falls. The
integration (de-integration) response is stronger for firms with greater scope for upgrad-
season—Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers can generally increase the total amount of inputs they obtain
from integrated suppliers in a given production season only by acquiring suppliers (see Section 2.2).
8A potential criticism of this argument is that firm-specific scope for quality upgrading might also cor-
relate with some unobservable related to the marginal cost of integration and/or quality upgrading. The
most natural forms of such arguments—that firms producing high quality output (a) have low marginal
costs of further upgrading and are also more likely to integrate in general, or (b) have low marginal costs
of integration and are also more likely to upgrade in general—predict the opposite of our findings. Fur-
thermore, as our primary measure of quality is a share (rather than a level), arguments such as (a) cannot
hold for firms that are already producing exclusively high quality, as they mechanically have no scope to
improve further. Our results considering these firms are similar.
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ing (downgrading) quality.9 In an alternative approach shown in the Appendix, we ex-
ploit a different form of variation to show that firms similarly integrate when faced with
greater firm-specific relative demand for high quality output. Finally, and crucially, we
show that firms’ organizational response to the quality premium does not reflect associ-
ated income shocks or general incentives to expand production of any-quality fishmeal:
firms do not integrate suppliers when faced with higher average prices.
This first piece of evidence is hard to reconcile with alternative theories in which
higher output quality is an unforeseen by-product of vertical integration driven by
other motives and with stories wherein organizational structure and output quality are
not causally linked in the “minds” of firms. Several of the most prominent, specific al-
ternative explanations—such as firms integrating suppliers for general supply assur-
ance reasons but coincidentally achieving higher quality in the process, and foreclosure
motivations—are also inconsistent with other features of the context we study and auxil-
iary findings.10 Our results indicate that quality upgrading itself is an important motive
for integrating suppliers.
Next we explore why firms use integration as a strategy for upgrading quality. Our
second key piece of evidence shows that integration changes suppliers’ behavior, caus-
ing them to shift towards quality-increasing actions. We proxy for actions that increase
input quality—i.e., fish freshness (FAO, 1986)11—using GPS-based measures. We show
9The long-term trend is towards more integration in the Peruvian fishmeal industry, and the long-
term trends in demand for quality and average output quality in Peru are also positive. These broad
patterns are consistent with our hypothesis. However, it is higher frequency variation around the long-
term trends that we exploit to test our hypothesis. For example, we also observe de-integration during our
data period—sales of boats from fishmeal firms to independent co-ops or captains, and from one fishmeal
firm to another.
10We show that (i) Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers appear to achieve general supply assurance pri-
marily through repeated interactions with independent suppliers (see also Martinez-Carrasco, 2017)—
the quantity supplied by a given supplier to a given firm is in fact lower after integration (/before de-
integration)—and (ii) repeated interactions with suppliers do not enable firms to produce higher quality
output. Similarly, the relationship between output quality and integration holds when we control for a
firm’s share of the industry’s total production, in contrast to what traditional “foreclosure” theories would
predict.
11“Freshness of raw material is important in its effect on the quality of the protein in [quality of] the
end product [fishmeal]. The importance of minimizing the time between catching fish and processing,
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that—as the managers in the industry we interviewed reported to us12—a given supplier
supplying a given plant delivers lower total quantities, but inputs whose quality has been
better maintained, when integrated with the plant. We also show that, in the context
we study, it is integration per se—not repeated interactions—that influences a supplier’s
quantity-versus-quality behavior. This result is consistent with a dynamic version of
our model—which, along with the result, is shown in Appendix B.2—and with the fact
that suppliers that de-integrate from a firm/plant supply that firm/plant almost as often
after the change in status. Finally, we consider the possibility that integration affects be-
havior not via a supplier’s quantity-quality trade-off, but instead via associated knowl-
edge transfers, of the form that Atalay et al. (2014) convincingly show occur in the U.S.
post-integration. We find that a given supplier behaves “as an integrated supplier” only
when supplying its owner firm and not when owned by one firm but supplying another.
Reconciling this finding with knowledge transfer theories would require such knowl-
edge transfers to be useful only when supplying the parent firm. We ultimately cannot
rule out that other incentives emanating from organizational structure itself than those
our model focuses on also help explain the impact of integration on supplier behavior,
but our third piece of evidence suggests that any such alternative incentives would need
to ultimately benefit downstream output quality.
Our third piece of evidence indicates that vertical integration in fact increases output
quality, as the managers in the industry we interviewed reported to us. (In the words of
Ricardo Bernales Parodi, Managing Director of Pesquera Diamante, Peru’s third largest
fishmeal company: “Around 80 percent of my company’s fishmeal is high-quality. If
all my inputs came from integrated boats, around 95 percent of my fishmeal output
would be of high-quality.” (Authors’ translation).) We first show that the firm level
relationship between the share of inputs coming from integrated suppliers—Share VI—
and of keeping the fish at low temperatures by icing [which reduces the amount of fish a boat can fit], has
already been mentioned” (FAO, 1986, sub-section 10.1.2).
12In the words of a prominent executive of Peru’s National Fisheries Society: “as a consequence of
integration, they must adopt my rules. Things like saying, ‘hey, you must offload raw 24 hours after
having caught it, at the maximum.”’ (Authors’ translation).
48
and output quality holds also at the individual plant level, including within firms. We
then instrument for a plant’s Share VI using a leave-firm-supplied-out measure of the
local presence of a particular type of supplier that is prohibited by regulation from being
integrated. The presence of such suppliers fluctuates due to natural variation in fish
density, weather, and decisions made by their captains. The logic behind the instrument
is simply that a plant—holding fixed output quality objectives—will be forced to source
a higher share of its inputs from integrated suppliers when there happens to be a local
scarcity of independent suppliers.13 The IV estimates are very similar to OLS estimates.
When viewed through the lens of our model, the three key pieces of evidence we
present each follow logically from each other. We conclude that firms vertically integrate
in order to produce higher quality products, and that the reason they do so appears to
be that integration changes supplier behavior in a way that increases output quality.
A natural question is whether our results are specific to Peru’s fishmeal industry.
However, because input quality is so frequently difficult to observe (and hence incen-
tivize), the challenges we describe—while far from universal—are likely typical of in-
dustries producing vertically differentiated output, particularly in settings where con-
tracts are difficult to enforce.14 In the concluding section of this chapter, we document a
positive relationship between (a proxy for) the average quality of a given type of man-
ufacturing product a country exports to the U.S. and the average degree of vertical in-
tegration among the exporters. This provides suggestive evidence that the relationship
between firms’ output quality and organizational structure we establish in this chapter
may hold more broadly in export manufacturing industries.
13Plausible arguments against the exclusion restriction underlying our interpretation of the IV results
would require a positive sign on the first stage (negative correlation between the use of independent sup-
pliers by different plants in a locality), a negative sign on the second stage (use of independent suppliers
increasing output quality), and/or a time-varying, location level component of output quality (that goes
beyond the presence of independent suppliers)—none of which we find. The IV results are very similar
if we instrument with the total number of independent suppliers present, rather than the subset that is
independent by law.
14There is a robust relationship between countries’ input-output structure and their level of contract
enforcement (Nunn, 2007; Boehm, 2016), and vertical integration is more common in developing countries
(Acemoglu et al., 2009; Macchiavello, 2011).
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Our study bridges and advances the literatures on the boundaries of the firm and
quality upgrading.15 We make three contributions to the former. First, we identify an
overlooked motivation for vertical integration. By showing that firms vertically inte-
grate in order to raise output quality, we advance the body of work on the causes of
organizational form (for seminal empirical work, see Hart et al. (1997); Baker and Hub-
bard (2003, 2004); Forbes and Lederman (2009)). Existing studies convincingly demon-
strate how firms change their relative use of integrated suppliers in response to changes
in e.g. available contracts (Breza and Liberman, 2017) or monitoring technology (Baker
and Hubbard, 2003). We instead study how firms change their organizational structure
when their output objectives change.16
Second, and building on earlier studies of the behavior of integrated and indepen-
dent suppliers (Mullainathan and Sharfstein, 2001; Baker and Hubbard, 2003, 2004; Mac-
chiavello and Miquel-Florensa, 2016), we provide what to our knowledge is the first
evidence on how integration changes the quality-oriented behavior of a given supplier
supplying a given firm. To do so we follow Atalay et al. (2014) and exploit changes in
integration within supplier-firm pairs.
Finally, we show that vertically integrating raises output quality, which to our knowl-
edge has not been done before. The one-dimensional nature of quality differentiation in
our setting allows us to document this.17 In general, there is little existing evidence on
15There is also a prominent literature studying the relationship between integration and international
trade (Antràs (2014, 2016) provides excellent overviews of this literature), but our focus is on firms’ do-
mestic organizational structure.
16In a superficial sense, our finding that higher average fishmeal prices do not lead to more integration
in the Peruvian fishmeal industry contrasts with the innovative work of Alfaro et al. (2016). We see our
results as largely consistent with and complementary to theirs, however. Both their analysis and ours
emphasize the impact of prices in the context of certain goods—in our case high quality products—where
integration generates a gain in efficiency. We highlight that this efficiency gain is not generic, but rather
depends on firms’ quality objectives, while they emphasize that efficiency gains can also depend on the
need to coordinate production stages.
17In settings where product differentiation is multidimensional, an analysis like ours would be difficult.
Like this paper, the pioneering study by Forbes and Lederman (2010) exploits exogenous drivers of use
of integrated suppliers, showing that routes airlines self-manage have fewer delays/cancellations (see
also Gil et al., 2016; Gil and Kim, 2016). Other important evidence on the consequences of organizational
structure includes, among others, Novak and Stern (2008); Gil (2009).
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causal consequences of organizational structure for firm performance (see Gibbons and
Roberts (2013), and Forbes and Lederman (2010) for a notable exception). Our results
also imply that using independent suppliers is often efficient for producing output in high
volumes rather than of high quality (see also Kosová et al., 2013). An especially unusual
aspect of this paper is that the data and variation we exploit allow us to identify both
the effectiveness of particular firm strategy and corresponding determinants of its use.
We can therefore show that Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers vertically integrate when
quality objectives indicate that they should do so.18
Both the friction—imperfect contracting over input quality—and the firm objective—
producing high quality output—we focus on are especially relevant for poorer countries
attempting to help meet growing global demand for quality. This connects our paper
with a smaller empirical literature on the causes and consequences of firms’ choice of
organizational structure in the developing world that began with Woodruff (2002)’s
landmark study (see also Natividad, 2014; Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa, 2016;
Martinez-Carrasco, 2017).19
The literature on quality upgrading is larger. It is now well-documented that produc-
ers of high quality goods use high quality inputs (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Halpern
et al., 2015a; Amodio and Martinez-Carrasco, 2018; Bastos et al., 2018), skilled workers
(Verhoogen, 2008; Frías et al., 2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Brambilla and Porto, 2016;
Brambilla et al., ming), and export to richer destinations (Hallak, 2006; Verhoogen, 2008;
Manova and Zhang, 2012; Atkin et al., 2017a; Bastos et al., 2018). Firms with such a pro-
18Existing empirical papers on firms almost exclusively study either the effectiveness of a strategy or the
determinants of its use.
19Woodruff finds that forward integration is less common in the Mexican footwear industry when non-
contractible investment by retailers is important, as the property rights framework predicts (Grossman
and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa (2016) convincingly show how
supply assurance motives influence organizational structure in the Costa Rican coffee industry by relating
measures of ex post reneging temptations to ex ante choice of structure (see also Banerjee and Duflo, 2000;
Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2015). We follow Natividad (2014) in studying organizational structure in
the Peruvian fishmeal industry. He focuses on an earlier period when an unusual regulatory system—
industry-wide fishing quotas—generated common pool incentives famously overshadowing other forms
of supplier/plant incentives (see e.g. Tveteras et al., 2011), which lead to an “Olympic race” for fish.
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file tend on average to be bigger, more productive, based in richer countries themselves,
and to face foreign competition in low-quality segments (Schott, 2004; Hummels and
Klenow, 2005; Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Medina, 2017). We provide
the first evidence linking quality upgrading to the boundaries of the firm.
2.2 Background on Peru’s Fishmeal Manufacturing Sector
In this section we provide an overview of Peru’s fishmeal manufacturing sector. We ar-
gue that three features are particularly salient for firms attempting to source high quality
inputs: input quantity is measurable at the time of delivery, but input quality is not, and
formal contracts appear to be difficult to write.
2.2.1 Sector profile
Fishmeal is a brown powder made by burning or steaming fish (in Peru, the anchoveta),
and is primarily used as feed for agriculture and aquaculture. Peru makes up around 30
percent of the world’s fishmeal exports. During our data period, 2009 to 2016, around
95 percent of the country’s total fishmeal production was exported. The three largest
buyers are China, Germany, and Japan, but many other countries also import Peruvian
fishmeal (see Appendix Table B.1).
Fishmeal is produced in manufacturing plants located along the coast of Peru, of
which there were 94 in 2009. These plants were in turn owned by 37 firms. There is
heterogeneity in processing capacity, technology, and the share of production that is
of high quality grade across both firms and individual plants in our sample. Firms
differ considerably in their average number of export transactions per season, and in the
size and value of their shipments. As seen in Appendix Figure B.1, firm size correlates
positively with average quality grade produced.
Plants receive inputs of raw fish from their suppliers. The suppliers may be large
steel boats—which may be independent or owned by the firm that owns the plant—or
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smaller wooden boats. Regulations prohibit fishmeal firms from owning wooden boats.
There are on average 812 boats active in a given season, and significant heterogeneity in
boat characteristics such as storage capacity, engine power, and average quantity caught
per trip. Fishing trips last 21 hours (s.d. = 10 hours) and boats travel 76 kilometers
away from the port of delivery (s.d. = 46 kilometers) on average. Changes in installed
technology are observed in our data but rare both for boats and plants. Table 2.1 shows
summary statistics, providing further detail on the sector.
Since 2009, boats in Peru have operated under Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs),
a common resource management system used in fisheries and natural resource sectors
worldwide. Individual boats are assigned a share of an industry-wide quota. We limit
our analysis to the time period after ITQs were implemented to avoid any potential
changes in quality production or integration driven by the quota system.
2.2.2 Product differentiation and quality
An important feature of fishmeal is that output quality effectively depends on a single—
measurable—dimension: protein content. Batches with protein content above a speci-
fied percentage are labeled “prime” quality, and plants report their production of prime
and “fair average” (below prime) quality fishmeal to regulatory authorities each month.
Price differentials across transactions for Peruvian fishmeal of a given quality grade in a
given time period are negligible, highlighting the horizontal homogeneity of the prod-
uct.
Fishmeal’s protein content depends crucially on input characteristics, namely the
freshness and integrity of the raw fish that boats deliver (see e.g. FAO, 1986). Freshness
and integrity of the fish at the time of delivery in turn depends on choices made by the
boat’s captain before and during a trip, such as the amount of ice brought on board,
the amount of fished packed on board, how tightly fish is packed, and the time spent
between a catch and delivery to a plant (FAO, 1986). Because of the relationship between
freshness and output quality, fish is processed as soon as possible after offload.
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While it is easy to weigh and determine the quantity of fish a boat delivers, it is
difficult to quantify or measure fish freshness directly. In theory, chemical tests of total
volatile nitrogen content can be used to do so (imperfectly), but the managers in the
industry we interviewed reported that such tests were too costly and time-consuming to
be usable in Peru during our data period. In addition to the fixed cost of (the human and
physical capital required for) adoption, this was due to high marginal cost of use and
the value lost if fish was not processed immediately after offload. Footnote 6 discusses
the extent to which input quality can be inferred from output quality post-production.
After offload, the fish is weighed, cleaned, and converted to fishmeal using one of
two technologies: steam drying (hereinafter “High technology”) or exposing the fish
directly to heat (hereinafter “Low technology”). The technology used can matter for the
protein content achieved.
Peru allows anchovy fishing for fishmeal production during two seasons each year
and because of the need for fresh fish, fishmeal plants operate only during the fishing
seasons. There were thus 14 fishing and fishmeal production seasons during our 2009-
2016 study period. In theory fishmeal can be stored for a short period of time, but
we find that almost all is sold before the next production season begins, as shown in
Appendix Figure B.2 and discussed below.
2.2.3 Organizational structure
Consistent with our hypothesis, both integration and average output quality have slowly
increased over time in the Peruvian fishmeal industry. However, these long-term trends
are not the source of the relationship between organizational structure and quality up-
grading we establish in this chapter. This is because our empirical strategy exploits
variation around the long-term trends for identification.
There is significant buying and selling of suppliers during our sample period. As
seen in Panel A of Table 2.2, we observe 317 instances where ownership of a steel boat
changes hands. In 103 of these instances, a fishmeal firm acquires a supplier that is
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initially owned independently, that is, by a co-op or an individual captain. However, we
also observe 32 instances where a supplier is sold from a fishmeal firm to an independent
buyer, and 50 instances where a supplier is sold from one fishmeal firm to another. On
average, 28 percent of the boats that are active in a given season are integrated with a
fishmeal firm.
In our data, we observe not only supplier ownership but also deliveries from integrated
and independent suppliers. We can therefore construct a measure of the vertical struc-
ture of firms’ production process, namely the share of inputs coming from integrated
suppliers (“Share VI”). Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers’ Share VI is on average 45 per-
cent. Firms can generally increase or decrease the total amount of inputs that come from
integrated suppliers only by buying or selling boats. The reason is that a boat’s total
catch in a given season is governed by a regulatory quota, and each boat typically ex-
hausts its quota. Of course, a firm may vary its Share VI also by increasing or decreasing
its use of independent suppliers. As seen in Appendix Figure B.3, and following the
trend in ownership, Share VI slowly increased during our data period—by 2.9 percent
from season to season. Approximately 77 percent of this growth came solely from in-
creasing the amount of input coming from integrated suppliers, and the rest from lower
total input purchases, as shown in Panel B of Table 2.2.
Importantly for our purposes, Share VI can be defined not just for firms, but also
for individual plants within firms. A plant’s Share VI at a given point in time depends
mostly on the organizational structure of the firm the plant belongs to, but there is sig-
nificant variation across plants within the same firm. This variation depends both on the
extent to which firm managers direct integrated suppliers to deliver to one plant over
another, and on the presence of independent suppliers near a given plant. The latter
varies considerably over time, and depends on variation in weather, fish density, and
independent captains’ decisions.
Figure 2.1 shows that integration and de-integration primarily represents a change
in the formal status of the relationship between a firm/plant and a supplier engaged in
frequent and continuing interactions. The figure displays the fraction of trips suppliers
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deliver to various firms and plants. The top part of the figure focuses on all boats, while
the bottom part of the figure restricts attention to the “switchers” we focus on in our em-
pirical analysis of supplier behavior in Section 2.6. These switchers—suppliers that get
integrated or sold—deliver to the plant (within the acquiring/selling firm) they interact
with most frequently around 41 percent of the time when independent (i.e. before getting
acquired or after getting sold), and around 45 percent of the time when integrated. Simi-
larly, switchers deliver to the acquiring/selling firm around 63 percent of the time when
independent and around 81 percent of the time when integrated.20
2.2.4 Contracting and supplier incentives
There is no centralized spot market for fish purchases: plants are spread out along the
coast, both because the fish move around and because of geography’s influence on the
location of ports. Similarly, the movements of boats are a complex function of fishing
conditions, weather (winds, swell, etc), and the captains’ incentives. Because of the im-
portance of fish freshness, independent captains typically begin contacting plants over
the radio on their way to a port after fishing.
We interviewed fishmeal industry associations, a major company’s Managing Direc-
tor, another major company’s Chief Operating Officer, and others in the sector to gain
a qualitative understanding of the characteristics of the contracts used and the incen-
tives suppliers face. The interviewees reported that captains of boats owned by fishmeal
firms generally are paid a fixed wage, in some cases with a bonus tied to some measure
of performance.21
We are not aware of formal contracts between independent suppliers and firms over
when, where, or what quality of fish to deliver. Interviewees reported that payments
20In the top part of the figure, we see that, as a whole, integrated suppliers deliver to the firm they
deliver to most often (i.e., the parent firm) about 90 percent of their trips, and the plant they deliver to
most often 38 percent of trips. Independent suppliers deliver to the firm they deliver to most often around
65 percent of trips, and the plant they deliver to most often 45 percent of trips.
21The fishmeal industry associations reported that payment schemes vary across firms; that some pay
bonuses tied to measures of performance; but that these are on top of a fixed wage and usually small.
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to independent suppliers—while agreed upon case by case—are typically simply the
quantity multiplied by a going price. We use internal data on payments to suppliers
from a large firm to confirm this. These indicate that independent suppliers at a given
point in time are paid a price per metric ton of fish delivered that is essentially fixed:
Port×Date fixed effects explain 99 percent of the price variation across transactions.
Our data on suppliers’ behavior—discussed in Section 2.4—come from a map the
regulators update roughly every hour using the GPS signals all boats are required to
transmit to authorities while fishing. Firms are allowed to access information on their
integrated suppliers’ whereabouts if they install the required technology, but not the
GPS data of independent suppliers or those owned by other firms. This is a primary rea-




In this section we present a simple model to highlight how vertical integration may re-
solve the contracting issues facing downstream firms that aim to produce high quality
output. The intuition of the model is based on two insights. First, high powered in-
centives to produce quantity can lead to actions that are wasteful and even harmful to
quality. Second, the open market provides independent suppliers strong incentives to
produce quantity and, in a setting where contracts are difficult to write, the only way to
temper those incentives may be to integrate.
The first point of intuition above—the tradeoff between quality and quantity—is one
of the classic examples of the challenges of designing incentives in a multitask environ-
ment, and in fact is used by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) to motivate their seminal
work. This is for the simple reason that input quantity is typically straightforward to
measure and reward, while quality is not. As a result, care must be taken not to over-
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incentivize quantity to the detriment of quality.
Of course, the difficulty of determining quality is somewhat of a stereotype: there
are goods for which quality depends on something like strength or size or durability
that is just as easy to measure as quantity. However, in our setting, this stereotype seems
broadly accurate. While the quantity of fish that suppliers deliver is easily measured, the
quality of that fish is difficult to ascertain for a purchasing manager examining several
tons of anchoveta.
A few pieces of context are helpful to understand the second point of intuition above.
Firstly, it appears that contracts are difficult to write ex-ante: independent suppliers
retain their right to deliver their catch where they choose. Additionally, while some
firms primarily produce high protein content fishmeal, others primarily produce low
quality grades, and hence provide a (presumably less quality sensitive) alternative for
suppliers to deliver their catch.22
With this in mind, a logic applies that is familiar from the models presented in Baker
et al. (2001, 2002), based on the notion of integration as asset ownership that follows
Grossman and Hart (1986). Even if a firm interested in sourcing high quality inputs
has no interest in high volumes, the fact that an independent supplier has the option to
sell its inputs to an alternative downstream firm that values quantity creates powerful
incentives. The independent supplier will then invest in producing quantity—although
it may be wasteful or detrimental—if only to improve its bargaining position with the
quality focused firm. By acquiring the supplier, the manufacturer removes this outside
option, and hence any incentive for wasteful or harmful investment in quantity. In this
sense, integration is valuable precisely because it mutes the power of market incentives,
a notion that has been described by Williamson (1971), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994),
and Gibbons (2005a), among others.
22A question that our model abstracts from is why firms might want to produce different quality levels
simultaneously. We return to this question at the end of Section 2.3.
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2.3.2 Model details
We consider a static game with two actors: suppliers and high quality firms. Suppli-
ers take costly actions to produce a good that is valuable both to the firms and in an
alternative use. They may be integrated or independent. If the suppliers are integrated,
the firms that own them have the right to the good after the actions are taken. If the
suppliers are independent, they retain the right to the good. They bargain with the high
quality firms over whether to deliver the good or consign it to its alternative use.








2. These actions impact the surplus created by delivering their inputs to a down-
stream quality focused firm. We denote this surplus by Q, and refer to it as the quality
surplus. Suppliers’ actions also impact the surplus they receive by delivering the inputs
to an alternative—quantity focused—downstream firm. We denote this by P, and refer
to it as the quantity surplus. We assume that the good is specific, in the sense that Q > P.
In particular, we define:
P = a1
Q = Q0 − γa1 + δa2.
with γ, δ ≥ 0.23 In this sense, a1 is a quantity focused action, while a2 is a quality focused
action. While this is a simplified model, a1 can be thought of along the lines of fishing
for extended periods to catch the maximum amount, traveling long distances to find
fish in high volumes, or packing the hold tightly with fish. On the other hand, a2 can be
thought of as carrying extra ice on board to keep the catch cool, or taking care to ensure
that the fish are not crushed. Q0 is a baseline level of quality surplus.24 Note also that a1
enters negatively in Q, to capture the notion that actions taken to increase the quantity
23More specifically, we assume that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1− α. Also, note that P could itself be the
result of a bargaining process between the boat and a quantity focused firm.
24This can be thought of as the amount that suppliers will catch before exerting any costly action, or
perhaps more reasonably as the result of some limited contractual agreement that we abstract from.
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caught, such as packing the hold tightly with fish, often adversely affect quality.
We assume that neither P nor Q is contractible, but that P—the quantity surplus—is
perfectly observable at the time of bargaining and Q—the quality surplus—is not. All
parties know the value of Q0, and because P = a1 is observable, Q in effect has an
observable portion: Q˜ = Q0 − γa1 = Q− δa2.
Integrated suppliers
If a supplier is integrated, the firm has rights to the supplier’s catch. However, because
the firm cannot write contracts over Q and P, it cannot credibly commit to rewarding
the supplier’s actions. As a result, the supplier chooses a1 = 0 and a2 = 0, and the total
surplus is simply Q0.
Independent suppliers
Although neither Q nor P is contractible25, the firm and supplier may bargain ex-post
over the price of the delivery. We assume a Nash bargaining concept, with the supplier’s
bargaining coefficient equal to α. Because the supplier can always deliver its catch to the
alternative quantity focused firm and receive P, the supplier must always receive at least
P. The supplier additionally receives a share α of the observable portion of the surplus










This gives: a1 = (1− αγ− α), a2 = 0, and social surplus is
Q0 − γ(1− αγ− α)− 12(1− αγ− α)
2 < Q0
25Alternatively, we could assume that only a portion of Q and P is non-contractible, and that we con-
sider only this portion as in Baker et al. (2002).
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Because of the counterproductive actions to increase quantity (a1 > 0), and the
adverse effects of those actions on the quality surplus, the surplus is lower when the
suppliers are independent. As a result, the more efficient organizational structure to
produce quality is vertical integration.
It is worth noting that a number of assumptions made in this model are not strictly
necessary to get this result. The relative efficiency of integration holds whether or not
quantity focused actions directly negatively impacts the quality surplus (because of the
inefficiency of quality actions), and would hold even more strongly if, for example, there
were complementarities in the costs of quality and quantity actions.
2.3.3 Discussion
The theoretical role of vertical integration is a contentious topic. Our framing follows
Baker et al. (2001, 2002) in combining elements of the incentives based theories in the
tradition Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and the property rights theories in the vein
of Grossman and Hart (1986). Such a framing is not the only type of model that would
produce a relationship between integration and output quality. In actuality, integration
is a complex organizational change whose causes and consequences operate through
multiple mechanisms. However, because the foundations of the model above depend
on a series of salient features of our context—unobservable quality, observable quantity,
and alternative buyers that are less concerned with quality—and because we are able to
directly test the predictions of the model, we see these alternative theories as comple-
mentary to the mechanisms our framework focuses on, rather than contradictory.
Our model presents a highly stylized, and somewhat stark, example to highlight a
key intuition: that integration can act as a valuable tool for muting the incentives pro-
vided in the open market. We believe this starkness most simply portrays why firms in
our context might want to integrate in order to produce high quality output. That said,
this oversimplification does have a few drawbacks, most notably the lack of incentive
to take quality focused actions, and to take any actions at all when integrated. This is
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in some sense a strong version of what are sometimes called the drone employees (Gib-
bons, 2005a) that appear in property rights theories of the firm that follow Grossman
and Hart (1986). However, this feature may be easily remedied in more complex mod-
els that preserve the basic intuition and result. For example, assuming observability
over Q induces quality focused actions among independent suppliers and—for suffi-
ciently small values of δ—does not affect the main result. Perhaps more realistically,
introducing dynamics into the model, with long-term relationships between firms and
suppliers, creates an environment in which the incentives of the downstream and the
upstream parties can be aligned through repeated interactions.
In Appendix B.2, we present and test the empirical implications of exactly such a
dynamic model, in which we allow the downstream party to use relational contracts to
incentivize the quality action. We posit that Q—the quality surplus—can be observed
to the downstream party but only with some lag (e.g. once the inputs are processed
and output quality is measurable). The firm can then offer the supplier a (delayed)
reward contingent on this surplus, but can only credibly promise to pay this reward if
it interacts repeatedly with the upstream party. In this context, we show that the value
of the relationship can incentivize the supplier to take the first best actions, but that this
sort of relational contract may be difficult to sustain if the supplier is independent. The
intuition for this result is similar to our static baseline: independent suppliers own the
rights over the inputs, and when the value of these inputs in their alternative use is
high, they face incentives to renege on the relational contract and sell the goods in their
alternative use.
Our model above also implicitly demonstrates the costs of integration. The market
provides strong incentives for quantity, and for a low quality firm that is aiming to pro-
duce quantity, integration would only interfere with and lessen the strength of these in-
centives. Accordingly, quantity focused firms prefer independent suppliers. A similarly
formulated model, with the roles of high and low quality firms switched (e.g. P >> Q),
provides precisely this result.
In our stylized model, firms are either quality-oriented or not. In reality, a firm’s
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output objectives are likely a combination of quality surplus and quantity surplus in
which the weight attached to each depends on the demand the firm faces at a particular
point in time. In this case, firms should not source all inputs from either integrated or
non-integrated suppliers, but choose an intermediate organizational structure—that is,
an intermediate level of integration—that depends on the relative importance of Q and
P in the firm’s current objective function.
The framework presented in this section motivates three empirical predictions that
we test in the remainder of the chapter:
1. Firms’ organizational structure responds to variation in the relative profitability of
producing high quality output. An increase in the quality premium—for example
due to increased demand for high quality grades—leads to more integration, that
is, a higher share of inputs from sourced from integrated suppliers.
2. The reason is that the actions of a supplier differ when the supplier is integrated.
In particular, suppliers that get integrated reduce their effort to produce quantity,
especially in ways that benefit quality.
3. As a result, the degree to which a firm or plant uses integrated suppliers affects
output quality. Firms that use inputs from integrated suppliers produce higher
quality output.
2.4 Data, Variables, and the Relationship of Interest
2.4.1 Data
The primary datasets we use to test our three predictions are the following:
Plant production. Administrative data on all plants’ production come from Peru’s
Ministry of Production, which regulates the fishmeal industry. Every month plants are
required to submit information on how much prime (high quality) and fair average
(low quality) fishmeal they produce. Quality grade is thus directly reported in the plant
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production data, and subject to auditing by government inspectors. As discussed in
Sub-section 2.2.2, the distinction between prime and fair average quality is based on the
fishmeal’s protein content. From these records, we construct each individual plant’s and
each firm’s “high quality share of production” in a given month or production season.
Plant registry. We link the production data with an administrative plant registry that
contains monthly information on each plant’s (i) technological production capacity and
(ii) owner, typically a multi-plant fishmeal firm.26 We also use this registry to link the
production data to export data. We can do so for almost all firms, but not the smallest
firms, which use intermediaries to export.
Export transactions. Detailed data on the universe of fishmeal exports at the trans-
action level come from Peru’s customs authority. We observe the date of the transaction,
the export port, the destination country, the weight of the fishmeal, the value of the
transaction, and the exporting firm.
Internal data from a large firm. One of the largest fishmeal firms in Peru shared
its internal sales records with us. The firm owns many plants along the coast. The
sales records include information on the shipment’s packing, its free-on-board value, the
price per metric ton, the buyer, destination country, date of the contract, and the terms.
Most importantly for our purposes, the specific plant that produced a given shipment
of fishmeal is reported.
Supply transactions. The Ministry of Production records all transactions between
the fishmeal plants and their suppliers of raw materials, i.e. fishing boats. Informa-
tion on the date of the transaction, the boat, the plant, and the amount of fish involved
(though not the price), is included.
Boat registry. We merge the supply transactions data with an administrative boat
registry that provides information on a boat’s owner, the material the boat is made of,
26The data contains information on the number of metric tons that can be produced per hour with cur-
rently installed Low and High technology. As very few firms in our sample only have the Low technology,
we define a High technology firm as one for which the High technology share of total processing capacity
is higher than the median (0.67).
64
its storage capacity and engine power, and whether it has a cooling system installed.27
Boat GPS data. Peruvian fishing boats that supply fishmeal plants are required
to have a GPS tracking system installed, and to continuously transmit their GPS sig-
nal to the Ministry of Production while at sea. The ministry stores the transmitted
information—the boat’s ID, latitude, longitude, speed, and direction—each hour on av-
erage, and shared the resulting dataset with us.28
2.4.2 Variables of interest
Our primary measure of an individual plant’s output quality is the share of the fishmeal
the plant produces in a given month that is of “prime” quality grades—a direct measure
of quality whose interpretation requires no assumptions. We aggregate this measure
up to firm level to construct a corresponding measure of a firm’s “high quality share of
production”.
We also construct a granular measure of the average quality grade—protein content—
of the fishmeal a firm produces. While we do not directly observe the exact protein
content of each export shipment, we can go beyond simply using unit prices and ap-
proximate the precise quality grade. This is because we observe quality grade-specific
fishmeal prices in detailed (week×export port×protein content level) data recorded
by a fishmeal consulting company. We infer the protein content of each of a firm’s
export shipments by comparing the corresponding unit values to this price data. To
construct a firm×season level measure, we average protein content across export ship-
ments, weighting by quantity.29 A priori, we have little reason to believe that this in-
27Information on engine power is only available for 2004-2006. However, changes in engine power are
extremely rare in that period, so we treat this characteristic as fixed over time.
28Only about half of the observations in the Supply transactions dataset can be matched to a GPS record-
ing. Some boat owners, for example, disappear from the GPS data for a complete calendar year. However,
such missingness is unlikely to be of concern for within-boat analysis, the level at which we use the GPS
data.
29The export transaction records do not report the specific plant that made the fishmeal so the inferred
quality grade is only available at the firm level—except for data covering the fishmeal firm that shared
internal data with us, including information on the plant that produced a given export shipment. One
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ferred protein content measure could be systematically biased.30 Empirically, it is highly
correlated with the “high quality share of production” directly observed for a firm’s
plants in production data, and with the exact quality grade reported in the sales records
of a firm that shared its data with us.
To quantify vertical integration, we consider both the number of suppliers a firm owns,
and the corresponding share of inputs used in its production process that come from in-
tegrated suppliers (“Share VI”). Share VI is our preferred measure of integration for a
number of reasons. Because we observe all transactions between plants and suppliers,
we can construct Share VI in a consistent manner for both firms and individual plants.
This allows us to move from the across firm comparisons we make in Section 2.5 to the
within firm comparisons we make in Section 2.7. Furthermore, Share VI automatically
captures suppliers’ size, allowing us to avoid assumptions on “scale effects”—e.g. how
the benefit of one big integrated supplier compares to two small ones. Finally, Share VI
is the more relevant measure when asking whether organizational structure and output
quality are causally related: if firms vertically integrate when the quality premium rises
because doing so allows them to increase input quality, then it should matter not just if
a firm owns suppliers, but the degree to which the firm as a whole and its individual
potential concern is that fishmeal can be stored for a short period, and hence firms could attempt to
strategically time their export transactions. In practice the product is almost always sold before the next
production season starts. (The reason why inventories are small—between +10 and -10 percent of to-
tal season production (see Appendix Figure B.2)—is likely that many contracts are entered into before
the production season starts (which helps the fishmeal manufacturers and their foreign buyers reduce
demand/supply uncertainty), and because firms’ ability to strategically “time” their sales is in actuality
limited). A shipment can thus be traced back to a specific production season (but not a specific production
month; constructing the inferred protein content measure at month level would require an assumption
about how firms manage their inventories—for example, first-in-first-out versus first-in-last-out). A re-
lated concern is that firms that are about to end operations and close down might sell off their fishmeal,
in which case a lower unit price might not reflect lower quality but rather a “going-out-of-business” dis-
count. We thus exclude data from any firm×season observations that correspond to a firm’s last season
producing and exporting fishmeal, but the results are robust to including these observations. These issues
are not relevant for our directly observed “high quality share of production” measure of output quality.
30Fishmeal is a vertically differentiated but otherwise homogenous product, and price differentials
across shipments of a given quality level (and across firms producing a given quality level) in a given
time period are negligible (see Sub-section 2.2.2). This implies that pricing-to-market, bulk discounts, etc,
are not a concern.
66
plants actually source inputs from those suppliers at the time of production. Recall from
Sub-section 2.2.3 that Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers generally use integrated suppli-
ers to capacity over the course of a season, so in the context we study, Share VI and
supplier ownership are closely related measures of integration.
2.4.3 Relationship of interest
In Section 2.5 we begin our analysis of how exogenous changes in incentives to quality
upgrade affect integration decisions. Before doing so, we first demonstrate that the basic
relationship predicted by our model holds empirically: integration and output quality
are positively correlated. To do so, we estimate regressions of the form:
Qualityit = α+ β1VIit + β2HighTechit + γi + δt + εit (2.1)
where Qualityit and VIit respectively measure the quality of the output produced by
firm i in season t and how vertically integrated the firm’s organizational structure is in
the same season. We control for the technology the firm uses to convert fish into fish-
meal,31 HighTechit, and firm and season fixed effects γi and δt. We thus estimate changes
in output quality for those firms that vertically integrate in a given season, relative to
other firms that do not. We cluster the standard errors at the firm level.
The results in Panel A of Table 2.3 point towards a strong baseline relationship be-
tween owning suppliers and output quality. The estimates in column 3 imply, for exam-
ple, that moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of number of boats owned is associated
with an increase in protein content of just under 10 percent of the range observed in
Peru.32
31A firm’s production technology is an important potential determinant of output quality, and one that
could plausibly correlate with organizational structure (Acemoglu et al., 2007, 2010). We thus control for
installed HighTechit, i.e., steam drying (High) technology. At the firm level, HighTechit is equal to the
share of installed capacity that is of the high type.
32Firms in the 25th percentile own four boats, while firms in the 75th percentile own 36 boats. βˆ ×
(asinh(36) − asinh(4)) = 0.43. The range of protein content observed in Peru is approximately 63-68
percent.
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In Panel B we show that, beyond simply owning suppliers, what matters for output
quality is Share VI: the share of a firm’s supplies coming from integrated suppliers at the time of
production. The results imply that a firm that uses inputs coming entirely from integrated
suppliers rather than inputs entirely from independent suppliers sees a share of high
quality output that is 50 percent higher, and an average protein content that is higher by
about 20 percent of the range observed in Peru.
In Panel C we show that these results are not not driven by observable, time-varying
supplier or firm characteristics. We control for the firm’s share of total industry produc-
tion and a series of supplier characteristics. Doing so has little impact on the estimated
coefficient.33
In Appendix B.2, we consider whether the relationship between output quality and
integration might be the result of long-term supplier-firm relationships, rather than
ownership per se. This does not appear to be the case, as we do not observe the as-
sociation between quality and the share of inputs coming from suppliers in long-term
relationships that we do for Share VI. In other words, it is integration itself, not the re-
lationship, that co-varies with output quality. This is in line with the predictions of a
dynamic version of our model, also shown in Appendix B.2.
The relationship between a firm’s organizational structure and its output quality that
we established in this sub-section is the starting point of our empirical analysis. This ba-
sic relationship is consistent with this paper’s hypothesis. However, it is also consistent
with the alternative theories discussed in the introduction. In these theories, a corre-
lation between integration and output quality arises, but the relationship is either not
causal or not known to (or ignored by) firms. We rule out such explanations in the next
33Controlling for the share of inputs coming from steel boats, high capacity boats, and boats with a
cooling system leaves the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on share of inputs coming from VI
suppliers essentially unchanged. Note that two of the supplier characteristics variables included—Share
of inputs from high capacity boats and Share of inputs from boats with cooling system—are significantly
correlated with output quality in the cross-section of firms. One reason why the coefficients on these char-
acteristics are not significant is that we observe little change in these boat characteristics over time. Con-
trolling for the firm’s share of total industry production also leaves the magnitude and significance of the
coefficient on Share VI essentially unchanged.
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section.
2.5 The Quality Premium and Organizational Structure
We now show that the relationship between output quality and vertical integration we
established in the previous section reflects an explicit organizational choice firms make
in order to “climb” the quality ladder. Specifically, Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers inte-
grate suppliers when the returns they earn from upgrading quality rises for exogenous
reasons. This finding provides empirical support for the prediction that a vertically
integrated organizational structure is efficient for producing high quality output. We
provide additional evidence that makes clear why this finding is difficult to reconcile
with alternative theories.
2.5.1 Estimating how the quality price premium affects vertical inte-
gration
We begin by showing that firms as a whole do vertically integrate when the quality pre-
mium is high and de-integrate when the quality premium is low. We quantify Integrationit—
a firm’s decision to integrate (de-integrate)—as a season-to-season increase (decrease) in
the share of inputs the firm obtains from integrated suppliers.34 We measure the quality
premium as the difference between the (log) price of high and low quality fishmeal.
We first show results from simple descriptive regressions of the form:
Integrationit = α+ βQualityPremiumt + ηi + εit. (2.2)
Here, β > 0 indicates that firms vertically integrate when the quality premium is high,
and ηi represents a firm fixed effect.
34Specifically, if VIit is defined as Share VI, we analyze VIit − VIit−1, where t indicates a season. In
Appendix Table B.3 we show all of our results using VIit, rather than the difference, with qualitatively
similar results.
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The first column of Table 2.4 shows the results from this specification, omitting firm
fixed effects. There is a strong baseline correlation between the quality premium and
firm integration. The second column shows that this relationship holds both when the
quality premium increases and when it decreases. Firms vertically integrate when the
quality premium is high and de-integrate when the premium is low. In this specifica-
tion, we replace QualityPremiumt with two dummy variables: an indicator equal to one
when the quality premium is above the mean, and an indicator equal to one when the
quality premium is below the mean.35 The signs on the two coefficients suggest that
firms respond to both high and low levels of the quality premium, but the coefficient on
the high quality premium indicator is larger and significant.
In column 3 we show that firms’ response to the quality premium is not due to asso-
ciated income shocks or general incentives to expand or reduce production. We repeat
the regression from column 1, but with the Log(Average Price)—the average fishmeal
price in season t—replacing the quality premium as the regressor of interest. The esti-
mated coefficient is near zero and insignificant, indicating that firms are not more likely
to vertically integrate when the overall price level is high. Figure 2.2 highlights that the
quality premium in Peru is at most weakly correlated with average prices in Peru. It
is thus not surprising that firms respond differently to the two. Column 4 includes the
firm fixed effect, with effectively identical results to column 1. In sum there is a strong
relationship in the time series between the quality premium and vertical integration.
We next consider how the quality premium differentially impacts firms’ integration
decisions depending on their capacity to upgrade quality. Firms that are already pro-
ducing exclusively high quality output have no scope to upgrade the average quality
they produce. For these firms, an increase in the quality premium should not lead to a
change in organizational structure. Conversely, a firm that produces some mix of high
and low quality output has capacity to raise quality. If vertical integration indeed en-
hances output quality, we expect to see these firms integrate when the quality premium
35We omit the constant in this specification.
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rises.
To investigate this differential response, we interact QualityPremiumt with two mea-
sures of a firm’s capacity to upgrade. First, in each season t, we consider a binary indi-
cator for the firms who produced exclusively high quality output in season t− 1 (High
Quality Producers) versus those who produced at least some low quality output in t− 1
(Low Quality Producers). Second, we explicitly consider each firm’s share of low quality
production in season t− 1, which we refer to as the Upgradable Share of Production. For
example, a firm currently producing 25 percent high quality output has a 75 percent
Upgradable Share of Production. We consider specifications of the form:
Integrationit = α+ β(UpgradingCapacityit−1 ×QualityPremiumt) (2.3)
+ γUpgradingCapacityit−1 + ηi + δt + εit.
where UpgradingCapacityit−1 refers to either Low Quality Producer or Upgradable Share
of Production. The approach in (2.3) is a generalized difference-in-differences in which
firms that are more versus less exposed to changes in quality upgrading incentives are
compared in each of 13 different production seasons, and in each of these 13 seasons
the quality premium may be relatively high or relatively low. The season-to-season
variation in the quality premium is shown in Figure 2.2. While the long-term trend
is weakly positive during our data period, the quality premium fluctuates substan-
tially from season to season, sometimes rising and other times falling. We control for
UpgradingCapacityit−1 itself, firm and production season fixed effects (γi and δt), and
cluster the standard errors at the firm level.36 Our hypothesis implies that β1 > 0.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.4 show OLS results from these specifications for Low Qual-
36The fact that we control for the characteristic that defines a firm’s exposure to a “treatment” variable
that varies across time—here UpgradingCapacityit−1—distinguishes our approach from traditional Bar-
tik instrument approaches (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2017). Note also that firms’ upgrading capacity
evolves over time. A strength of our approach is thus that the high and low Upgrading Capacityit−1 firms
being compared across one rise or fall in the quality premium may differ from those being compared
across another rise or fall.
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ity Producer and Upgradable Share of Production, respectively. Under both definitions, we
find that firms with greater scope to shift from low to high quality production are more
likely to vertically integrate when the quality premium is high—consistent with our hy-
pothesis and the model in Section 2.3. It is worth noting that if—not implausibly—firms
producing a high share of high quality output face a lower marginal cost of either qual-
ity upgrading or vertical integration, then such a countervailing force would if anything
strengthen the support for our hypothesis implied by the results in columns 5 and 6 of
Table 2.4.37
A potential concern is that some omitted factor might be influencing both Peruvian
firms’ incentive to integrate and the quality premium (or, alternatively, that the qual-
ity premium is itself influenced by integration decisions). To address this concern, we
develop an instrumental variable strategy based on quantities produced by other top
fishmeal producing countries. The total quantities these other countries produce are
ideal instruments because they are driven by aggregate fishing quotas set by each coun-
try’s (and European) regulatory authorities. Aggregate fishing quotas are set based on
sustainability considerations so the quantities of fishmeal these other countries produce
are unlikely to correlate with factors influencing Peruvian firm’s integration decisions,
except via their influence on market prices.38 In addition, the production volumes of
countries that specialize in high or low quality grades generate meaningful variation in
the quality premium in Peru—and we know from column 2 of Table 2.4 that any im-
pact these volumes may ultimately have on integration decisions in Peru does not arise
37Suppose firms producing a higher share of high quality output, in addition to their mechanically
lower scope for further quality upgrading, also face a lower marginal cost of quality upgrading. This
would only be a concern for our strategy of this lower cost of upgrading was also related to those firms’
ease of integration. (Similarly, a potential lower marginal cost of integration for firms producing a higher
share of high quality output would only be a concern if the lower cost of integration was also related to
those firms’ ease of upgrading). The logic of our approach—the argument that firms with high scope for
quality upgrading face stronger incentives to upgrade quality when the quality premium is high—would
then need to not only hold, but to outweigh any such countervailing forces for this empirical strategy to
yield evidence supporting our hypothesis.
38Chile, Denmark and Iceland have had aggregate fishing quotas in place for the relevant fish species
throughout our sample period (IFFO, 2014; Tanoue, 2015; IRF, 2017; European Commission, 2018), while
Thailand introduced such a system in 2015.
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through the general price level.
Specifically, our instruments are the quantities exported in each production season by
the top 5 fishmeal exporters, excluding Peru: Chile, Denmark, Iceland, and Thailand, all
of which specialize in high or low quality grades.39 We interact these instruments with
Upgrading Capacityit−1 to instrument for Upgrading Capacityit−1 ×Quality Premiumt
as follows:
Upgrading Capacityit−1 ×Quality Premiumt = β2 Upgradable Share Of Productionit−1
+∑
c
βc Upgrading Capacityit−1 ×Quantityct + γi + δt + εit (2.4)
where c is an exporter country, and Quantityct is quantity of fishmeal exported from
country c in season t. The first stage results—shown in Appendix Table B.2—are strong,
confirming that the total quantities of high and low quality fishmeal produced by coun-
tries with aggregate fishing quotas impact the quality premium in Peru.
The second stage results with Upgrading Capacityit−1 defined as Low Quality Pro-
ducer are shown in Column 7 and as Upgradable Share of Production in Column 8. The IV
estimates of βˆ are of very similar magnitude to the OLS estimate in columns 4 and 5. For
example, the estimates in columns 7 and 8 both imply that, when the quality premium
in Peru rises by 10 percent, a firm with a high upgradeable share of production—one
that produces only low quality output—increases its Share VI by about 30 percent when
compared to a firm producing only high quality output.
Our instrumental variables strategy rests on the assumption that the quantities pro-
duced by other top fishmeal exporting countries affect integration decisions in Peru only
through their impact on market prices. If this argument is correct, we would expect
these production volumes to manifest themselves in the price of high and low quality
fishmeal locally, and ultimately in the quality premium in Peru. This is what we find in
39Information on total monthly exports from these countries is available from COMTRADE (a dataset
described in footnote 52).
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columns 9 and 10, where we repeat the strategy in equation 2.4, but instrument using
the quality-grade specific price in other top exporting countries, rather than the quantities
exported themselves. The estimates are again qualitatively similar to the OLS estimates
in columns 5 and 6.40
In Appendix B.3 we exploit a different form of variation and find results consistent
with those discussed in this sub-section. We show that manufacturers respond the same
way to variation in firm-specific, quality-differentiated demand shocks as they do to
analogous shocks to the quality price premium—integrating suppliers and increasing
Share VI when relative demand for high quality grades increases, and selling boats and
decreasing Share VI when relative demand for high quality grades decreases. To do so
we construct instruments for firm-specific demand shocks that exploit the fact that each
importer country tends to import very specific quality grades; that importer countries’
relative demand fluctuates over time; and that changes in demand from a given country
matter more for firms that previously exported to that country.41
2.5.2 Interpretation
The results discussed in this section are consistent with this chapter’s hypothesis and
the theoretical framework in Section 2.3. In our model, a firm integrates suppliers when
its returns to upgrading quality rise because it is difficult to ensure that independent
suppliers deliver high quality inputs when the quantity they produce is valued by other
buyers in the market. We now consider whether firms’ decision to integrate suppliers
when the benefits of quality upgrading rise can be explained by alternative theories.
40Specifically, we use the high quality price in other top exporting countries. Price data is available—from
IFFO, an industry association—only for three of the four exporters used in our strategy above, all of which
specialize in high quality fishmeal: Chile, Denmark, and Iceland. In Equation 2.4We replace Quantityct
with HighQualityPricect, the high quality price in exporting country c in season t. High quality fishmeal
prices in Chile, Denmark, and Iceland—shown in Appendix Figure B.4, along with Peru’s price—are
highly correlated with those in Peru. The first stage results in Appendix Table B.2 are thus strong. (Note
that the reason why high quality prices are not exactly the same across countries is that production seasons
differ and the distance between countries make it difficult to conduct arbitrage.)
41We follow many fruitful applications of such an approach in the trade literature (see e.g. Park et al.,
2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Bastos et al., 2018; Tintelnot et al., 2017).
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A first possibility is that firms simultaneously choose their organizational structure
and output quality, and shocks—for example to demand (Legros and Newman, 2013;
Alfaro et al., 2016)—affect both without the two being directly related. Such a story is
difficult to reconcile with the fact that Peruvian fishmeal manufacturers integrate sup-
pliers in response to increases in the relative price of high quality output, but not in
response to increases in the average price of fishmeal.
The same is true for a second possibility, namely that firms, when the benefits of
producing high quality output rise, buy suppliers so as to restrict competitors’ access to
independent suppliers and thereby capture a higher share of a newly appealing market
segment that happens to be the high quality one (Ordover et al., 1990). If such a story
explained our results, we should see manufacturers integrating suppliers also when the
price of low (or any) quality fishmeal rises—unless integrated suppliers are more useful
when producing high quality output (as we conjecture).
A third—and related—possibility is that the integration decisions we observe are
driven by supply assurance motives (Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa, 2016; Martinez-
Carrasco, 2017). One supply assurance story—namely that firms integrate suppliers to
secure general access to inputs but in the process coincidentally produce higher quality
output—cannot explain our findings. Such a story is inconsistent with the fact that man-
ufacturers vertically integrate in response to the relative price of high quality output, but
not average prices. Another form of supply assurance—integrating to secure access to
suppliers who are incentivized to deliver the high quality inputs that are needed to meet
the demand for high quality output—is exactly the interpretation we favor.
We conclude that manufacturers vertically integrate when the quality premium rises
for exogenous reasons in order to produce a higher share of high quality output.
75
2.6 Firms’ Organizational Structure and Supplier Behav-
ior
The model in Section 2.3 predicts that integration is an efficient organizational structure
for producing high quality output for a specific reason: because integration weakens
suppliers’ incentives to maximize quantity in ways that might be detrimental to the
quality of the inputs they produce. As a result, we expect to see suppliers reduce behav-
ior that increases quantity but is harmful to quality when integrated.
2.6.1 Estimating how vertical integration affects suppliers’ quality-
enhancing actions
We analyze three measures of behavior that capture the tradeoff between input quantity
and quality: the total quantity supplied, the maximum distance travelled from the de-
livery port, and the total time the supplier spends at sea on a given trip. The first of these
three we observe in supply transactions data, while the second two are constructed from
boat GPS data. The total quantity supplied is a direct measure of actions taken by the
supplier to increase quantity. However, this variable also relates to input quality. This is
because the supplier may need to forego quality-increasing actions—such as bringing a
lot of ice on board to keep it fresh, not stacking fish high on top of each other to prevent
smashing it, etc—in order to bring back a high quantity of fish. The maximum distance
travelled and total time spent at sea are chosen because they explicitly capture quality-
decreasing actions that will tend to increase quantity. Fish freshness—which depends on
the time between catch and delivery—is paramount for the protein content of fishmeal.
As the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations puts it, “Freshness of
raw material is important in its effect on the quality of the protein in the end product
[fishmeal]. The importance of minimizing the time between catching fish and process-
ing, and of keeping the fish at low temperatures by icing [which reduces the amount of
fish a boat can fit], has already been mentioned” (FAO, 1986, sub-section 10.1.2). Cap-
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tains must thus balance traveling further and longer to catch more fish against ensuring
freshness. Because all three of these measures of behavior increase quantity but decrease
quality, we expect them to decrease post-integration (or increase post-separation).
Our empirical strategy focuses on “switchers”. Switchers are suppliers that are ei-
ther bought or sold by a fishmeal firm during our data period and observed supplying
the same plant within the firm in question both before and after the change in status.
We include supplier×plant fixed effects and hence compare the behavior of a specific
supplier within a specific relationship before versus after integration (or de-integration).
As discussed in Section 2.2, we observe 103 instances in which a fishmeal firm ac-
quires a supplier that is initially owned independently; 32 instances where a supplier
is sold from a fishmeal firm to an independent buyer; and 50 instances where a sup-
plier is sold from one fishmeal firm to another. Conveniently, a subset of our qualifying
switches—in which the supplier is observed supplying the firm in question both before
and after the change in status—comes from this last set of firm-to-firm supplier tran-
sitions. This is because integrated suppliers sometimes supply other fishmeal firms.42
We exploit these transitions in which an always-integrated supplier’s relationship with
a specific firm changes below.
We do not observe any significant changes in suppliers’ characteristics when switch-
ing in or out of integration with the plant supplied. Thus, while any average differences
between the behavior of independent and integrated suppliers might be attributable in
part to boat characteristics,43 our analysis of within supplier changes in behavior is un-
likely to be influenced by these attributes. Recall also that we saw in Figure 2.1 that
suppliers that get integrated or sold deliver to the acquiring/selling firm 63 percent of
the time before integration (or after de-integration): integration typically implies a sim-
42A firm’s output objectives may vary across time within seasons, and fish move around and the loca-
tion of a catch constrains the set of plants a boat can deliver to. As a result, and as seen in Figure 2.1, Panel
(a), integrated suppliers on average deliver to other firms just over 10 percent of the time.
43As shown in Appendix Table B.4, the characteristics of integrated suppliers unsurprisingly differ from
the characteristics of independent suppliers. On observable features such as the size of the boat, the power
of its engine, and whether or not it has a cooling system installed, the average switcher falls in between
the average always-independent boat and the average always-integrated boat, but closer to the latter.
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ple change in the formal status of the relationship between a firm/plant and a supplier
engaged in frequent and continuing interactions.
We estimate regressions of the following form:
Bijt = α+ βI[VI× supplies owner firm]ijt + γij + δt + εijt (2.5)
where Bijt is a measure of the behavior of supplier i, delivering to plant j, on date t.
[VI× supplies owner firm]ijt is an indicator for the supplier being integrated with the
plant it delivers to on date t. We include date fixed effects (δt) to control for potential
date specific effects and Supplier×Plant fixed effects (γij) to focus on how integration
affects the behavior of a specific supplier supplying a specific plant. We cluster the
standard errors at the boat level.
Column 1 of Panel A shows that, when integrated and supplying a parent plant, a
boat delivers on average about ten percent less per trip compared to when it supplies
the same plant while independent. This result is clearly consistent with integration of-
fering lower powered incentives to produce quantity, and also suggests that integrated
suppliers dedicate more of their storage capacity to ice and/or are more concerned with
crushing fish. Columns 2 and 3 show that boats fish approximately five percent closer
to the port of delivery, and spend on average three percent less time at sea on a trip
when integrated with the plant supplied. These results suggest that, when integrated,
suppliers reduce costly actions associated with long trips, and bring back fresher fish as
a result—as the managers in the industry we interviewed reported to us. (In the words
of a prominent executive of Peru’s National Fisheries Society: “Independent boats pre-
fer to extend their fishing trips [until] they are at full hold capacity, so as to maximize
quantity, and this is not good for fish quality...as a consequence of integration, they must
adopt my rules. Things like saying, ‘hey, you must offload raw 24 hours after having
caught it, at the maximum.”’ (Authors’ translation).)
In our model, integration is defined by asset ownership, as in Grossman and Hart
(1986). Indeed, suppliers’ change in behavior appears to be the result of integration
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itself, as opposed to any long term relationship that coincides with integration. In
Appendix Table B.8, we show that—absent integration—repeated interactions with the
same plant do not lead to a change in quality-increasing actions, consistent with the pre-
dictions of the dynamic version of our theoretical framework also shown in Appendix
B.2. Thus, while repeated interactions help fishmeal manufacturers and independent
suppliers exchange supply and demand assurance (Martinez-Carrasco, 2017), they ap-
pear not to offer an alternative way to achieve the change in quality-conducive incen-
tives associated with integration in the context we study.
2.6.2 Interpretation
In this section we have seen that a given supplier supplying a given plant takes more
quality-oriented and less quantity-oriented actions when the two are vertically inte-
grated. Our interpretation is that integration dampens high-powered incentives to pri-
oritize quantity over quality that suppliers face on the open market. Other changes in
incentives that arise due to integration could also play a role. Perhaps the most plau-
sible possibility is that what constrains suppliers’ input quality is not their incentive to
prioritize quality but their knowledge of how to do so. If so, firms may be reluctant to
“teach” a supplier how to upgrade input quality if the supplier is independent (Pigou,
1912). We can shed some light on the likelihood that such a story explains our results in
this section by exploiting the fact that integrated suppliers occasionally deliver inputs
to other firms. We analyze the behavior of suppliers that are always integrated with a
fishmeal firm, but sold from one firm to another during our sample period, and that sup-
ply a plant belonging to the acquiring and/or the selling firm both before and after the
sale. We thus continue to focus on changes in supplier behavior within a supplier×plant
pair.44
As seen in Panel B of Table 2.5, we find quite similar—even slightly larger—effects
44To implement, we run the same specification as in Equation 2.5, but define I[VI×supplies owner firm]
to be equal to one if the supplier is (i) always owned by a fishmeal firm, and (ii) currently delivering to its
parent firm.
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compared to Panel A. If acquired, a supplier changes its behavior consistent with prior-
itizing quantity less—to the benefit of quality—while delivering to the acquiring firm.
This pattern is identical to how previously independent “switchers” change their be-
havior once integrated, suggesting that a story in which integration enables knowledge
transfer from Peruvian manufacturers to their suppliers is unlikely to be the primary ex-
planation behind the difference in supplier behavior when integrated. In other contexts,
such knowledge transfers may provide an additional—or the primary—motivation for
vertical integration (see Atalay et al., 2014).
The results in Panel B of Table 2.5 also underscore that it is not the case that firms
simply choose to integrate suppliers that have already begun changing their behaviors,
providing support for the parallel trends assumption that underlies a causal interpreta-
tion of the results in Panel A.
Another alternative explanation of the change in supplier behavior when integrated
is that our results simply reflect the fact that integrated suppliers face low-powered in-
centives, the behaviors we see not generating any input quality benefits that manufac-
turers are aware of and act on them. Such a story is difficult to reconcile with this chap-
ter’s central finding that firms integrate suppliers when the quality premium rises.45
2.7 Vertical Integration and Output Quality
In Section 2.5 we saw that firms vertically integrate when the benefits of shifting from
low to high quality production rise. In Section 2.6 we saw that suppliers that get in-
tegrated take more input quality-increasing and less input quantity-increasing actions.
In this section we show that plants’ output quality responds to integrating suppliers in
exactly the manner we expect if the integration-induced change in supplier behavior
improves input quality. This provides empirical support for our model’s third predic-
tion, namely that vertical integration is an effective organizational strategy for producing
45Additionally, such a story would raise a conceptual question: if there is no known input quality
benefit, and integration lowers input quantity, then why integrate at all?
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high quality output—as the managers in the industry we interviewed reported to us. (In
the words of Ricardo Bernales Parodi, Managing Director of Pesquera Diamante, Peru’s
third largest fishmeal company: From the boat to the factory, and to the commercializa-
tion, the flour has quality A, B, C and D. If I only bought from my boats, I would make
an effort so that 95 percent would be A and B, and only 5 percent of C and D. But when
buying from third parties, I end up with 20 percent of C and D.” (Authors’ translation).)
We first show that there is a robust relationship between changes over time in the
share of inputs individual plants obtain from integrated suppliers—Share VI—and changes
in their output quality that goes beyond the firm level evidence discussed in Sub-section
2.4.3. We then attempt to isolate shifts in a plants Share VI that occur for exogenous rea-
sons. We show evidence from an IV approach that exploits geographic variation in the
local concentration of a particular type of supplier that is prohibited from being inte-
grated by regulation. In sum the results we present suggest that the Share VI-output
quality relationship arises because integration increases output quality.
2.7.1 Estimating how vertical integration affects output quality
If integration increases output quality because integrated suppliers deliver higher qual-
ity inputs, then the relationship between Share VI and output quality we observe at the
firm level should hold at the plant level as well. This is what we find in Table 2.6. We
repeat regression (2.1) from Sub-section 2.4.3, but now at plant (i) ×month (t) level, the
lowest level at which we directly observe output quality.
The sample consists of all 94 plants we observe across Peru. We include plant and
month fixed effects and thus focus on variation in Share VI across months within a given
plant.46 The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6 imply that the share of a plant’s
output that is of the high quality type would be 8-12 percent higher if its parent firm
were to integrate all (relative to none) of the plant’s suppliers. We also find the same
46We observe whether each plant has any high technology installed so HighTechit is now a dummy
variable.
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integration-quality relationship across different plants within the same firm over time, as
shown in Appendix Table B.5. There we use internal data provided to us by a single
major firm.47
In combination with Table 2.3, the first two columns of Table 2.6 establish a posi-
tive, statistically significant, and quantitatively consistent association between Share VI
and directly observed output quality at the firm and plant levels. Of course, the fact
that these correlations hold for individual plants does not rule out non-causal interpre-
tations. It may be that plant specific shocks, for example to productivity,48 occur and
independently affect the quality of a plant’s output and the share of the plant’s supply
coming from integrated suppliers.
To evaluate this alternative explanation, we construct an instrument for a plant’s use
of integrated suppliers at a particular point in time. We use the local presence of wooden
fishing boats—which are, by law, independently owned—as a source of variation in a
plant’s Share VI. These, and other independent boats, move up and down the coast as
a function of weather, presence of fish, and other factors. The logic of our instrument is
simply that, at times when there happens to be an abundance of independent suppliers
in a given area for exogenous reasons, firms are more likely to use those suppliers. A
plant’s choice of suppliers is the result of a complex optimization process involving
output quality objectives on the one hand and the relative cost of using integrated versus
independent suppliers on the other. At times when input from independent suppliers is
relatively cheap, optimizing plants will tend to decrease their Share VI—even holding
their incentives to produce quality constant. When independent suppliers are scarce,
the cost of their inputs is likely to be high, and vice versa. This suggests that measures
of the presence of independent suppliers may serve as instruments for a plant’s Share
47The firm’s data reports which plant produced the fishmeal included in a given export shipment. In
addition to “share high quality”, for this firm’s plants we can thus measure output quality also as the
fine-grained quality grade inferred from exports unit values and auxiliary price data, as we do for firms
in columns 3 and 4 of Panel B of Table 2.3. The magnitude and significance of the estimates are very
similar to those in Panel B of Table 2.3.
48Another example of a shock that may affect different plants within a firm differently is El Niño, which
hit Peru in late 2009.
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VI.
With this in mind, we consider the number of wooden—and hence independent by
law—suppliers active in a port (cluster of plants) in a given month as a proxy for the
relative cost of using independent suppliers. Of course, a plant’s quality objectives may
themselves influence independent suppliers’ whereabouts. The plant may for example
request deliveries from independent suppliers. We thus use a leave-firm-out measure of
the presence of independent-by-law suppliers in a given port during a given period. In
particular, our instrument for Share VI is the number of wooden boats present, exclud-
ing any that supply the firm to which the plant in question belongs. We also show results
for an analogous instrument using all independent suppliers, not restricting to wooden
boats.
The first stage, shown in Appendix Table B.6, is strong: the number of wooden (or
independent) boats supplying other plants in the port is highly correlated with the share
of integrated supply to the plant in question during the same period. The sign is nega-
tive, suggesting that—even using our leave-out proxy—the availability of independent
suppliers influences Share VI in the manner we expect. A plant substitutes towards
integrated suppliers when independent suppliers are relatively scarce, and vice versa.
Results from the IV specifications are in columns 3-6 of Table 2.6. The IV estimates
are of the same sign, statistical significance, and general magnitude as the corresponding
OLS estimates, only slightly bigger. This holds whether we restrict attention to suppliers
that are independent by law or include all independent suppliers. Additionally, the
same is true in a similar specification show in Appendix Table B.5, which utilizes internal
data from the firm that shared its data with us.
Might the composition of neighboring plants’ suppliers correlate with the quality of
a given plant’s output for other reasons than having comparable access to independent
suppliers? A time-varying, port level component of output quality that correlates with
our instrument for other reasons than independent suppliers’ inputs lowering output
quality is a possible concern. However, beyond the presence of independent suppliers,
we find no evidence of a relationship between changes in output quality across different
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plants within the same port.49 This result, in combination with the sign we find on the
first stage—greater presence of independent suppliers increases use of such suppliers—
and the second stage—use of independent suppliers lowers output quality—suggests
that our instrument’s exclusion restriction holds.50
In this section we began by documenting that the firm level relationship between
inputs coming from suppliers that are integrated at the time of production and output
quality holds also at the plant level, including within firms. We then showed that instru-
menting for Share VI yields the same positive, estimated relationship with the quality of
a plant’s output as OLS regressions.
2.7.2 Interpretation
Our interpretation of the results in this section is that access to inputs from integrated
suppliers directly increases output quality because a manufacturer can incentivize sup-
pliers to engage in less quality-decreasing behavior once the suppliers are integrated.
This follows the model in Section 2.3, and is consistent with the results in Section 2.6.
A priori, output quality may of course co-vary with organizational structure without
necessarily reflecting a causal relationship. Perhaps the most plausible non-causal links
between quality upgrading and integration—for example, that growing firms both pro-
duce higher quality output and acquire more suppliers for independent reasons—are
ruled out as explanations of our findings by the simple OLS regressions in Table 2.6 and
Appendix Table B.5: output quality correlates with use of integrated suppliers at the
49For example, consider a regression of the share of high quality output at the plant level on the average
share of high quality output of other plants in the port, controlling for month and plant fixed effects, as
well as the presence of independent suppliers. If a given plant’s output quality and that of other plants
were perfectly positively or negatively correlated across time, the coefficient on the average share of high
quality output of other plants in the port would be respectively one and minus one. We find a coefficient
of 0.04, with a standard error of 0.080.
50A priori, it could be that a plant’s use of independent suppliers itself affects the number of indepen-
dent suppliers supplying other plants in the port because firms compete for access to suppliers, or that
high fish density near a cluster of plants simultaneously enables plants to produce higher quality fishmeal
and attracts independent fishing boats. The first of these scenarios would imply a positive sign on the first
stage and the second a negative sign on the second stage—the opposite of what we find.
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time of production across plants, including within firms. The IV regressions go a step
further by documenting that the same relationship holds when we restrict attention to
fluctuations in the use of integrated suppliers that is driven by variation in the local
presence of independent suppliers.51
Combining these findings with those found in Section 2.5, we conclude that it is not
the case that higher output quality in vertically integrated Peruvian fishmeal manufac-
turers is simply an ignored by-product of integration decisions made for other reasons,
nor that integration and output quality are causally unrelated in the “minds” of the
firms in our sample. In Section 2.5 we showed that one of firms’ explicit motives for
integrating suppliers is to produce a higher share of high quality output. Our evidence
indicates that vertical integration increases output quality and that, as a result, firms
integrate suppliers when the quality premium rises.
2.8 Conclusion
Guided by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)’s classical ideas and subsequent theories
of the firm characterizing how we expect firm boundaries to respond to the multitask-
ing nature of suppliers’ work (Baker et al., 2001, 2002; Gibbons, 2005a,b), this chapter
identifies an overlooked motivation for and consequence of vertical integration in in-
complete contracts settings: downstream firms integrate to be able to produce output of
high enough quality to sell to high-paying consumers abroad. Integration allows man-
ufacturing firms to incentivize quality-increasing behavior from existing suppliers and
better control input quality.
We first present a simple theoretical framework that captures how suppliers and the
downstream firms they supply are expected to behave in sectors where firms produce
vertically differentiated goods and contracts are incomplete. The model motivates three
predictions that follow logically from each other: on how the quality premium—the
51In Table 2.3 we also showed that the firm level relationship between vertical integration and output
quality holds when we control for the firm’s share of total industry output and supplier characteristics.
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difference between the price of high and low quality output—affects firms’ choice of
organizational structure; how suppliers’ behavior changes with integration; and how
integration consequently affects output quality.
We test these predictions using transaction level data and direct measures of the
quality grades manufacturers produce in Peru’s fishmeal industry. We show that, when
firms’ returns to shifting from low to high quality production rise for exogenous reasons,
they acquire more of their suppliers. This strategy appears to be effective because fishing
boats change their behavior in a way consistent with delivering fresher fish when they
are acquired by the downstream firm they supply—which helps firms produce higher
quality fishmeal. Finally, we show that firms ultimately produce higher quality output
when their organizational structure is more vertically integrated.
These results are inconsistent with alternative theories in which the integration-quality
relationship reflects third factors that affect both firms’ choice of structure and products
produced without the two being directly related. They are also inconsistent with expla-
nations in which firms integrate for reasons other than quality—for example to assure
their own or restrict competitors’ general access to inputs—but in the process coinciden-
tally produce higher quality output. Instead, the evidence we present suggests that—
while firms vertically integrate for many different reasons—in settings where output
quality is vertically differentiated and contracts incomplete, one motive for integration
is quality upgrading. That is, integration is an explicit organizational choice made in
order to “climb” the quality ladder.
A natural next question is the generality of this finding. In Figure 2.3, we plot a proxy
for average quality that is available for most exporter countries—the average unit value
of manufacturing products exported to the U.S.—against the share of those exports that
is imported by “related party” downstream firms located in the U.S. (a measure of verti-
cal integration). The figure shows clear evidence of an upward-sloping relationship be-
tween average unit values and related party import shares. The same relationship holds
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also within product categories.52 This suggests that our findings reflect an association
between vertical integration and manufacturing output quality that tends to hold on av-
erage across countries and industries. We find this unsurprising, as theory suggests that
integration can help address the contracting problems that are typical when producing
high quality goods. Given this—and despite vertical integration overall being common
in developing countries (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Macchiavello, 2011)—it may thus be that
the extent of vertical integration observed among firms in the developing world is ac-
tually suboptimally low, since upgrading output quality is essential for export-driven
economic development. Of course, in a world with perfect contracting, there might be
no need for integration. As such, our paper’s results conversely imply that improve-
ments in contract enforcement may reduce the need for firms to rely on organizational
structure to align their suppliers’ incentives.
52We show this in Appendix Table B.7. In Figure 2.3, the variable plotted on the y-axis is γˆc from
the regression log(unit value)cpt = αpt + γc + εcpt, where log(unit value)cpt is the average log unit value
of products exported from country c, of HS6 code p, in year t to the U.S.; αpt is a product×year
fixed effect; and γc is an origin country fixed effect. This regression is estimated using COMTRADE
data from BACI (See Gaulier and Zignago (2010) for a description of the data). The variable plotted
on the x-axis is δˆc from the regression Related party share of U.S. importscpt = βpt + δc + υcpt, where
Related party share of U.S. importscpt is the share of products exported from country c, of NAICS code p,
in year t to the U.S. that are imported by related parties (usually other units of the same firm (Ruhl, 2015));
βpt is a product×year fixed effect; and δc is an origin country fixed effect. This regression is estimated us-
ing data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Mean Sd
Firms Total number of firms in sample 37
Export shipment (metric tons) 380 (351)
Export Price ($/metric ton) 1454 (303)
Number of destinations per season 7.05 (5.30)
Number of export transactions per season 85 (99)
Plants Total number of plants in sample 94
Has high technology 0.85 (0.36)
High quality share of production 0.85 (0.35)
Monthly production (metric tons) 3116 (3266)
Processing capacity (metric tons/hour) 106 (54)
Boats Number of boats operating per season 812 92
Fraction owned by a downstream firm per season 0.28 (0.45)
Fraction of boats made of steel per season 0.44 (0.50)
Storage capacity (m3) 187 (165)
Power engine (hp) 432 (343)
Number of fishing trips per season 24.6 (13.3)
Number of delivery ports per season 3.49 (1.90)
Offload weight (metric tons) per trip 110 (110)
Time at sea per trip (hours) 20.85 (9.96)
Max. distance from the plant’s port (kms) 76 (46)
Notes: This table gives summary statistics over our sample period. Has high technology is a dummy equal
to 1 if the plant is equipped with steam drying technology. Plants’ processing capacity measures the total
weight of fish that can be processed in an hour. Steel is a binary variable equal to 1 if a boat is a steel boat
(which tend to be bigger, better suited for industrial fishing, and are subject to different regulations). Of-
fload weight per trip is the amount fished and delivered to a downstream firm on each trip. Time at sea per
trip is the total time spent at sea on a fishing trip. Max. distance from the plant’s port is the maximum dis-
tance between the boat and the port it delivers to on any trip.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics on Integration
Panel A: Boat purchases and sales
Total number of steel boats registered 741
Number of steel boat transactions 317
Number of transactions Indep. → VI 103
Number of transactions VI→ Indep. 32
Number of transactions VI→ VI 50
Number of transactions Indep. → Indep. 132
Panel B: Decomposition of the growth rate of Share of inputs from VI suppliers

























(Boats purchases (Buying less
or sales) from Indep.)
Growth 2.1% 1.4% 0.7%
Relative Contribution 67% 33%
Notes: Panel A displays basic statistics on boat purchases and sales. In Panel B, the growth rate of “Share VIi,t”
– the share of the inputs sourced by firm i during production season t that comes from vertically integrated
suppliers – can be decomposed as presented in the first row of this table. VIi,t and Totali,t is respectively the
amount of inputs firm i sources from vertically integrated suppliers and in total during season t, and Totalt is
the total amount of inputs sourced by the industry as a whole during season t. Term A can then be interpreted
as the contribution to the growth rate of Share VIi,t that comes from increasing solely the (relative) amount of
inputs coming from integrated suppliers. Since boats fish all their individual quota during the course of a sea-
son, the only way to increase (decrease) this term is by acquiring (selling) suppliers. Term B can be interpreted
as the contribution of a firm decreasing the (relative) amount of inputs sourced from all suppliers. The table
gives the growth rate of “Share VIi,t”, Term A and Term B.
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Table 2.3: Output quality and vertically integrated suppliers
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
Panel A: Output quality and number of suppliers owned
Dep. var: High Quality share of prod. Protein content
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asinh(Number of suppliers owned) 0.056 0.043 0.197∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.060) (0.042) (0.083) (0.066)
High technology share of capacity No Yes No Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.75 0.75 65.7 65.7
N 275 275 208 208
Panel B: Output quality and Share of inputs from VI suppliers
Dep. var: High Quality share of prod. Protein content
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 0.377∗∗ 0.375∗∗ 0.982∗∗∗ 1.040∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.164) (0.293) (0.283)
High technology share of capacity No Yes No Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.75 0.75 65.7 65.7
N 275 275 208 208
Panel C: Output quality and Share of inputs from VI suppliers
Dep. var: High Quality share of prod. Protein Content
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 0.313∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.313∗ 1.153∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 1.190∗∗
(0.159) (0.148) (0.159) (0.457) (0.260) (0.461)
Share of inputs from steel boats −0.098 −0.092 −1.152 −1.153
(0.164) (0.161) (0.808) (0.794)
Share of inputs from boats 0.152 0.139 0.988 1.036
with high capacity (0.166) (0.164) (1.003) (0.976)
Share of inputs from boats 0.191 0.202 −0.232 −0.282
with cooling system (0.123) (0.124) (0.979) (0.986)
Share of industry’s production −0.807 −0.748 1.799 1.889
(0.925) (0.891) (3.869) (3.930)
High technology share of capacity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 65.7 65.7
N 275 275 275 208 208 208
Notes: One observation is a firm during a production season. High Quality share of prod. is the share of a firm’s total production during a
fishing season that is reported as high quality (“prime”) output. Protein content is the quantity weighted average of a measure of quality
inferred from a database that provides weekly prices by quality. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is the share of a firm’s inputs that come
from VI suppliers during a season. Steel boats tend to be bigger, better suited for industrial fishing, and are subject to different regula-
tions. High capacity boats are boats whose hold capacity is in the upper quartile of the distribution. Boats without integrated cooling
system must use ice to keep fish fresh. High technology share of capacity controls for the share of the firm’s total processing capacity (mea-
sured in metric tons per hour and averaged across all active plants within the firm) that uses steam drying technology. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 2.4: Vertical integration and the Quality price premium
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Dep. var: Share of inputs from VI suppliers (t) - Share of inputs from VI suppliers (t-1)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Quality premium 0.248∗∗ 0.249∗∗
(0.089) (0.095)
Quality premium is high 0.018∗∗
(0.007)




Low quality producer (t-1) 0.784∗ 0.767 0.831∗
× Quality premium (0.451) (0.479) (0.434)
Upgradable share of production (t-1) 2.151∗∗∗ 1.724∗ 2.430∗∗∗
× Quality premium (0.584) (0.932) (0.436)
Low quality producer (t-1) No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Upgradable share of production (t-1) No No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Season FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 78 178 30 471
Notes: One observation is a firm during a production season. Share of inputs from VI suppliers (t) - Share of inputs from VI sup-
pliers (t − 1) is the change between season t − 1 and season t of the share of inputs sourced from integrated suppliers. As
shown in Table 2.2, most of the variation in Share VI is driven by acquisition or sales of suppliers. Quality premium is equal
to Log(High Quality) − Log(Low Quality) where High and Low Quality are the average price of “Prime” and “FAQ” fish-
meal in the month preceding the current fishing season. We choose to take the month preceding the fishing season rather
than the fishing season itself as integration decisions are typically decided in the month preceding the season and integration
within a season is extremely rare in the data. High Quality premium (Low Quality premium) is equal to 1 is the Quality Pre-
mium is above (below) the sample average value. Log(average price) is the Log of the average price of Peruvian fishmeal,
again computed in the month preceding the current fishing season. Low quality producer(t− 1) is equal to 1 if a firm’s share
of low quality output in the preceding season was at least 1 percent. Upgradable share of production(t− 1) is the share of a
firm’s production that was of low quality in the previous season. A firm that produces almost only low quality output has
more potential to upgrade than a firm already producing almost only high quality output. In Columns 7 and 8, the instru-
ments are interactions between Low quality producer(t− 1) or Upgradable share of production(t− 1) and the quantity pro-
duced by top fishmeal exporters. In Columns 9 and 10, the instruments are interactions between Low quality producer(t− 1)
or Upgradable share of production(t− 1) and the price of fishmeal in other top fishmeal exporting countries. Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.5: Supplier behavior and vertical integration
Panel A: Identified from all switchers (Idependent to VI, VI to Independent and VI to VI)
XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Log(Quantity Log(Max. distance Log(Total time
supplied) the plant’s spent at sea)
port)
(1) (2) (3)
I[VI × supplies owner firm] −0.096∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.030∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.016)
Date FEs Yes Yes Yes
Supplier × Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes
N 315,442 137,278 159,724
Panel B: Idenfified only from VI switchers changing ownership (VI to VI)
XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Log(Quantity Log(Max. distance Log(Total time




I[Always VI× supplies owner firm] −0.147∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Date FEs Yes Yes Yes
Supplier × Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes
N 315,442 137,274 159,724
Notes: One observation is a boat during a fishing trip. Quantity supplied is the amount of fish the boat delivers to
the plant per trip. Max. distance from the plant’s port is maximum distance a specific boat is observed away from port.
Max. distance from the plant’s port can only be measured if the boat leaves from and arrives at the same port. Total
time at sea is the amount of time the boat is away from port per trip. The number of observations varies from one
column to the next as GPS variables for a given trip are sometimes missing. In panel A, we define I[VI×supplies
owner firm] to be equal to one if the supplier is (i) currently vertically integrated (ii) currently delivering to its
parent firm. In panel B, we define I[Always VI×supplies owner firm] to be equal to one if the supplier is (i) al-
ways owned by a fishmeal firm, and (ii) currently delivering to its parent firm. Because we include Supplier ×
Plant FEs, I[VI×supplies owner firm] and I[Always VI×supplies owner firm] are identified based only on suppli-
ers who change ownership during our sample period. Standard errors clustered at the boat level are included in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.6: Output quality and share of inputs from vertically integrated suppliers
Impact of Share of VI Inputs on Quality
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Dep. var: High Quality Share of Production
OLS OLS IV: Ind. Boats IV: Wooden Boats
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 0.102∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.038) (0.030) (0.080) (0.068) (0.060) (0.060)
Has high technology No Yes No Yes No Yes
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
N 2647 2647 2487 2487 2647 2647
Notes: One observation is a plant in a particular month. High Quality share of production is the share of a firm’s
total production during a fishing season that is reported as high quality “prime” output. Share of inputs from VI sup-
pliers is the share of a firm’s inputs that come from VI suppliers during a season. Has high technology is a dummy
variable equal to one if the plant in question has any steam drying technologies installed. Columns 3 and 4 instru-
ment for Share of inputs from VI suppliers with the number of independent boats present locally (in the plant’s port)
in the season in question, excluding those that interact directly with the plant itself. Columns 5 and 6 instrument
for Share of inputs from VI suppliers with the number of wooden boats present locally (in the plant’s port) in the sea-
son in question, excluding those that interact directly with the plant itself. Standard errors are clustered at the firm




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2009m7 2011m7 2013m7 2015m7 2017m7
Peru average price Peru Quality Premium
Notes: This figure shows the evolution over time of the average fishmeal price in Peru (the average
between the price of “Prime” and “FAQ” fishmeal grades) and the Quality Premium in Peru. Quality
premium is equal to Log(High Quality)− Log(Low Quality) where High and Low Quality are the average
prices of “Prime” and “FAQ” fishmeal grades respectively.
95











































































































































































































-.3 -.15 0 .15 .3
Related party share of imports - Country FE
Notes: In this Figure, the variable plotted on the y-axis is γˆc from the regression log(unit value)cpt =
αpt + γc + εcpt, where log(unit value)cpt is the average log unit value of products exported from coun-
try c, of HS6 code p, in year t to the U.S.; αpt is a product×year fixed effect; and γc is an origin coun-
try fixed effect. This regression is estimated using COMTRADE data from BACI (See Gaulier and Zig-
nago (2010) for a description of the data). The variable plotted on the x-axis is δˆc from the regression
Related party share of U.S. importscpt = βpt + δc + υcpt, where Related party share of U.S. importscpt is
the share of products exported from country c, of NAICS code p, in year t to the U.S. that are imported by
related parties (usually other units of the same firm (Ruhl, 2015)); βpt is a product×year fixed effect; and
δc is an origin country fixed effect. Related party share of U.S. importscpt is constructed using data from
the U.S. Census Bureau. The data is from 2005 to 2014.
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Chapter 3
Import Liberalization and Political Con-
nections: Evidence from Myanmar
Joint with Felix Forster and Rocco Macchiavello
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3.1 Introduction
Trade liberalization has been widely recognized as a key driver of productivity improve-
ments and economic growth 1. Yet, as institutional environments shape the gains from
trade, regulatory or economic distortions can protect inefficient incumbent enterprises
and so prevent reallocation of economic activity from low to high productivity firms.
In this chapter, we study how politically connected firms benefit from a competitive
landscape tilted in their favour. This generally includes subverting the liberalization
process itself. In developing country contexts, it furthermore includes market failures,
such as incomplete credit markets, that connected firms are better positioned to over-
come. The prevailing institutions and domestic market conditions may then protect
rents and undermine the gains from trade liberalization.
Several features of the political environment in Myanmar and the unique data we
gathered allows us to investigate these issues. First, after decades of military control,
Myanmar recently went over a long process of economic and political liberalization.
This provides a unique opportunity to follow how individuals connected to the previ-
ous regime were impacted by this transition. This provides a unique opportunity to fol-
low how individuals connected to the previous regime were impacted by this transition.
Second, the data environment allows us to study firms’ connections with military power
beyond just state-owned entreprises. The Directorate of Investment and Company Ad-
ministration (DICA) publicly releases the list of all firms registered in Myanmar, their
board members and their national identification number. We use this information to
match firms in the import data to the list of individuals sanctioned by the US, the EU
and Australia, for their connection to the military. We thus have three separate groups of
firms for this study: SOEs, privately connected firms and non connected firms. Third, in
2013, the country implemented a trade liberalization reform, which removed the need
to get a license prior to importing a shipment of goods. However, this liberalization
1See e.g. Pavcnik (2002); Topalova and Khandelwal (2011); Khandelwal et al. (2013) all inspired by
Melitz (2003)-type theoretical predictions
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was only limited to a subset of the products imported. Fourth, the government body in
charge of the de jure liberalization is historically less connected to the military than the
one implementing the reform de facto. We observe that the set of goods liberalized de
jure is wider than the list of products liberalized de facto, which allows us to study the
determinants of de facto liberalization.
In the first part of this chapter, we quantify the impact of the import liberalization
reform. We follow closely the methodology developed in Khandelwal et al. (2013) in
separating the effect of removing import licenses along the intensive and the extensive
margins. In the sectors where connected firms are only marginally present, we show
that liberalization had a significant impact on import volumes, almost entirely driven
by entry of non connected firms. However, in the sectors populated by connected firms,
our results depart from the existing literature on the subject in that we document no
effect of the liberalization and no subsequent reallocation.
The second part of this chapter is dedicated to explaining these patterns. We first ab-
stract from the import liberalization event and show that higher presence of connected
firms is associated with less entry of non connected firms across sectors. This correla-
tion holds both in the short and in long run. The low entry rates observed in sectors
populated by connected firms is thus not specific to the impact of import license lib-
eralization. We then document that the set of product codes in which connected firms
operate exhibit important economies of scale. Importing these goods in large quan-
tities or through shipments of high value offers significant unit price discounts. The
results suggest the following interpretation. Economies of scale provides opportunities
for rent-seeking activities. Wholesalers can import large quantities of these products
at low prices and resell them in the domestic market. Even if importers charge sig-
nificant markups when selling downstream, manufacturing firms and small final good
distributors would choose to purchase these products from connected firms rather than
importing the goods directly at higher costs. In turn, credit constraints or poor access to
capital act as a barrier to entry and prevent other large firms or wholesalers to compete
with connected firms in these sectors.
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Finally, we show that only a subset of the goods liberalized de jure were liberalized
de facto. The ministry deciding on the set of products to be liberalized is historically
less connected to the military than the ministry implementing the reform. We document
that products connected firms were importing were less likely to be de facto liberalized.
However, sectors with connected firms presence which were liberalized de facto were
more likely to be products with low economies of scale. This last result suggests that the
institution implementing the reform maintained the licensing scheme to protect con-
nected firms in the sectors where they had to rely more on the licensing process to act as
a barrier to entry.
Our paper relates to two broad strands of the literature: (i) studies from international
economics and development on the impact of trade liberalization; and (ii) the economics
of political connections.
The trade literature highlights reallocation of economic activity as a key characteristic
of liberalization episodes. The seminal work by Melitz (2003) provides the general nar-
rative that low-productivity incumbent firms exit due to increased competitive pressure
from imports as existing high-productivity (exporting) firms and new entrants grow
their share. These dynamics are broadly reflected in the empirical literature on develop-
ing countries (Pavcnik, 2002; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Brandt et al., 2017, 2019)
as well as advanced economies (Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al., 2006). There is also growing
evidence, however, of differences from this standard narrative. Khandelwal et al. (2013),
for instance, find that that the removal of inefficient export quota allocations in China
resulted in higher-than-expected growth (through entrant rather than incumbents). In
a related paper, Bai et al. (2018) show that other types of distortions can lead to the op-
posite: welfare losses from trade liberalization. Most closely related to our work is a
paper by Baccini et al. (2019) who show that private firms in Vietnam experience the
predicted aspects of trade liberalization during accession to the WTO (higher exit rates,
lower profitability and increases in productivity) while state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
did not. Overall, the “consensus” that emerges from this literature is that entry of new
firms and reallocation to high-productivity firms are very important for the gains from
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trade liberalization to materialize, but that barriers to entry (regulatory or economic)
can undermine this process. Our paper’s contribution picks up exactly this point by
expanding the scope of barriers beyond SOEs to private politically connected firms.
Our focus on imports relative to the trade literature is noteworthy for three reasons.
First, imports have been recognized as a key contributor to the productivity gains from
trade liberalization. They arise within firms that benefit from the above-mentioned re-
allocation at the sector level, but also within firms from access to cheaper and/or higher
quality imported inputs (e.g., Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Goldberg et al., 2009, 2010;
Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011; Halpern et al., 2015b). Second, in most of the recent
theoretical trade literature and the description of many related empirical findings, im-
ports are either assumed to be consumed (final goods) or used as production inputs
(intermediates); but they are not traded domestically. One of the simpler ways in which
connected firms, however, might extract rents is by restricting access to certain imports
or positioning themselves in sectors with high barriers to entry and imposing high
markups on domestic resale. We therefore regard “importing” as a separate step in
the international supply-chain that can be conducted by wholesalers, in contrast to the
direct sales by the producer as it is common in the literature. Third, our paper is the
first, to our knowledge, to distinguish import sectors according to their economies of
scale. This may be particularly relevant in developing country contexts, where capital
constraints preclude many businesses from operating at a large scale and thereby limit
competition and potentially the gains from trade within the “importing segment” of the
supply chain.
Our research also relates to the empirical literature on the relationship between polit-
ical connections and private sector outcomes in developing countries. The most promi-
nent studies in this literature aim to quantify the value of political connections, either
for firms (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006; Chekir and Diwan, 2014; Rijkers et al., 2017) or
for politicians (Fisman et al., 2014). Firm value in the former case is, however, typi-
cally measured as equity value and taken from public companies’ financial data. This
restricts the set of firms included in the analysis and requires that financial markets accu-
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rately incorporate the value of connections into company share prices. While the value
of connections is not the primary focus of our study, we contribute to this literature
by assessing the differential performance by political connectedness on a different (and
potentially broader) set of firms and by introducing alternative performance measures,
including entry/exit rates, trade value.
This literature also provides some insight into the relevance of the institutional con-
text for the success of economic reform efforts and macroeconomic performance. Most
closely related to our work is a paper by Rijkers et al. (2017) who study the relative per-
formance of firms connected to President Ben Ali’s family in Tunisia and the associated
sector licensing requirements, FDI restrictions, and market structure2. A few case stud-
ies of crony capitalism in other countries with strong military regimes, including Egypt
(Chekir and Diwan, 2014) and Turkey (Demir, 2005), also document how privatization
of state-owned assets and trade liberalization can facilitate the establishment of opaque
rent-seeking networks. Firms and sectors intertwined in these networks can be shielded
from competition and thereby undermine key benefits from economic liberalization.
The evidence provided in these case-studies, however, is generally qualitative or ex-
clusively focused on describing the setting. Overall, international trade is a dimension
that, to our knowledge, is almost entirely lacking from this literature.
3.2 Background and data
3.2.1 Historical Background
After over 50 years of authoritarian control, Myanmar military junta was officially dis-
solved in 2011 and a nominally civilian government was installed. Alongside the release
of political prisoners, improved foreign relations led to the easing of western trade and
2Also notable are several studies on the Chinese economy that attempt to explain the country’s growth
experience despite the prominence of SOEs, political connections, and rent-seeking relationships, e.g.,
through reduced frictions from market imperfections (Kang, 2003) or competition between locally favored
businesses (Bai et al., 2014)
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targeted economic sanctions. In the following years, the military-backed government
implemented a series of economic and political reforms. The 2013 announcement that
Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party could run for elec-
tions and their widely expected landslide victory held the promise of change for many,
including a new business environment. While the economic liberalization has contin-
ued, albeit at a slower pacethere is widespread speculation/anecdotal evidence among
observers that the patronage networks established during the military rule, still loom
large in the business and political spheres (James, 2010; Jones, 2014; Larkin, 2015).
Despite the expectation of changing crony relationships during Myanmar’s transi-
tions, their persistence is not entirely surprising given the country’s history of power
relations. First, one key justification for military control in Myanmar since it first took
power in 1962 has been the presence of insurgent armed groups, particularly in the bor-
der regions with Thailand and China, several of which still remain in conflict with the
central state today. The military negotiated bilateral “ceasefire agreements” with many
of these groups in the early 1990s (and later from 2011). In exchange for relinquishing
varying degrees of territorial control, armed groups were permitted to continue their ac-
tivities, retain arms and access government services. The relative stability brought about
by ceasefires also allowed such groups to commence or dramatically increase activities
in lucrative illicit trade, including drug trafficking (Callahan, 2007). It is alleged that sev-
eral of today’s largest enterprises in Myanmar build their capital base on profits derived
from illicit trade, and such companies were long “permitted” to launder the proceeds
through state banks (Meehan, 2011). In addition, the ceasefire agreements, in conjunc-
tion with nascent pro-market reforms, opened up the possibility for large-scale resource
extraction businesses - prominently mining, logging and rubber - in the resource-rich
border regions. Monopoly licenses for these extractive industries were granted to a
select group of individuals with close personal connections to the military regime, en-
suring a tight network of beneficiaries comprised of ethnic leaders, military officers and
crony entrepreneurs Woods (2011). Overall, the backdrop of Myanmar’s state fragility
and the military’s engagement with ethnic leaders created a system of entrenched inter-
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ests among the elites that has in part survived until today.
A second contributing factor to the persistence of cronyism in Myanmar is the con-
tinued direct involvement of the military in many parts of state and business affairs,
despite its partial retreat from government. Importantly, as per the 2008 constitution,
a quarter of the seats in both houses of parliament and states and regions parliaments
are reserved for military personnel appointed by the army, guaranteeing the former
regime’s continued influence on the legislative process in the country and veto power
over constitutional amendments. They also fully control three powerful ministries -
Home Affairs, Defense and Border Affairs. In addition, two military-owned conglomer-
ates, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar
Economic Corporation (MEC), still belong to the largest companies in the country de-
spite partial divestitures. UMEHL and MEC were established in 1990 to directly finance
the army’s operations and personnel, including retired veterans, and the companies
own interests in a broad range of sectors in the country, including outright ownership
and joint ventures Myoe (2009). During the 1990s, all major foreign investments were
required to enter a joint venture with such military firms These large conglomerates con-
tinue to extend the military’s reach deep into the business community of Myanmar and
foster close connections not only to subsidiaries but also affiliate companies.
Finally, several waves of privatization in Myanmar, most importantly those staring
in 2008 and in 2011, concentrated private asset ownership in the hands of the business
elite with personal connections to the military regime. These included primarily family
members and close prior business associates, like the “national entrepreneurs” that were
already the key beneficiaries of the first private businesses and “ceasefire capitalism” in
the 1990s. During the reign of successive military regimes, the state was long reliant on
the support of the private sector, with enterprises often supplementing state capacity
through the provision of public goods in exchange for import permits or monopolistic
concessions. For example, connected firms contributed to the construction of the sprawl-
ing new capital city of Naypyitaw in the early 2000s. This co-dependence became dra-
matically apparent in the aftermath of the 2008 cyclone Nargis when relief efforts were
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partially provided by individual publicly denounced as “cronies” in coordination with
international donors and non-governmental organizations Jones (2014). More recently,
the NLD government has asked private individuals including the wealthiest who gained
their fortunes under the former military regime to contribute to the humanitarian and
rebuilding efforts in the wake of Rakhine State’s Rohingya crisis. Despite the shifting
political landscape, the concentration of resources in a few industries therefore appears
to have limited the government’s alternatives in some areas to working with individuals
publicly regarded as cronies of the former regime.
3.2.2 Measures of connectedness
Our measures of firm connectedness cover two broad categories: (i) firms with direct
connections to the former military regime via company board membership or commonly
known business connections, which we refer to as “Privately connected firms” and (ii)
state-owned enterprises, which we label “SOEs” for the remainder of this chapter. For-
mer military regime members, their family, and their business associates have access the
strong (patronage) network of the powerful elite that effectively governed the country
for half a century. State-owned enterprises undoubtedly also have access to these net-
works, but may face political constraints to use them to their advantage under the new
democratic regime. Nonetheless, SOEs may benefit more directly from current govern-
ment policy and access to similarly valuable resources, including financing. The key
common features for our analysis are that both types of connections can facilitate access
to capital and help overcome regulatory barriers (such as licensing requirements).
Private firms’ connectedness to the former military regime is measured according to
information from international sanctions lists and investigative work based on public
sources by a local research company. In the aftermath of the 1990 elections in Myanmar
and the military’s refusal to relinquish power, trading partners around the world grad-
ually imposed sanctions targeted at senior figures in the military regime, their family
members and close business associates. We focus on the targeted sanctions by Aus-
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tralia,3 the EU,4 and the US5 that were in effect at the outset of the recent democratic
transition, the November 2010 election, and through their revocation in 2012, 2013 and
2016 for Australia, the EU, and the US, respectively.6 While these sanctions typically
prohibited trade with named entities and froze any assets held in the sanctioning juris-
diction7, we do not think of them as a variable prohibiting these firms to operate in the
import market. Ninety percent of the goods imported in Myanmar come from neighbor-
ing and non sanctioning Asian countries. Instead, we consider these sanctions lists as
comprehensive records of the most important actors with connections to the former mil-
itary regime, compiled by some of the most intelligence agencies.8 In aggregate, these
sanctions lists provide a total of 669 individuals and 136 firms with connections to the
former military regime.
Sanctioned businesses from these lists were matched to those from the customs data
directly by name whereas sanctioned individuals were first matched to firm directors
using a nearly comprehensive company registry maintained by DICA. For the identifi-
cation of the sanctioned individuals, the sanctions lists often contain detailed informa-
3These were initially under the Banking (Foreign Exchange) Regulations 1959 by the Reserve Bank of
Australia and since 2011 under the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
4These were implemented via various regulations of the Council and Commission of the European
Union .
5These were implemented under the Burma sanctions program by the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC).
6Some targeted sanctions were re-introduced in response to the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine
state, but these were not considered in our analysis.
7The Australian sanctions were first introduced in October 2007 and we refer to the October 2008
amendment (which includes an extended list) and subsequent amendments to construct a comprehensive
list of entities in Myanmar sanctioned by Australia for their connection to the former military regime.
Targeted sanctions by the EU against entities in Myanmar were first introduced in April 2003 and, sim-
ilar to the Australian case, we consider the most substantially expanded list from May 2010 and subse-
quent amendments for our analysis. Targeted US sanctions against individuals and firms connected to the
former military regime were initiated in 2007 and we capture all entities from the Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN) list from that point until their removal in October 2016.
8The sanctions lists notably change over time and we consider any individual or firms as being con-
nected to the military regime if she/he is listed at least once during the periods given above.
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tion, including various aliases, passport numbers, addresses, affiliated businesses, and
family members. This information was used in corroborating any potential matches be-
tween the entities from the sanctions lists and DICA company directors. In a second
step, the businesses from DICA were then matched to the import data by name. The
matching of sanctioned individuals to company directors in DICA was implemented by
the mentioned local research company and the matching of company directors to com-
panies in the customs data conducted or confirmed by a team of research assistants in
Myanmar. In addition, this research company also maintains its own database of com-
panies and individuals connected to the former military regime and we also classify
these companies as connected whenever they were not already among the sanctioned
entities (or entities with sanctioned directors).
The second category of connected firms, “SOEs”, is identified directly in the import
customs data – which is available at the transaction level from April 2011 to March 2016
9– by means of a variable distinguishing between private and government enterprises.10
This process resulted in a total of 300 importers that are connected to the former
military regime and 420 SOEs. Tables 3.1 provides summary statistics on their rele-
vance among importers, in terms of number and size. As a share of the total number
of importers in the country, connected firms and SOEs are a very small fraction (less
than 1% taken together), but they are substantially larger on average than not connected
firms and include some of the largest importers by value, accounting for nearly 30%
of total imports (11.6% and 17.3% for connected and government entities, respectively).
Figure 3.1 documents that there is significant dispersion in the presence of connected
firms across sectors. They are not present in approximately 40 percent of product codes
and appear marginally (market share lower than 20 percent) in 45 percent of sectors.
Connected firms have more than 80 percent of the market share in only a handful of
9The data was provided by the Ministry of Commerce. It has a total of approximately 4 million trans-
actions.
10As a few companies are both sanctioned and government, for this analysis, we define any importer as
an SOE if the entity is listed as a government company in the customs data and it is not classified as firm
with connections to the former military regime according to the process described above.
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product codes. Appendix Table C.1 reports the share of import value for HS-chapters
by the different importer classifications and overall. It is evident that the activity of con-
nected firms is primarily focused on a few sectors: mineral products, especially mineral
fuels/oils (approximately 40%), machinery and electrical equipment (13%), metals and
metal products (9%), transportation equipment (8%), and animal/vegetable fats and oils
(8%). Overall, over 90% of imports by value among connected entities is accounted for
17 HS2-codes.
3.3 Import license liberalization: implementation and im-
pact
3.3.1 De facto vs. de Jure liberalization
In February 2013, the Government of Myanmar removed the requirement to obtain a
license prior to importing 166 broad categories of goods11. Prior to this reform, all com-
panies had to apply for a license from the Ministry of Commerce before being able to
clear a shipment from customs. As such, the removal of licenses should have reduced
the fixed cost of making individual import shipments. The reform was implemented by
the customs department in April 2013, the beginning of the new fiscal year in Myan-
mar. Historically, the Ministry of Commerce in Myanmar is known to be reformist and
pro-liberalization while the customs department, under the control of the Ministry of
Finance and Revenue, is more tied to the former military regime.
We compare the de jure list of products liberalized which was decided upon and
published by the Ministry of Commerce, 12 to the de facto set of product codes liberalized
from the customs data. Customs indicates in the transaction-level data if a license was
requested for clearing a specific shipment. The de jure list of liberalized products is wider
11This corresponds to roughly 2,700 HS6 product codes.
12The list published by the Ministry of Commerce is actually a negative list which provides the product
codes that were still under the licensing scheme post-reform. (Announcement Order no 16/2013)
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than the de facto list. Of the products which were meant to be liberalized by the Ministry
of Commerce and appear at least once in the trade data over our sample period, 58
percent ended up not being liberalized in practice. We do not find evidence in the data
that this partial liberalization was implemented differentially across firms. The de facto
set of products which were liberalized was the same for all companies, connected or
not. We asked the Ministry of Commerce in Myanmar who was aware of the situation
and attributed it to poor communication or lack of training of customs agents. Post-
liberalization, the Ministry of Commerce was still issuing licenses for products for the
products liberalized de jure to satisfy the requirements made by customs agents.
As can be seen in Figure 3.2, the choice of import goods to be liberalized de jure was
mostly driven by a choice of broad product categories or HS chapters. Almost none of
animal, vegetable and mineral products were liberalized, while for most of the other
HS chapters, more than 70 percent of product codes were liberalized. The patterns in
the share of products that were de facto liberalized is more challenging to interpret. We
revisit the determinants that render a product code de jure but not de facto liberalized in
section 3.4.3.
3.3.2 The effect of import liberalization
In this section, we closely follow the methodology employed by Khandelwal et al. (2013)
to measure the impact of the removal of import licenses on trade volumes and the con-
tribution of incumbents versus entrants in generating these patterns. We restrict our
analysis to the set of products which are imported pre and post reform (excluding prod-
uct entry and exit) and the set of products labeled as “not liberalized” and “liberalized”
by both the Ministry of Commerce and the customs data. We do so as we know little
about the conditions under which licenses were still delivered by the Ministry of Com-
merce for the de jure but not de facto set of products liberalized, so that we cannot easily
compare the cost of obtaining a license between these products and those that were not
liberalized de jure.
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We estimate a simple difference-in-differences model that compares changes in out-
comes among liberalized and non liberalized products in 2013, the first year post-reform:




is the centered growth rate between year t-1 and year t. 1{Lib}
is a dummy equal to one if the HS6 code belongs the list of liberalized products, and
1{Post} is a dummy that indicates if the fiscal year belongs to the post liberalization
period. The terms αt are time fixed effects and γp are product fixed effects.
The regression includes both fiscal years 2012 and 2013. As we do not have suffi-
cient time periods pre-liberalization to test the parallel trends assumption, we add HS6
fixed effects to account for the heterogeneity in growth rates across product codes. Our
preferred setting replaces time fixed effects with HS2-time fixed effects to control for
demand shocks. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the choice of products liberalized de jure
was based on broad product categories, which could be subject to differential shocks in
demand. We thus consider the variation within years and broad product categories to
compare the trade volumes between liberalized and non liberalized products.
We split sectors according to the prevalence of connected firms. We do so to differ-
entiate the impact of the liberalization between sectors with high and low incidences
of connected firms. We define a sector to be connected if privately connected firms and
SOEs represent at least 15 percent of the market share in the pre-liberalization period
(66th percentile) 13. We then decompose the effect of the liberalization into the intensive
and extensive margins. The intensive margin corresponds to incumbents, firms that
import the same product code in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. The extensive margin com-
prises entrants and exiters. Entrants are firm-product pairs which import in fiscal year
2013 but not in 2012, and the converse holds for exiters. For each margin, we distinguish
13In Appendix Table C.2, we show a robustness test where sectors are defined as connected if at least 30
percent of the market share in the pre-liberalization period is comprised of privately connected firms and
SOEs. The patterns found are similar under that definition.
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connected and non-connected firms. We thus estimate 8 regressions (two connected firm
categories multiplied by two margins for connected and non connected sectors) similar to
the estimation equation given in 3.1.
We choose to work with the centered growth rate for two reasons. First, as opposed
to working with market shares as in Khandelwal et al. (2013), it facilitates the interpre-
tation of the decomposition exercise as the sum of each margin’s contribution corre-
sponds to the overall impact of the liberalization. Second, we take the centered growth
rate rather than the classical growth rate to have a bounded variable centered on zero.
There is enormous heterogeneity in growth rates across product codes but the classical
growth rate is not bounded above which could lead to overestimating the impact of the
liberalization.
Finally, for the decomposition to reflect the effect per dollar imported rather than the
average across sectors, we weight each observation by its product code share in total
trade in the pre-liberalization period. This is necessary for the sum of the margins’ con-
tributions to match the overall estimate of the liberalization effect - reallocation patterns
in sectors worth tens of millions of dollars must proportionately more in the regression
than sectors worth several thousand dollars.
Table 3.2 presents the results of the overall impact of the liberalization. Panel A
shows that import license liberalization had a important effect on import volumes, but
only in non connected sectors. Column 1 shows a negative and significant coefficient for
connected sectors which is smaller in magnitude and no longer significant when adding
HS2-year pair fixed effects. Panel B shows that there is no differential effect in connected
sectors whether the majority of the market share of connected firms is composed of
privately connected firms or SOEs.
Table 3.3 presents the decomposition across the different margins. Given the large
number of regressions ran for this table, we only report the coefficients and their signifi-
cance. In non connected sectors, the positive effect of the liberalization is almost entirely
driven by the net entry of non connected firms. The results are similar to Khandelwal
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et al. (2013), in that incumbents do not seem to benefit from the liberalization14 while
entrant firms, who may have been unable to import due to the fixed cost of getting a li-
cense prior to 2012, benefit greatly from the liberalization. In connected sectors however,
there is a small reallocation effect between connected and non connected firms, where
non connected firms appear to grow marginally while connected firms shrink but not
significantly. Importantly, while it is almost entirely net entry that contributes to the
positive impact of the liberalization in non connected sectors, there was no significant
entry in the liberalized connected sectors relative to non liberalized connected sectors.
Analyzing these results, we postulate that there are higher barriers to entry in the
sectors populated by connected firms. This hypothesis would explain both why there
was limited entry in the liberalized connected product codes post-reform but also why
connected firms operate in these sectors in the first place. Through their connections,
these firms may be able to overcome the high barriers to entry in these sectors more
easily and thus capture rents from limited competition in importing these goods. In the
next section, we explore this hypothesis.
3.4 Connected firms and economies of scale
3.4.1 Patterns of entry and presence of connected firms
We first abstract from the import license liberalization to explore the patterns of entry
of non connected firms across sectors as a function of the presence of connected firms,
in the short and in the long run. We do so by running the following cross-sectional
regression at the product-code level:
MSnon conn, entp,2012 = α+ β ·MSconnp,2012,inc + ep (3.2)
14In Appendix Table C.3, we show that even if incumbents did not grow significantly post liberalization,
they started making smaller shipments but more of them on a given year, consistent with the remark made
earlier that removing the licensing process reduced the fixed cost of making an individual shipment.
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where p is a product-code, MSnon conn, entp,2012 =
valuenon conn, entp,2012
valuep,2012
is the market share of non
connected firms that are entrants in 2012 (that did not import the good in 2011 but import
it in 2012) and MSconnp,2012,inc =
valueconn, incp,2012
valueincp,2012
is the market share of connected firms among
incumbent firms in 2012 (firms that imported the product code in 2011 and 2012). We
use the market share among incumbents rather than simply the overall market share of
connected incumbents to avoid a mechanical correlation between the market share of
incumbents and the market share of entrants. The parameter β thus captures potential
barriers to entry associated with sectors in which connected firms are also more likely
to be present.
We run another similar regression replacing the dependent variable by MSnon conn, entp,2015 ,
the market share of non connected entrant firms in 2015 to capture how the presence of
connected firms in sectors affects entry of non connected firms in the long run. The esti-
mates from these two regressions are reported in column 1 of Table 3.4. Panel A reports
the short run correlation while Panel B reports the same coefficient in the long run. Both
panels show that a higher incidence of connected firms negatively impacts entry of non
connected firms. These results are consistent with our hypothesis made at the end of
the previous section that connected firms operate in sectors with higher barriers to en-
try. Low entry rates of firms in sectors in which connected firms are present is thus not
specific to the license liberalization.
From these basic regression settings, we gradually add sector characteristics as con-
trols and explore how adding them affects our estimate of the β parameter. We look
for intrinsic sectoral features that would generate high barriers to entry and would then
make it more likely for connected firms to operate in these sectors. The negative correla-
tion observed in column 1 is robust to adding HS2 fixed effects, which could potentially
capture the differences in fixed costs associated with entry in various broad product
categories. Column 3 adds BEC product types which classifies HS6 codes according to
intermediates, capital and final goods. In column 4, we add fixed effects associated to
the conservative Rauch (1999) classification, which codes products in three separate cat-
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egories: goods traded on an organized exchange market, goods with a reference price
and differentiated products. These last two product classification could capture differ-
ences in fixed costs associated with knowing demand for specific products downstream
to the importing activity or setting up the distribution networks domestically to resell
imported goods. Our estimates are robust to including these fixed effects 15.
Column 5 adds in a control which corresponds to the logarithm of the average ship-
ment value of non connected firms in the considered sector. Our rationale for doing so
is that some sectors may require that shipments be of a higher value because of mini-
mum scale required for logistics reasons (it may be difficult to import small quantities
of a particular good) or because importing large quantities of the good may give a com-
petitive advantage (e.g. by obtaining lower unit prices). In both the short-run and the
long-run, controlling for shipment value annuls the negative correlation observed pre-
viously. This means that connected firms are more prominent in sectors with higher
capital requirements and suggests that they have easier access to the capital needed to
make imports in these sectors. As capital may be more difficult to access for non con-
nected firms, these sectors then tend to exhibit less entry. In the next sub-section, we
test this idea that connected firms may be importing products with high economies of
scale. If importing high quantities of a good translates into lower average unit costs,
connected firms may leverage their access to capital to import goods at low prices and
extract significant rents from doing so.
3.4.2 Measuring economies of scales
We test the hypothesis that connected firms occupy sectors with higher internal economies
of scale. To measure economies of scale, we estimate the price discount for buying larger
quantities or importing shipments of higher value. For each HS6 code, we first divide
15In an alternative specification, not presented here, we add controls for the main origins of the goods
imported and do not find that it affects the correlation between entry and presence of connected firms
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the sample of quantities imported into five bins of equal sizes16 and run the following
regression:




δi · 1{qp,o,t ∈ Qi}+ ep,o,t (3.3)
where log(unit val)p,o,t denotes the log unit value of a shipment of product p im-
ported during month t from origin o, qp,o,t is the corresponding quantity, and αp,o,t are
product-origin-month fixed effects. The Qi’s are the quantity bins defined above and the
δi correspond to the average unit value residual for quantity bin Qi. The importance of
economies of scale is assessed by the degree to which the estimated δi decrease with i.
Sectors with limited economies of scale might potentially never make very large
shipment in value over our sample period, so that quantity bins in different sectors
would not correspond to shipments of similar (comparable) values. We therefore also
estimate a similar regression as the one above with value bins rather than quantity bins,
the bins being defined in absolute value rather than relative value:




γi · 1{vp,o,t ∈ Vi}+ ep,o,t (3.4)
where the bounds of the value bins are: $1,000; $10,000; $100,000 and $1,000,000.
We estimate these two equations for connected and non connected sectors, as defined
in the previous section, to assess if economies of scale are more important in the sec-
tors populated by connected firms. We exclude connected firms from these regressions,
because they might potentially benefit from lower prices through their connections that
are unrelated to sector-specific scale economies.
As the unit value of a shipment is just its value divided by its quantity, there is a
mechanical negative correlation between our dependent variable and the quantity bins
and a positive one with the same left-hand side variable and the value bins. As such,
our δi estimates are a lower bound of the actual economies of scale in the considered
16The bins are not of equal density as product codes with higher economies of scale should have the
distribution of shipment sizes concentrated on high values
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sectors while the γi constitute an upper bound. Importantly, we are not interested in the
level of these estimated economies of scale per-se, but rather the relative level between
connected and non connected sectors. Thus, we need to assume that the bias to which
our δi and γi estimates are subject to is the same in sectors in which connected firms are
prominent and sectors where they are not.
The coefficients δi and γi are reported in the top and bottom part of Figure 3.3. Both
graphs display larger economies of scale for connected sectors compared to non con-
nected sectors, and especially so for the highest quantity and value bins. These results
confirm the hypothesis that connected firms are more prominent in sectors with high
economies of scale. From the combination of all these empirical patterns, we posit that
these firms have better access to the capital required to make large shipments and as
such, capture the benefits from importing goods with high price discounts. These high
economies of scale generate opportunities for rents to be captured by importing these
goods in bulk at low prices reselling to the domestic market. Firms looking to compete
with connected firms as wholesalers may not be able to do so from binding credit con-
straints while individual firms or small distributors face lower costs from buying their
inputs or final goods from connected firms than directly importing the goods in small
quantities.
3.4.3 Connected firms, economies of scale and de facto liberalization
In this final section, we investigate the determinants that made some sectors liberalized
de jure but not de facto. We test the assumption that connected firms may have been
able to prevent de facto liberalization in sectors where they needed protection from en-
trants. Our previous analysis has shown that connected firms tend to operate in sectors
in which imports are subject to high economies of scale. Firms with limited access to
capital may not be able to enter and benefit from these economies of scale. Thus, the lib-
eralization of sectors with high economies of scale should not lead to entry, as observed
in section 3.3.2, and would not jeopardize the rents captured by connected firms in these
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sectors. However, in sectors which do not exhibit high economies of scale, connected
firms may rely more heavily on the licensing process to act as a barrier to entry and
have incentives to prevent their liberalization if they are able to do so.
We test these hypotheses by running a set of probit regressions. We keep only the
set of products which were liberalized de jure to estimate the probability that a given
product code in that list is liberalized de facto. We run several regressions based on the
following estimation equation:
y∗p = αh + β · 1{p=connected}+γ · 1{p=economies of scale}
+δ · 1{p=connected} · 1{p=economies of scale}+ ep
(3.5)
where p indexes a product code, αh are HS2 fixed effects, 1{p=connected} is a dummy
equal to one if product p is a connected sector as defined in section 3.3.2 and 1{p=economies of scale}
indicates whether sector p is subject to economies of scale on the import side. y∗p is the
standard probit model latent variable that drives the likelihood that a product be liberal-
ized de facto. Our hypothesis is that β should be negative and significant while δ should
be positive and significant.
To measure economies of scale in a particular sector, we use the logarithm of the
average shipment size for non connected firms as in section 3.4.1. Additionally, we run
the regression described in Equation 3.4 for each product code and then categorize a
specific product code as subject to economies of scale if the estimate γ5 in that sector is
negative 17.
Results are presented in Table 3.5. Column 1 presents the pseudo-R2 in a version
with only HS2 fixed effects as a benchmark. Column 2 shows that connected sectors
where less likely to be liberalized. Column 3 uses a continuous version of the right-
hand side variable, where the dummy for connected sector is replaced by the market
share of connected firms in the pre-liberalization period. Column 4 splits connected
17For sectors in the sample which do not contain at least one shipment which value is higher than a
million dollars, we extrapolate the coefficient from the slope of the γi’s estimated for smaller bins as a
fuction of i.
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firms into our two sub-categories: privately connected firms and SOEs. The presence
of both decreases the likelihood that a sector be de facto liberalized. Column 5 follows
closely equation 3.5. It shows that while connected sectors were less likely to be de facto
liberalized, connected sectors which exhibit high economies of scale were more likely
to be de facto liberalized relative to connected product codes with lower economies of
scale. Column 6, using our measure of economies of scale derived from section 3.4.2,
shows similar results 18. In both columns 5 and 6, economies of scale, in the absence
of connected firms, do not appear to be important in explaining the likelihood that a
sector be liberalized. These results suggest that connected firms may have used their
relationships with parties in power to limit de facto liberalization and especially so in
sectors with low economies of scale that could act as “natural” barriers to entry and
prevent competition.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of import license liberalization in Myanmar, a
complex political economy environment. By contrast to the literature on this issue, we
find that liberalization in the sectors where firms that are politically connected operate
did not lead to substantial entry and so lack an important reallocation effect. We explore
potential explanations for these patterns and document that connected firms tend to
trade goods which offer important price discounts if imported in large quantities. These
economies of scale act as a “natural” barrier to entry to protect connected firms from
potential competition. Finally, this chapter documents interactions between the strategic
decisions made by connected firms in the choice of the sectors in which they operate
and the role of institutions in shaping economic liberalization while protecting the rents
18One caveat of these results is that the presence of connected firms in a sector or the importance of
economies of scale in a given sector only explain a small portion of the total variation in the likelihood
that a sector be de facto liberalized, especially relative to other factors such as 2 digits HS codes. However,
both our measures of connectedness and economies of scale are noisy, so doing a variance decomposition
exercise with these variables is challenging.
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of connected firms. These observed patterns motivate the developments of a unifying
theoretical framework to rationalize them.
The findings in this study also point to potentially important follow-up research. Our
paper is, to our knowledge, the first to investigate the role of economies of scale in the
import sector. Possible leads of research in that area could be developments of a stronger
methodological approach to measuring economies of scale as well as documenting their
role in shaping market power and concentration in import markets worldwide.
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Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Connected and Not Connected Importers
Not Connected Privately connected SOEs Total
XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
Number of firms 118,412 300 420 119,132
Share of firms (%) 99.4 0.3 0.4 100.0
Value (Million USD) 45,720 7,455 11,156 64,330
Share of import value (%) 71.1 11.6 17.3 100.0
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for our connectness variables. Privately connected firms
are firms which are either directly sanctioned by the US, the EU or Australia or firms who have on their
board an individual that is sanctioned. SOEs are government companies. Total value is the total import
value in our sample.
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Table 3.2: Import license liberalization and connected sectors
XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX
Panel A: Privately connected firms and SOEs combined
Dep. var: Standardized growth rate
Connected sectors Non connected sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Lib}× 1{Post} −0.148∗ −0.026 0.233∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.155) (0.036) (0.098)
Year FEs Yes No Yes No
HS2 X Year FEs No Yes No Yes
HS6 FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 818 818 1544 1544
Panel B: Distinguishing sectors with majority of privately connected vs. SOEs
Dep. var: Standardized growth rate
Connected sectors Connected sectors Non connected sectors
Privately conn. SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1{Lib}× 1{Post} −0.086 0.204 −0.308 −0.165 0.233∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.240) (0.187) (0.254) (0.036) (0.098)
Year FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No
HS2 X Year FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
HS6 FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 464 464 354 354 1544 1544
Notes: One observation is a 6 digit product code during fiscal year. 1{Lib} is a dummy equal to one if the product
is in the group of products which are de facto liberalized. The sample only includes the set od products which are
de facto and de jure liberalized or not liberalized. 1{Post} is a dummy equal to one if the fiscal year considered is
greater than 2013, the first fiscal year when the liberalization was implemented. HS2 X Year FEs are 2 digit product
codes - fiscal years pairs of fixed effects. Sectors are defined to be connected if the market share of connected firms
in that sector in the pre-reform period is higher than 15 percent. Appendix Table C.2 provides a robustness check.
Connected sectors where the privately connected firms constitute most of the market share of connected firms are
presented in Panel B, columns 1 and 2. Connected sectors where SOEs constitute most of the market share of con-
nected firms are presented in Panel B, columns 3 and 4. Standard errors are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Decomposition of the effect of import license liberalization
Connected sectors Non connected sectors
Incumbents 0.007 0.003
Connected firms −0.034 −0.008
Not connected firms 0.041∗∗ 0.011
Net Entry −0.034 0.464∗∗∗
Connected firms −0.089 0.024
Not connected firms 0.056 0.441∗∗∗
All −0.026 0.467∗∗∗
Connected firms −0.123 0.016
Not connected firms 0.097 0.451∗∗∗
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from the regressions detailed in section
3.3.2 and equation 3.1. The coefficient reported is the coefficient for the interaction
1{Lib} · 1{Post}, so each coefficient is estimated in a separate regression. For exam-
ple, the incumbents non connected coefficient in non connected sectors corresponds
to the estimates from regression equation 3.1 for a sample that only includes incum-
bent firms which are non connected and operate in non connected sectors. Standard
errors are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: Connected sectors and entry
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
Panel A: Entry in the short run
Dep. var: Market share of non connected entrants in 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connected firms MS - 2012 −0.080∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Log(Av. shipment size) −0.046∗∗∗
(0.006)
HS2 FEs No Yes Yes Yes No
BEC-type FEs No No Yes Yes No
Rauch Class FEs No No No Yes No
Panel B: Entry in the long run
Dep. var: Market share of non connected entrants in 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connected firms MS - 2012 −0.089∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.027
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Log(Av. shipment size) −0.030∗∗∗
(0.005)
HS2 FEs No Yes Yes Yes No
BEC-type FEs No No Yes Yes No
Rauch Class FEs No No No Yes No
Notes: One observation is a 6 digit product code. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the market
share of non connected firms which are entrants in 2012 (they did not import that product in 2011). In
Panel A, the dependent variable is the same except that the year considered is now 2015, the last year in
our sample. In both panels, the right hand side variable is the market share of connected firms among
incumbent firms in 2012, that is the value of imports made by connected incumbent firms in 2012 di-
vided by the value of imports made all incumbents in 2012 in the considered product code. Standard er-
rors are included in parentheses. HS2 FEs are 2 digit product code fixed effects. BEC-type FEs are fixed
effects that classify goods according to whether they are intermediates, final or consumption goods.
Rauch Class FEs are fixed effects for the Rauch (1999) classification. Log(av. shipment value) is a leave
out connected firms average shipment value by sector. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: De facto liberalization
Dep. var: 1 {de facto liberalized}
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connected sector −0.206∗∗∗ −1.481∗∗∗−0.417∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.568) (0.112)
Market share of connected firms −0.591∗∗∗
(0.135)
Market share of privately −0.491∗∗
connected firms (0.208)
Market share of SOEs −0.652∗∗∗
(0.166)
Log(av. shipment value) −0.045
(0.037)
Connected sector × 0.145∗∗
Log(av. shipment value) (0.064)
Sector with economies of scale −0.021
(0.095)
Connected sector × 0.377∗∗
Sector with economies of scale (0.158)
HS Chapter FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1407 1407 1407 1407 1407 1407
Pseudo - R2 0.144 0.147 0.154 0.154 0.150 0.152
Notes: One observation is a 6 digit product code. The sample is restricted to the set of goods which are liberal-
ized de jure. The table reports the estimation results from a probit model where the left hand side variable is a
dummy equal to one if the product considered is liberalized de facto. A sector is defined to be connected is the
market share of connected firms is greater than 15 percent. Log(av. shipment value) is a leave out connected firms
average shipment value by sector. Sector with economies of scale is a dummy equal to one if the sector exhibits
economies of scale as defined in section 3.4.3 and estimated through equation 3.4. HS2 FEs are 2 digit product
code fixed effects. Standard errors are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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MS=0 MS<20% MS>20% MS>80%
Market share of connected firms
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of product codes in the pre-liberalization period according to
the importance of the presence of connected firms. Approximately 40 percent of sectors do not have any
connected firms trading the good, while more than 45 percent of the product codes have a connected firms
market share higher than zero percent but less than 20 percent.
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Figure 3.2: Share of products liberalized by HS chapter
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Animal & Animal Products
De Jure De Facto
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of products which are liberalized de facto or de jure and so by
HS chapter. The share of products which are liberalized de facto is a subset of the set of products which
are liberalized de jure. There is significant heterogeneity in the shares of products liberalized across HS
chapters.
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Figure 3.3: Economies of scale
Notes: This figure reports the point estimates of the quantity bins and value bins estimated in equations
3.3 and 3.4 respectively. The bars represent the 95 percent confidence intervals. Both equations are esti-
mated separately for connected and non connected sectors.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Estimation procedure in details
This appendix describes in more details how the marginal cost parameters are estimated.
As explained in the text, the challenge of the estimation lies in translating the parameters
mci,s and v that define the distribution F (.|mci,s) into the parameters that define Hijs(.)
and H˜ijs(.) as defined in equation 4.
First, it is worth noting that the optimal bidding strategy β j,s(mc) = E[Yj|Yj > mc] is
the expectation of the truncated distribution of the first-order statistic of Nj,s− 1 draws of
the normal distribution. While the distribution of the minimum of random draws of the
normal distribution is not a well-known function form, I use the results from Chen and
Tyler (1999) which provide a very good approximation. If X ∼ N (µ, σ2), the first order
statistic can be approximated by a normal with mean µ(N) = µ − Φ−1(0.52641/N) · σ





Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal distribution. Thus, β j,s is just the truncated
mean of a normal distribution and so can be approximated by the following expression:
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) · σ(Nj,s − 1)
where φ and Φ are respectively the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution.
Using the Taylor expansions for the moments of functions of random variables in
Benaroya et al. (2005), Hijs(.) can then be approximated by a normal N (µijs, σijs) with
µijs = β j,s(mci,s) and σijs = β
′
j,s(mci,s) · v.
Finally, I need to translate the parameters that describe Hij(.) the distribution of the
actual bids pijt into the distribution H˜ij(.) of the bids with errors in the data p˜ijt =
pijt + eijt. As [1 − Hkj(pijt)] corresponds the probability that pkjt > pijt = p˜ijt − eijt,
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Notes: This figure shows the price discounts estimates obtained from the regression in 1. The x-axis
variable represents the size of the shipment in containers. The omitted bin is a size of one container.
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Notes: This figure shows transaction prices as a function of the length of a buyer-exporter relationship. If
switching costs were important in explaining the observed price dispersion documented in section 1.3.1,
prices should increase with the length of the relationship.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of order size classifying buyers by their overall size. Small
buyers are defined as buyers who make less than 25 shipments per year.
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Notes: This figure shows the distribution of profits (as defined as the sum of the expected difference
between transaction price and marginal costs).
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Tables and Figures
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Table B.1: Main importers of Peruvian fishmeal and Average Quality Imported
Total Weight Average Protein content Sd(Protein content)
(1000 metric tons)
CHINA 4266 66.06 1.60
GERMANY 972 65.42 1.62
JAPAN 545 66.12 1.69
CHILE 305 66.60 1.51
VIETNAM 277 65.91 1.59
TAIWAN 248 66.02 1.71
UNITED KINGDOM 147 65.26 1.62
TURKEY 128 64.91 1.52
INDONESIA 94 66.16 1.64
SPAIN 90 65.44 1.61
AUSTRALIA 85 66.06 1.80
CANADA 66 65.76 1.52
FRANCE 55 65.59 1.72
SOUTH KOREA 24 66.56 1.46
ITALY 21 64.97 1.52
BULGARIA 15 65.42 1.75
VENEZUELA 13 66.67 1.64
PHILIPPINES 12 64.92 1.47
BELGIUM 11 65.08 1.69
INDIA 10 65.17 2.03
Notes: This table reports the top 20 importers of Peruvian fishmeal, the total quantity imported over
the whole period of our sample, the average quality imported and the standard deviation of the qual-
ity imported across all transactions.
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Table B.2: Vertical integration and the Quality price premium – First Stage
XXXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX
Dep. var: LQP (t-1) × USP (t-1) × LQP (t-1) × USP (t-1) ×
Quality Quality Quality Quality
Premium Premium Premium Premium
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LQ producer (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Chile)] (t-1) −0.081
(0.097)
LQP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Denmark)] (t-1) 0.142∗∗∗
(0.036)
LQP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Iceland)] (t-1) 0.351∗∗∗
(0.046)
LQP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Thailand)] (t-1) 0.133∗∗∗
(0.012)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Chile)] (t-1) −0.410
(0.245)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Denmark)] (t-1) 0.249∗∗
(0.116)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Iceland)] (t-1) 0.433∗∗
(0.165)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Qty exp. by Thailand)] (t-1 0.104∗∗∗
(0.034)
LQP (t-1) × [Log(Chile Price)] 1.175∗∗∗
(0.044)
LQP (t-1) ×[Log(Denmark Price)] −2.158∗∗∗
(0.534)
LQP (t-1) × [Log(Iceland Price)] 0.667
(0.486)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Chile Price)] 1.081∗∗∗
(0.135)
USP (t-1) ×[Log(Denmark Price)] −2.950∗∗∗
(0.740)
USP (t-1) × [Log(Iceland Price)] 1.469∗∗
(0.558)
Low quality producer (t-1) Yes No Yes No
Upgradable share of production (t-1) No Yes No Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Results from the first stage of IV specifications reported in Table 2.4. One observation is a firm during
a production season. Quality premium is equal to Log(High Quality)− Log(Low Quality) where High and
Low Quality are the average price of “Prime” and “FAQ” fishmeal in the month preceding the current fishing
season. LQP(t− 1) is equal to 1 if a firm’s share of low quality output in the preceding season was at least 1
percent. USP(t− 1) is the share of a firm’s production that was of low quality in the previous season. A firm
that produces almost only low quality output has more potential to upgrade than a firm already producing
almost only high quality output. In column 1 and 3, the instruments are LQP(t− 1) and USP(t− 1) inter-
acted with average export prices in other high quality fishmeal exporting countries for which the data was
available. In Column 2 and 4, the instruments are LQP(t− 1) and USP(t− 1) interacted with the quantity
exported by the top fishmeal exporting countries (excluding Peru) for which there is a national fishing quota.
Standard errors clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Vertical integration and the Quality price premium – Robustness Checks
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Dep. var: Share of inputs from VI suppliers
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Quality premium 0.832∗∗ 0.333
(0.303) (0.199)
Quality premium is high 0.375∗∗∗
(0.061)
Quality premium is low 0.294∗∗∗
(0.061)
Low quality producer (t-1) 0.218 0.279 0.208
× Quality premium (0.277) (0.298) (0.284)
Upgradable share of production (t-1) 0.423 0.406 0.457
× Quality premium (0.411) (0.470) (0.416)
Low quality producer (t-1) No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Upgradable share of production (t-1) No No No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Season FEs No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
N 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203
Notes: One observation is a firm during a production season. ∆ Share VI is Share of inputs from VI suppliers (t)
- Share of inputs from VI suppliers (t − 1) as defined in 2.4. Quality premium is equal to Log(High Quality) −
Log(Low Quality) where High and Low Quality are the average price of “Prime” and “FAQ” fishmeal in the month
preceding the current fishing season. We choose to take the month preceding the fishing season rather than the
fishing season itself as integration decisions are typically decided in the month preceding the season and integra-
tion within a season is extremely rare in the data. Low Quality Producer(t− 1) is equal to 1 if a firm’s share of low
quality output in the preceding season was at least 1 percent. Upgradable share of production(t− 1) is the share
of a firm’s production that was of low quality in the previous season. A firm that produces almost only low qual-
ity output has more potential to upgrade than a firm already producing almost only high quality output. Standard
errors clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Supplier characteristics
Offload weight Cooling Capacity Power engine Max. Dist. from
per trip system (m3) (hp) the plant’s
(metric tons) port (kms)
XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
Wooden 41.00 0.00 65.73 215.40 56.10
(16.24) (0.06) (27.34) (94.78) (7.74)
Steel - Independent 104.03 0.09 219.30 412.31 81.15
(40.77) (0.28) (84.35) (189.82) (13.43)
Steel - Switchers 148.88 0.25 301.18 616.30 92.25
(0.43) (0.444) (129.92) (328.51) (15.37)
Steel - VI 181.62 0.34 382.00 769.96 97.29
(68.13) (0.47) (137.11) (352.52) (12.62)
Notes: Offload weight is the amount fished on a trip. Maximum distance from port is the maximum distance at
which a boat is from the port on a fishing trip. Steel boats are generally bigger, better suited for industrial fishing,
and are subject to different regulations. Wooden boats cannot be owned by fishmeal firms. Independent boats are
owned by an individual or a company that is not a fishmeal company. Switchers are boats that move from VI to
Independent or from Independent to VI at some point in our data. VI are boats that remain vertically integrated
during the whole sample of our data.
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Table B.5: Output Quality and Share of Inputs from Vertically Integrated Suppliers -
Robustness checks using a major firm in the Peruvian fishmeal industry.
Impact of Share of VI on Quality
XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX
Dep. var: Protein Content
OLS: Ind. Boats IV: Ind. Boats
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 1.369∗∗ 1.338∗∗ 1.469∗ 1.390
(0.654) (0.656) (0.807) (0.918)
Has high technology No Yes No Yes
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2487 2487 2647 2647
First Stage
XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Share of Inputs from VI Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Independent Boats in Port −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Share of Independent Boats in Port −0.412∗∗ −0.398∗
(0.200) (0.207)
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value (Under-id) 0.005 0.006
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (Weak inst) 3.61 3.06
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.24 0.31
Notes: This table presents robustness checks for Table 2.6 using a major firm’s internal data that allows us to
link export sales to a specific plant. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is the share of a firmÕs inputs that come
from VI suppliers during a season. Has high technology is a dummy variable equal to one if the plant in question
has any steam drying technologies installed. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is instrumented by (a) the number
of independent boats present in the plant’s port in the season in question, excluding those that interact directly
with the plant itself, and (b) the ratio of the number of boats in (a) to the total number of boats in the plant’s
port in that season that do not interact with the plant itself. Robust standard errors are included in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.6: Output Quality and Share of Inputs from Vertically Integrated Suppliers -
First Stage
First Stage
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
Dep. var: Share of Inputs From VI Suppliers
IV: Ind. Boats IV: Wooden Boats
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Independent Boats in Port (Leave-Out) −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of Wooden Boats in Port (Leave-Out) −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value (Under-id) 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (Weak inst) 23.55 23.73 27.69 27.69
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Has high technology No Yes No Yes
Month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2487 2487 2647 2647
Notes: Results from the first stage of IV specifications reported in Table 2.6. One observation is
a plant in a particular month. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is the share of a firmÕs inputs that
come from VI suppliers during a season. Has high technology is a dummy variable equal to one if
the plant in question has any steam drying technologies installed. Columns 1 and 2 instrument for
Share of inputs from VI suppliers with the number of independent boats present locally (in the plant’s
port) in the season in question, excluding those that interact directly with the plant itself. Columns
3 and 4 instrument for Share of inputs from VI suppliers with the number of wooden boats present
locally (in the plant’s port) in the season in question, excluding those that interact directly with the
plant itself. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.7: Countries’ output quality and vertical integration in export manufacturing
Dep. var: Log(unit value) -
Residuals from HS6×Year FEs and Country FEs
XXXXXX
(1)
Related party share of imports 0.038∗∗∗
- Residuals from HS6×Year FEs and Country FEs (0.007)
N 208 024
Notes: In this table, the dependent variable is εcpt from the regression log(unit value)cpt = αpt + γc + εcpt, where
log(unit value)cpt is the average log unit value of products exported from country c, of HS6 code p, in year t
to the U.S.; αpt is a product×year fixed effect; and γc is an origin country fixed effect. This regression is esti-
mated using COMTRADE data from BACI (See Gaulier and Zignago (2010) for a description of the data). The
independent variable is υcpt from the regression Related party share of U.S. importscpt = βpt + δc + υcpt, where
Related party share of U.S. importscpt is the share of products exported from country c, of NAICS code p, in year
t to the U.S. that are imported by related parties (usually other units of the same firm (Ruhl, 2015)); βpt is a
product×year fixed effect; and δc is an origin country fixed effect. Related party share of U.S. importscpt is con-
structed using data from the U.S. Census Bureau. Because the product level c (HS6) for the unit value residual
is different from the product level p (NAICS) from the share of related party imports residuals, we compute the
value weighted unit value residual at the p (NAICS) level using a HS6-NAICS conversion table. This regression
includes data from 2005 to 2014. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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6 8 10 12 14
Log(Total production)
Notes: Each dot represents one fishmeal firm in our sample. Total production is the total weight of
fishmeal the firm produced during our data period and average protein content is the quantity weighted
average protein content of the firm’s fishmeal exports.
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-75% -50% -25% 0 +25% +50% +75%
Inventories
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0373
Notes: Kernel density of estimated inventories. Inventories are defined as the ratio of (Total Production -
Total Exports) to Total Production, where Total Production is a firm’s production during a given produc-
tion season and Total Exports are the sum of exports that are shipped during the production season and
the period directly following the relevant production season (before the next production season starts).
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2009-1 2009-2 2010-1 2010-2 2011-1 2011-2 2012-1 2012-2 2013-1 2013-2 2014-1 2015-1 2015-2 2016-1 2016-2
Notes: This graph shoes the evolution of the Peruvian fishmeal industry’s share of inputs from integrated
suppliers by production season. For every year, −1 is the first production season in the calendar year, in
general from April to July, and−2 is the second production season, in general from November to January.
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2009m7 2011m7 2013m7 2015m7 2017m7
Peru average price Chile average price
Denmark average price Iceland average price
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the average fishmeal price in other fishmeal exporting countries.
Denmark and Iceland export mostly “Super Prime” fishmeal grade while Peru exports mostly “Prime”
grade fishmeal.
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B.2 Dynamic Theoretical Framework and Relational Con-
tracts
Dynamic theoretical framework
The model presented in the main body of the paper assumes that all transactions are
done on the spot market. This stylized version of the model results in the upstream
party not taking any action when integrated and the absence of incentives to take a
quality-increasing action (a2 = 0). In this version of the model, we follow closely Baker
et al. (2001, 2002) in allowing the downstream party to use relational contracts to incen-
tivize the quality action.
We make the same assumptions for Q as before, but add a shock to the alternative
use P:
P = a1 + e
Q = Q0 − γa1 + δa2
where e is orthogonal to any action taken by the upstream party1. We assume that e = e¯
with probability 12 and e = −e¯ with probability 12 and that e is known by the upstream
party at the time of delivery of the inputs. 2
As in the main text model, we assume that both P and Q are not contractible. P -
the quantity focused alternative use- is perfectly observable at the time of delivery of
the inputs, but Q -the quality surplus- is only observed to the downstream party with
1We could also assume uncertainty over the realization of the Q surplus, but it would not change the
intuition of the result below.
2As in the main text model, we assume that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1− α. Also, note again that P
could itself be the result of a bargaining process between the boat and a quantity focused firm.
159
some delay (e.g. once the inputs are processed).3 To incentivize the quality-increasing
action, the downstream party can offer a payment contingent on the realization of the
surplus Q to the upstream party. However, since this payment can only be made after
the inputs are delivered, the downstream party can only credibly promise to make this
delayed payment through repeated interactions with the upstream party.4 Note again
that at the time of delivery of the inputs, since all parties know the value of Q0, and
because P = a1 + e is observable, Q has an observable portion (in expectation) at the
time of delivery of the inputs: Q˜ = Q0 − γE(a1|P) = Q0 − γP. Hence, a payment on
the spot, proportional to Q˜ is still feasible.
As in Baker et al. (2002), we consider four possible organizational structures:
1. Spot Outsourcing (Nonintegrated Asset Ownership, Spot Governance Environ-
ment)
2. Relational Outsourcing (Nonintegrated Asset Ownership, Relational Governance
Environment)
3. Spot Employment (Integrated Asset Ownership, Spot Governance Environment)
4. Relational Employment (Integrated Asset Ownership, Relational Governance En-
vironment)
We write the relational compensation contract as {b(Q)}, where b(Q) is a payment con-
tingent on the observation of Q5.
3In our context, fish quality can hardly be assessed when the fish is offloaded at the factory. However,
once the fish is processed in the factory, fishmeal quality can be measured.
4In the model, we suppose that this delay is shorter than a full time period, so the surplus Q is ob-
served before the next period starts and the next transaction occurs. Thus, the downstream party does
not discount the payment.
5Alternatively, we could consider a more general relational compensation contract of the form
{s, b(Q)} as in Baker et al. (2002), where salary s is paid by downstream to upstream at the beginning
of each period and b(Q) is a payment contingent on the realization of Q. Such an assumption would not
change our results below.
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First Best
The first-best actions {a∗1 , a∗2}maximize the expected value of Q minus the cost of actions






2. This gives a
∗
1 = 0 and a
∗
2 = δ and total surplus:
S∗ = Q(a∗1 , a
∗





On the Spot Market, the supplier does not take the first best actions. In particular, under
both Spot Employment and Spot Outsourcing a2 = 0, because the downstream firm
cannot credibly commit to rewarding the supplier’s quality-focused actions.
Relational Contracts
Whether the upstream party is integrated with the downstream party or not, if she ac-












= Q(a1, a2)− t, where t is a transfer independant of the surplus
Q. In the remainder of this section, we assume that the relational contract is written in
such a way and that under relational employment (when the downstream party owns
the supplier) or under relational outsourcing (when the supplier is independent), the
suppliers take the first best actions {a∗1 , a∗2} 6.
This relational contract is self-enforcing if both parties choose to honor it for all pos-
6In particular, t must be such that t ≤ Q(a∗1 , a∗2)− c(a∗1 , a∗2) = Q0 + 12δ2 so that the downstream party
would accept the contract
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sible realizations of P. We next explore the feasibility of the first best contract under
employment and outsourcing and show that if the shock to the alternative use P is high
enough, the first best contract is only self-enforceable under Relational Employment.
We use superscripts {RE, SE, RO, SO} to indicate Relational Employment, Spot Em-
ployment, Relational Outsourcing and Spot Outsourcing and {U, D, S} to denote the
upstream party, downstream party and overall surplus respectively.
Relational Employment
Since SSE > SSO, 7 if one of the two party reneges, the downstream party will retain
ownership and earn DSE in perpetuity, while the upstream party will earn USE in per-
petuity. The upstream party reneges if she refuses to accept the promised payment b(Q).







Similary, the downstream party reneges if she takes the inputs and refuses to pay the
bonus to the upstream party. The downstream party honors the contract as long as:
1
r
DRE ≥ b(Q) + 1
r
DSE (B.2)
Summing (B.1) and (B.2), and noting that SX = UX + DX, we get the following
necessary condition:
SRE ≥ SSE (B.3)
(B.3) is actually sufficient as well as necessary, because a transfer t can always be
chosen so that when (B.3) is statisfied, (B.1) and (B.2) are also satisfied 8.
7See the proof in the main text model.





2 ≤ t ≤ Q0 + 12δ2
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As SRE = S∗ = Q0 + 12δ
2 and SSE = S∗ = Q0, (B.3) is satisfied, and so the first best
can always be enforced under Relational Employment.
Relational Outsourcing
Since SSE > SSO, if one of the two party reneges, the upstream party will purchase
the ownership right from the downstream party for some price pi, after which the up-
stream and downstream parties will earn USE and DSE, respectively, in perpetuity. If
the upstream party reneges on the relational-outsourcing contract, she negotiates to sell
the good for the spot-outsourcing price of (1− α)P + αQ˜, where α is the supplier’s bar-
gaining coefficient and Q˜ is the observable portion of the surplus Q as in the main text




URO ≥ (1− α)P + αQ˜ + 1
r
USE + pi (B.4)
The timing of reneging is slightly different for the downstream party. She has no
incentives to renege at the time of delivery of the inputs as Q is unobservable. Instead,
the downstream party reneges if she takes the inputs and refuses to pay the bonus to the
upstream party. The downstream party does not renege as long as:
1
r
DRO ≥ b(Q) + 1
r
DSE − pi (B.5)
If (B.4) holds for all P and Q˜, then it must hold for the maximum value of (1− α)P+





SSE +max {(1− α)P + αQ˜} (B.6)
Evaluated at {a∗1 , a∗2}, (B.6) is equivalent to:
(1− αγ− α)e¯ ≤ 1
2r
δ2 − αQ0 (B.7)
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Thus, if e¯ is high enough, the first best contract cannot be enforced under Relational
Outsourcing.
The intuition for why quality-oriented downstream firms may need to own upstream
productive assets and hire the suppliers operating the assets as employees is as follows.
Under any sort of outsourcing, suppliers are free to allocate the inputs produced to their
alternative use. As a result, when the value of the input is high in its alternative use
(e.g. if the supplier happens to get more fish or if there is less competition on a specific
day in the quantity-focused sector), quality-oriented firms may be unable to prevent the
suppliers they interact with from breaking their relationship and selling the goods for
its alternative use. In contrast, under Relational Employment, the downstream firm has
control over the inputs, and will choose to allocate them efficiently regardless of the
value of the inputs in their alternative use.
A key testable prediction of this model in our context is that (1) independent suppli-
ers under a relational contract should not adopt a behavior consistent with delivering
higher quality inputs and (2) downstream firms should not produce higher quality out-
put when they source more of their inputs from non-integrated suppliers with whom
they have a relational contract.
Empirical evidence on relational contracts in the Peruvian fishmeal in-
dustry
We now test these predictions. We show results for two different, frequency-of-interacting
based observable proxies for a supplier being engaged in a relational outsourcing con-
tract with a downstream firm: specifically, (i) that the supplier delivers more than 80
percent of its fish to the same fishmeal firm (approx. the 75th percentile of the under-
lying distribution) for two consecutive production seasons, and (ii) that the supplier
delivers to the same firm more than 10 times (approx. the 25th percentile of the underly-
ing distribution) in a given production season and does so for three seasons in a row. We
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“turn on” the inferred contract at the start of the relevant period, not when the “cut-off”
used in the proxy is reached.
In Appendix Table B.8, which is analogous to Table 2.5, we show that relational out-
sourcing contracts appear not to be used to incentivize supplier quality-increasing ac-
tions in the Peruvian fishmeal industry, consistent with the dynamic version of our theo-
retical framework above. The results show that a supplier supplying a given plant does
not deliver fresher fish when engaged in repeated interactions with the firm in question,
relative to more isolated instances of supplying the same plant.
In Appendix Table B.9, which is analogous to Table 2.6, we relate output quality not
only to the share of inputs coming from integrated suppliers, but also to the share com-
ing from suppliers under relational outsourcing contracts (as defined by the proxies de-
scribed above). The estimated coefficients on the share of inputs coming from integrated
suppliers remain positive and highly significant, while the estimated coefficients on the
share coming from suppliers under relational outsourcing contracts are very small and
insignificant. These results indicate that repeated interactions are not used to incentivize
the delivery of high quality inputs in the Peruvian fishmeal sector, as the model above
predicts.
In combination with the results in the body of the paper, the findings in tables 2.5
and 2.6 provide support for the idea that vertical integration enables downstream firms
to incentivize specific supplier behaviors—and consequently the types of output associ-
ated with those behaviors—that other organizational structures do not.
Organizational structure and supplier behavioral response to plant in-
put quality needs
The dynamic model with relational contracts presented above also predicts the follow-
ing result. When the return on the quality surplus Q of the quality-increasing action
is higher (when δ increases), integrated suppliers will choose a higher level of the that
action (a∗2 = δ increases). We test this prediction below.
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A change in the need for input quality arises when the plant aims to produce fishmeal
of the high quality type (for example because of a change in demand). As in Section
2.6, we compare periods when the supplier is integrated with the plant supplied and
periods when the supplier is independent from but supplies the same plant, but now
differentially when the downstream plant produces a low or high quality output.
We first estimate the following equation:
Bijt = α+ β1 I[VI× supplies owner firm]ijt × I[Low Quality]jt
+ β2 I[VI× supplies owner firm]ijt × I[High Quality]jt (B.8)
+ γij × I[High Quality]jt + γij × I[Low Quality]jt + δt + εijt
where I[Low Quality]jt is a dummy equal to 1 when plant j—i.e. the plant supplier i
supplies at t—produces comparatively low quality fishmeal in the month date t falls
within (and conversely for I[High Quality]jt).9 We include Supplier × Plant × Quality
level fixed effects (that is, γij × I[High Quality]jt and γij × I[Low Quality]jt ) to focus on
the supplier’s differential response to the plant’s input needs when integrated. The other
variables are as defined in equation (2.5).
The marginal impact of the behavioral response of a single supplier on the output
quality of the plant as a whole is likely to be limited. We thus interpret the coefficient
of interest as the supplier’s response to the plant’s intention to produce higher quality
output.
The results in Appendix Table B.10 suggest that suppliers differentially adapt their
quality behavior to the current needs of the downstream plant they supply when in-
tegrated. Column 1 shows that boats tend to deliver a lower quantity per trip when
integrated with the plant supplied, regardless of whether the plant produces low or
9We define this dummy variable using our directly observed measure of quality at plant level. The
dummy is equal to 1 if the share of the plant’s production that is of high quality type is higher than the
median in our sample.
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high quality at the time.10 However, columns 2 and 3 show that, when integrated, boats
adjust their behavior so as to deliver fresher fish when the plant supplied is producing
high quality output. When integrated, boats fish about seven percent closer to port and
spend about six percent less time at sea, when the plant supplied is producing fishmeal
of the high quality type Overall, the evidence confirms the prediction from the relational
model that integrated suppliers will provide more of the quality focused action when
its return to the quality surplus is higher.
10The estimated decrease in quantity per trip when integrating with the plant being supplied is bigger
when the plant is producing low quality fishmeal. This is surprising in light of our results in sections 2.7
and 2.5. A possible explanation is that independent suppliers face strong incentives to deliver high input
quantities when the plant being supplied is attempting to produce high output quantities (and prioritizing
output quality less) and that integrated suppliers do not.
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Table B.8: Supplier Behavior and relational outsourcing
Panel A: Relational outsourcing = 80% of offloads to the same firm
for 2 consecutive production seasons
XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Log(Quantity Log(Max. distance Log(Total time
supplied) the plant’s spent at sea)
port)
(1) (2) (3)
I[Relational× supplies relational firm] 0.010 0.016∗ −0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.006)
Date FEs Yes Yes Yes
Supplier × Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes
N 315,442 137,278 159,724
Panel B: Relational Outsourcing = more than 10 interactions with the same firm
for at least 3 consecutive production seasons
XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX
Dep. var: Log(Quantity Log(Max. distance Log(Total time
supplied) the plant’s spent at sea)
port)
(1) (2) (3)
I[Relational× supplies relational firm] −0.009 0.026 0.002
(0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
Date FEs Yes Yes Yes
Supplier × Plant FEs Yes Yes Yes
N 315,442 137,278 159,724
Notes: One observation is a boat during a fishing trip. Quantity supplied is the amount of fish the boat delivers to the
plant per trip. Max. distance from the plant’s port is maximum distance a specific boat is observed away from port. Max.
distance from the plant’s port can only be measured if the boat leaves from and arrives at the same port. Total time at sea
is the amount of time the boat is away from port per trip. The number of observations varies from one column to the
next as GPS variables for a given trip are sometimes missing. We define I[Relational ×supplies relational firm] to be
equal to one if the supplier is (i) currently under a relational contract (ii) currently delivering to the firm it is under
a relational contract with. In Panel A, we define an independent boat as being under a relational contract if the boat
delivers more than 80% of its offloads (75th percentile) to the same fishmeal firm for 2 consecutive fishing seasons. In
Panel B, we define an independent boat as being under a relational contract if the boat interacts more than 10 times
(25th percentile) with the same firm during a fishing season and so, for at least 3 consecutive fishing seasons. Because
use Boat × Plant FEs, I[Relational ×supplies relational firm] is identified from boats moving in and out of a relational
contract. Standard errors clustered at the boat level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.9: Output quality and share of inputs from vertically integrated suppliers and
suppliers under a relational outsourcing contract
XXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX
Panel A: First definition of relational contracts
Dep. var: High Quality share of prod. Protein content
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 0.343∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.950∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.161) (0.348) (0.333)
Share of inputs from relational suppliers −0.100 −0.009 −0.159 −0.003
(0.093) (0.065) (0.520) (0.430)
High technology share of capacity No Yes No Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.75 0.75 65.7 65.7
N 275 275 208 208
Panel B: Second definition of relational contracts
Dep. var: High Quality share of prod. Protein content
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of inputs from VI suppliers 0.395∗∗ 0.395∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.162) (0.265) (0.250)
Share of inputs from relational suppliers −0.424∗∗∗ −0.481∗∗∗ 0.809 1.076
(0.141) (0.131) (2.015) (1.812)
High technology share of capacity No Yes No Yes
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.75 0.75 65.7 65.7
N 275 275 208 208
Notes: One observation is a firm during a production season. Protein content is the quantity weighted average of a mea-
sure of quality inferred from a database that provides weekly prices by quality. Log(unit price) is the log of the quantity
weighted average unit price of exports during a season. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is the share of a firm’s (or plant’s)
inputs that come from VI suppliers during a season. Steel boats tend to be bigger, better suited for industrial fishing, and
are subject to different regulations. High capacity boats are boats whose hold capacity is in the upper quartile of the dis-
tribution. Boats without integrated cooling system use ice to keep fish fresh. High technology share of capacity controls for
the share of the firm’s total processing capacity (measured in metric tons per hour and averaged across all active plants
within the firm) that uses steam drying technology. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table B.10: Supplier Behavior, Vertical Integration and Output Quality
Dep. var: Log(Quantity Log(Max. distance Log(Total time




I[VI× supplies owner firm] −0.133∗∗∗ 0.017 −0.013
×I[Plant producing low quality] (0.043) (0.047) (0.031)
I[VI× supplies owner firm] −0.066∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗
×I[Plant producing high quality] (0.029) (0.026) (0.019)
Date FEs Yes Yes Yes
Supplier × Plant × High Quality FEs Yes Yes Yes
N 314,383 136,538 158,918
p-val - Test: two coefficients equal 0.00 0.03 0.04
Notes: One observation is a supplier during a fishing trip. This table is similar to Table 2.5, but with I[VI ×
supplies owner firm] interacted with the quality produced by the downstream plant. Quantity supplied is the amount
of fish the boat delivers to the plant per trip. Max. distance from the plant’s port is maximum distance a spe-
cific boat is observed away from port. Max. distance from the plant’s port can only be measured if the boat leaves
from and arrives at the same port. Total time at sea is the amount of time the boat is away from port per trip.
I[Plant producing high quality] is a dummy equal to one if the plant the supplier delivers to produces only high
quality fishmeal. The number of observations varies from one column to the next as GPS variables for on given
trip are sometimes missing. Standard errors clustered at the boat level are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B.3 How Demand for Output Quality Affects Vertical In-
tegration
In this section, we develop an alternative strategy to the one presented in section 2.5 to
show that firms choose to integrate their suppliers when they face increased demand
for high quality fishmeal. To do so, we develop an IV strategy that exploits quality-
differentiated firm-specific demand shocks. We find that these shocks cause firms to
increase their Share VI.
B.3.1 Empirical strategy
The logic behind our instruments for the quality grade of a firm’s exports at a given
point in time relies on two important facts about the Peruvian fishmeal sector. First,
there is an exceptionally tight link between quality grade and export destination. This
is apparent in the export transactions data, where some destination countries (e.g. Chile
and Japan) consistently buy higher unit price and protein content fishmeal than other
countries.11 Sales records provided by a large firm drive home this connection. Country
names are frequently used as a shorthand to represent different qualities—the quality
column for exports is often simply filled in with the name of a country (e.g. “Thailand
quality”). An increase in demand from high quality importers should thus increase the
quality content of Peruvian fishmeal exports.
The second important fact about the Peruvian fishmeal sector is that the timing of
sales contracts relative to production is typically such that a firm can integrate or sell
suppliers in a given production season in response to high or low demand from partic-
ular importer countries. An industry association informed us that almost all contracts
for a given season’s production are negotiated either before the season starts, or early in
11See Appendix Table B.1 for a list of the main importers of Peruvian fishmeal and the average quality
imported. Note that, as for humans, quantity and quality of feed (the latter here defined by protein
content) are highly imperfect substitutes for the animals that consume fishmeal.
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the season.
In the second stage, we estimate how acquisitions/sales of suppliers and firms’ input
mix respond to the quality grade produced:
VIit = α+ β1Qualityit + γi + δt + εit (B.9)
We control for firm and production season fixed effects and cluster the standard errors
at firm level as in Section 2.7.
To construct our demand shocks, we follow an approach similar to Bastos et al. (2018)
(see also Park et al. (2009); Brambilla et al. (2012)). In the first stage, quality grade pro-
duced is instrumented by demand shocks from specific destinations as follows:






−i,t) + εit (B.10)
where j is an export destination country, and Iji,t¯ S
j
−i,t are our excluded instruments. I
j
i,t¯
is a dummy variable equal to one if firm i exports to destination j at least once during
our analysis period. Sj−i,t is the leave-firm-out share of Peru’s fishmeal exports going to
country j in season t, a proxy for the relative demand for firm i coming from destination
j at a given point in time. Changes in j’s demand should matter more for firms that
previously exported to j, which we capture in the interaction between Sj−i,t and I
j
i,t¯. A
high β j should represent a high quality importer country. We present the results of this
specification in columns 3 and 4 of Appendix Table B.11).
In an alternative approach (presented in columns 5 and 5 of Appendix Table B.11), we
replace Sj−i,t by Quality
j
−i,t, the leave-firm-out average quality of Peru’s fishmeal exports
going to country j in season t. In that case, a positive and high β j represents a high
willingness of Peruvian firms to respond to the higher demand for quality expressed by
other countries. Conversely, a negative β j represents a substitution effect: if an importer
country starts buying higher quality output from other exporters, that same country
would start buying low quality from other firms.
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B.3.2 Results
We find that firms respond to positive shocks to demand for high quality fishmeal by
sourcing a higher share of their inputs from suppliers that have been integrated.12
The OLS and the second stage IV results are reported in Appendix Table B.11. The
estimates indicate that a one percentage point increase in the average protein content
demanded—about 20 percent of approx. 63-68 percent range observed in Peru—induces
the firm to source between 4 and 6 percent more of its inputs from integrated suppliers.
As presented in Table 2.2, most of the variation in the share of inputs sourced from
integrated suppliers comes from acquiring and selling suppliers.
Our interpretation of the results in Appendix Table B.11 is that firms vertically inte-
grate in order to be able to produce high quality output. A potential alternative is that the
liquidity that comes along with greater demand (rather than the demand for quality
itself) may affect firms’ ability to integrate. That is, if firms’ seasonal revenues are ex-
pected to be higher when relative demand for quality is high, they may be better able to
access the capital necessary to vertically integrate, but actually integrate for other rea-
sons than to satisfy the demand for high quality. We address the concern by including
controls for total seasonal sales. This has little effect on the estimated coefficients.
In the first stage, we use the 20 countries that import the most fishmeal from Peru
(see Appendix Table B.1). Since China represents about 50 percent of total exports, we
split China into 4 sub-countries, and we do so by using the destination port within China
of each specific shipment. Our results are very similar if instead we use the 10 biggest
importer countries or we use LASSO regressions to choose the importer countries whose
demand fluctuations most affect quality grade exported.13
12The IV coefficients in columns 3 to 6 are bigger than the OLS coefficients in columns 1 and 2. We
believe this is in part to be expected because the relationship between output quality and vertical integra-
tion at firm level estimated in Table 2.3 partly reflects a causal effect of organizational structure on output
quality and partly other mechanisms. If the OLS estimates in that table are biased upwards, we would
expect the OLS estimates here to be biased downwards, as we study the inverse relationship.
13LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator) is a regression analysis method that performs
both variable selection and regularization in order to enhance the prediction accuracy and interpretability
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Since the existing literature that uses destination country demand shocks for identi-
fication often struggles with weak instruments, we compute the Kleibergen-Paap and
Anderson-Rubin Wald test statistics. Comparing the statistics reported in Table 2.4
to the Stock-Yogo critical values14, while we do not pass the Kleibergen-Paap under-
identification test, we reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are weak (as the
F-statistic surpasses the 10 percent critical value). We also reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients on the excluded instruments are jointly zero when they are included in place
of quality itself in the second stage regression using the Anderson-Rubin Wald test. It
is additionally important to note that weak instruments would bias the IV coefficients
downward, i.e., towards the OLS coefficients, rather than upward. See Bastos et al. (2018)
for a lengthier discussion of this issue in the context of “demand pull” instruments.
The strategic changes in organizational structure in response to changes in the com-
position of demand are consistent with the integration→quality relationship shown in
Section 2.7 and confirm the results shown in section 2.5 that firms integrate when they
face incentives to quality upgrade. We conclude that Peruvian manufacturing firms are
aware of, and act on, their greater ability to produce high quality grade output when
their suppliers have been integrated.
of the statistical model it produces, penalizing the model for including more regressors. LASSO selects
eight importer countries.
14Though Stock-Yogo’s critical values are computed for the homoskedastic case, it is standard practice
to compare the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test statistics to these critical values even when one reports standard
errors that allow for heteroskedasticity.
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Table B.11: Vertically Integrated Share of Inputs and Output Quality - Instrumenting
with Firm-specific Demand Shocks
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
Dep. var: Share of inputs from VI suppliers
OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Protein content 0.028∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.061∗ 0.039∗ 0.042∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.034) (0.033) (0.023) (0.024)
Log(Sales) −0.013 −0.031 −0.020
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016)
Season FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
N 192 192 192 192 192 192
Kleibergen-Paap LM p-value (Under-id) 0.53 0.46 0.53 0.45
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic (Weak inst) 527.3 504.0 962.6 671.75
Anderson-Rubin Wald test p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: One observation is a firm during a production season. Share of inputs from VI suppliers is the share of a firm’s
inputs that come from VI suppliers during a season. Protein content is the quantity weighted average of a measure
of quality inferred with a database that provides weekly prices by quality. The instruments are interactions of indi-
cators for at least one export in our analysis period to each of the top 20 destination countries with leave-firm-out
share of Peru’s fishmeal exports towards the destination in the relevant season (columns 3 and 4) or leave-firm-out
average protein content exported towards the destinatiion in the relevant season (columns 5 and 6). Standard errors
clustered at the firm level are included in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Additional Tables and Figures
Table C.1: HS-Chapter Import Share by Connectedness Status
Not Connected Connected Government Total
Animal/Animal Products 1.1 0.4 0.0 0.9
Vegetable Products 5.8 8.5 0.2 5.1
Foodstuffs 5.8 1.9 0.2 4.4
Mineral Products 16.4 41.0 12.0 18.5
Chemicals/Allied Industries 8.0 4.1 1.9 6.5
Plastics/Rubbers 5.8 1.5 0.6 4.4
Raw Hides, Skins, Leather 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.2
Wood/Wood Products 1.7 1.7 0.9 1.5
Textiles 5.7 1.4 0.2 4.3
Footwear/Headgear 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3
Stone / Glass 1.6 1.5 0.2 1.3
Metals 11.0 9.2 15.8 11.6
Machinery / Electrical 14.9 13.4 30.3 17.4
Transportation 18.4 8.1 27.7 18.8
Miscellaneous 3.1 6.7 9.9 4.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: This table reports share of HS-chapter level imports for connected and not connected
firms and the aggregate import share. Aggregate shares are not the sum of individual shares
but a value-weighted average.
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Table C.2: Robustness check - Import license liberalization and connected sectors
Dep. var: Standardized growth rate
XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX
Connected sectors Non connected sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{Lib}× 1{Post} −0.157∗∗∗ −0.164 0.336∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.115) (0.044) (0.106)
Year FEs Yes No Yes No
HS2 X Year FEs No Yes No Yes
HS6 FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1188 1188 1174 1174
Notes: One observation is a 6 digit product code during fiscal year. 1{Lib} is a dummy equal to one if
the product is in the group of products which are de facto liberalized. The sample only includes the set
od products which are de facto and de jure liberalized or not liberalized. 1{Post} is a dummy equal to one
if the fiscal year considered is greater than 2013, the first fiscal year when the liberalization was imple-
mented. HS2 X Year FEs are 2 digit product codes - fiscal years pairs of fixed effects. Sectors are defined to
be connected if the market share of connected firms in that sector in the pre-reform period is higher than
30 percent. Standard errors are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table C.3: Shipment size and Number of transactions
Dep. var: Log(av. shipment) Number
size) shipments
All Conn. Non conn. All Conn. Non conn.
sectors sectors sectors sectors sectors sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1{Lib}× 1{Post} −0.032∗∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.021 7.953∗∗∗ 6.328∗∗∗ 8.831∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.048) (0.017) (1.793) (1.270) (2.327)
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company X HS6 FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 156,246 25,351 130,895 156,294 25,362 130,932
Notes: On observation is a 6 digit product code on a given fiscal year. This table presents the result of
a standard Difference in Difference model to estimate the effect of import liberalization on the size of
shipments being made and the number of shipments made per year. Variables are defined as in Table
3.2. Standard errors are included in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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